Assess the view that Khrushchevs policies were a failure both at home and abroad between 1955 and 1963.

On a global scale, Khrushchev found himself dealing with a multitude of nations employing a myriad of differing diplomatic methods to deal with the different situations of each nation.  Though Khrushchev’s predecessor, Malenkov, had engineered the concept of “peaceful competition,” it was in fact Khrushchev who applied this policy in foreign relations.  Support of wars for National Liberation formed a significant policy point for Khrushchev.  Soviet aid to foreign countries aimed to gradually undermine the power of the United States abroad; likewise, Khrushchev openly supported countries of non-alignment in the belief that communism would prevail as the superior choice over capitalism for a nation.  One of Khrushchev’s first orders of business involved the Soviet Union’s recognition of Austrian neutrality.  Keylor believes that the removal of Allied (including Soviet) troops from Austria implied that the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate with the West to settle their differences.  However, Soviet rejection of the proposed “open skies” agreement at the Geneva Conference as well as disagreement concerning the political future of Germany did nothing to add to the quelling of differences.  Yet, historian Peter Calvocoressi claims that any possibility of a settling of differences due to the open communication at Geneva was interrupted largely due to the issues in Poland and Hungary.  The Suez Canal Crisis and the ensuing Arab-Israeli War in 1956 strictly redefined allegiances and inadvertently pitted the United States against the Soviet Union.  Although the USSR gained presence in the Middle East, Eisenhower’s fear of this presence led to the Eisenhower Doctrine which would allow the United States to intervene in the Middle East given a situation of armed aggression.  Ultimately, Howarth argues that the peaceful co-existence of communism and capitalism by 1956 had already been challenged.  In China, Khrushchev’s view of Mao prompted the Sino-Soviet split, illustrating that decision-making regarding even Communist regimes would not be well-received.  Unlike China, however, Khrushchev found a common bond with his communist friend Fidel Castro who by 1959 had gained control of Cuba.  After the Bay of Pigs invasion, Khrushchev convinced Castro to allow Russian nuclear missiles to be built on Cuban soil; this decision and the subsequent heated tensions nearly brought the Soviet Union into a war with the United States but resulted in an easily accessible hotline between East and West as well as the removal of American arms in Turkey.  Historian John Merriman contends that although the Cuban Missile Crisis prompted the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it greatly accelerated the arms race between the superpowers.  The escalating situation in East Berlin during this time due to massive emigration from the region compelled Khrushchev to build the Berlin Wall; Calvocoressi believes that Khrushchev’s decision to construct the wall ultimately tested the limits of provocation yet maintained a peaceful control of the superpowers in Berlin.  By the end of 1963, Khrushchev’s decisions may have brought the USSR dangerously close to war but never crossed that line.  

               Soviet tensions with the United States gave way to the entire Cold War, and Khrushchev’s dealings with the Western superpower did neither emphasize nor facilitate peaceful competition.  Aside from each superpower’s involvement in foreign nations, two major “races” defined the policy as well as the competitive aspect of peaceful competition: the arms race and the space race.  Since 1946 with the failure of the Baruch Plan and 1949 with the successful testing of a Russian nuclear weapon, the “arms race” between the Soviet Union and the United States was more concerned with fortification than equalization, according to Calvocoressi.  As the Soviets had rejected the Baruch Plan, the United States rejected the Rapacki Plan to begin clearing nuclear arms from Eastern Europe; by 1957, the Soviets were now in possession of a hydrogen bomb as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), continuing a Soviet trend of domination in modern military technologies.  Although there existed a slight opportunity to diffuse the arms race at the Paris Summit in 1960, the U-2 incident involving American pilot Gary Francis Powers quickly led to the summit’s cancellation.  Calvocoressi argues that the destruction of U-2 plane over Soviet territory hindered East-West rapprochement, giving Khrushchev reason to accelerate his weapons program.  The most evident example of this acceleration came in the form of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The placement of Russian arms so close to the coastline of the United States nearly forced President John F. Kennedy to react militarily, potentially spawning war.  Howarth states that both superpowers from then on noted the brinksmanship of the United States, and Khrushchev’s concession in the subsequent treaty to ban nuclear testing exemplified his desire to avoid war.  Like the arms race, the space race agenda under Khrushchev became one of the Soviet Union’s greatest triumphs over the United States.  In October 1957, SPUTNIK became a major turning point in the peaceful competition of the superpowers; Merriman believes that SPUTNIK made the space race the biggest competition between the superpowers.  American response came during 1958 in the form of NASA, affording Khrushchev even more reason to hasten his space program.  However, the Soviets added to their list of successes by successfully launching Yuri Gagarin into space in May 1961.  Keylor contends that Khrushchev, in successfully launching both a human and a satellite into space before the United States, placed fear in the American public of the launching capabilities of the Soviet’s missiles.  In the end, it was Khrushchev who by 1963 gained apparent superiority in many aspects of technological development.    

        Between 1955 and 1963, Khrushchev successfully navigated the waters of diplomacy in avoiding the outbreak of war, the sum of all international fears.  He did provide a “thaw” in Cold War tensions which likely would not have occurred under the leadership of Stalin.  Many historians attempt to attribute his success in subverting war to his flamboyancy, his love of travel, and his outgoing personality.  However, the price of this success came in the form of crumbling relations with the United States and even the satellite states in the Soviet Union.  After Stalin, the Soviet people as well as the international community found reprieve and the possibility of ending Cold War tensions through Khrushchev.  Although he was unable to destroy the barriers separating East and West, he, unlike Stalin, made a conscious effort to achieve some semblance of peaceful co-existence; in fact, some may say that he reinforced these barriers, as seen in the symbol of the Berlin Wall.  Yet, Khrushchev may have spared the world another war by maintaining these boundaries between East and West.  Had he attempted to completely dominate or completely undermine in world politics, backlash against the recovering superpower could have been devastating.  Through the vehicle of history and the privilege of hindsight, Khrushchev’s role in the Cold War may have been the most significant road bump to or the greatest savior of international peace in modern history.