The conflict of Vilna was involved Lithuania and Poland. Vilna was proclaimed the capital of Lithuania after both these countries regained their independence. However, most of the population of Vilna was Polish, and a Polish army took control of the city during the Polish-Soviet war in 1920 (Wikipedia). The League of Nations did not physically intervene. In September 1931 the Japanese held control of the South Manchurian Railway. The Japanese then claimed that the Chinese sabotaged the railway and occupies Manchuria, renaming it Manchukuo. The League of Nations found Japan to be guilty and demanded it give Manchuria back to China. The report for the return of Manchuria passed 42-1 with only Japan against it (Wikipedia). After seeing this, Japan left the League and no sanctions or restrictions were placed upon it by the League of Nations.
C. Evaluation of Sources
Source A (Appendix 2)
Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Proclamation 2141 Prohibiting the Export of Arms and Ammunition to Ethiopia and Italy.” October 5 1935.
This source is a proclamation written by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935, during the second Italo-Abyssinian war. This document was written to inform all the members of the League of Nations what was considered contraband during the war and hence was not to be exported to either of the belligerent states. Nonetheless, this proclamation also had another purpose; to make it seem as if the U.S. were really bent over on keeping peace. However, it was well known at the time that Italy had no need for weaponry; what it needed was steel, coal and oil (none of which were banned in Roosevelt’s proclamation) (Morgan 142).
The most important value of this document is the fact that the U.S. did not place any restrictions on oil, steel or coal suggesting that it was following the interests of Britain and France (not to provoke Italy into causing another war). Another value of this document is that it shows that although the U.S. had isolationist policies at the time, it intervened to restore peace as fast as possible. This can be understood by analysing its reputation for being the “peacekeeper” of Europe (Wilson’s fourteen points); a reputation it clearly wanted to keep. A limitation of this source is that the U.S. was not a member of the League of Nations and was too far away to be directly threatened by Italy. This means that the U.S. could place restrictions on Italy practically without any fear, which leads to the last limitation: this source does not in any way show how willing Roosevelt was to enforce his restrictions.
Source B (Appendix 3)
Wilkinson, Richard. "Pierre Laval: The Man in the White Tie: Richard Wilkinson Exposes Prejudice and Myth in Assessing the Career of a Key Figure in Modern French History." History Review 48 (2004): 1.
This document is from a journal called The History Review, a journal from University College Dublin where history postgraduates can write articles. The purpose of this article is to discuss the Hoare-Laval pact and see if it really should have been seen as an insult and an offence to Abyssinia and global peace. As a second hand source written many years after the events took place, it is completely objective and the writer had many documents available to him which were most certainly not available to the public at the time of the conflict. Also, the fact that only history postgraduates can write articles in this journal indicates that the writer has studied history and his information is therefore reliable (further confirmed by his citation of sources).
The most important value of this article is the lines in which Sir Sidney Barton’s (the British ambassador in Ethiopia) opinion is shown. The opinion of this expert in international affairs was that France and Britain should “tell Italy that she cannot have Ethiopia.” He knew this was the only way to avoid a conflict, but his superiors chose to go on with appeasement. This is what led to the secrecy of the Hoare-Laval pact. A limitation of this document, however, is that as a secondary source, it does not serve to analyze things such as the impact of the pact on the public.
D. Analysis
The first question that arises from reading all the information above is, why was Mussolini so bent over on taking over Ethiopia? It is clear that Mussolini wanted Ethiopia regardless of the consequences because he completely disregarded many old treaties, something that could’ve proven disastrous if the great powers of Europe had not been so involved in their own interests. Nonetheless, Mussolini thought that Italy’s “place in the sun” was a top priority. He clearly did not seek to take over this nation for economic wealth because even after Ethiopia was under Italian control its economic losses outweighed its benefits.
There is one cause for Mussolini’s eagerness to take Ethiopia and his willingness to ignore the League of Nations, and that is nationalism. At home Mussolini faced a decadent economy due to his elevated prices on exports that were slowly decreasing and a relatively weak army compared to European standards (Evans 116). As many leaders chose to do when things go wrong at home, Mussolini looked for foreign conflicts that could spur Italian nationalism and fortify Italian pride, keeping his reputation safe. This also accounts for Italy’s involvement in the Corfu incident, where The League again chose to do nothing. It is also possible that Mussolini learned from past experiences such as this one and knew that the League of Nations would not try hard to stop him. This accounts for his deliberate and overwhelming use of poison gases, sometimes even spreading them from airplanes like pesticides.
Why, though, did the League of Nations do absolutely nothing to stop Italy, Japan or Poland in the conflicts of Ethiopia, Vilna and Manchuria? There is a simple chain of events that lead to this. First of all, the League of Nations states that if it is to get involved in an armed conflict it must do so with armies from the strongest nations in the League. This meant that if the League were to militarily intervene, Britain and France would be the ones to supply these armed forces with their soldiers. Therefore, if The League intervened, France would have to send a large portion of its forces all the way to China, weakening the Stresa Front and increasing the risk of a German invasion. Consequently, if France did not fight, Britain would not fight alone, so in the end whenever a mayor international conflict rose, the League did nothing to stop it because its members were too busy following their own interests. This obviously caused all aggressive nations to ignore the sanctions placed upon them by the League because they knew the members of the League would be too busy to enforce them.
In the case of Italy, however, things were a little difference. Britain and France rejected intervention not only because of troop mobilization but because of their relations with Italy. Both countries knew very well that if they were to impose harsh sanctions upon Italy, the latter would be enraged and more likely to join in an alliance with Germany, further jeopardizing French security because now France would risk an invasion from the north and the south. This is why the Hoare-Laval pact was decided upon. Britain and France knew that Italy would not stop until taking over all of Ethiopia. This pact was the last attempt to satisfy Italy’s thirst for East Africa while allowing part of Ethiopia to remain independent. However, since the agreement leaked to the press it was abandoned, leading to a policy of appeasement on Italy that would further prove the League’s inefficiency as a peacemaker during the interwar years.
E. Conclusion
In conclusion it can be said that based on all the information I have analyzed in this investigation, the Italo-Ethiopian war was a very significant factor in impeding the League of Nations to act as an effective peace-maker in the inter-war years. Because Britain and France were in a very weak position they could not be too harsh with Italy. However, Mussolini was stubborn and proud, and completely disregarded any restrictions set upon him by the League, further complicating its role. In my sources I analyzed the attempts of three powerful nations to stop Italy without provoking it into a war, and how ironically by being benevolent; they caused the war they were trying to avoid.
F. List of Sources & Word Count
Word Count:
Part A: 143 words
Part B: 647 words
Part C: 496 words
Part D: 595 words
Part E: 116 words
Total: 1997 words
Books:
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Evans, David. Mussolini's Italy. Second Edition. London: Hodder Headline, 2005.
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Knight, Patricia. Mussolini and Fascism. First Edition. London: Routledge, 2003.
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Lee, Stephen J. The European Dictatorships 1918-1945. First Edition. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1987.
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Morgan, Philip. Italian Fascism 1919-1945. First Edition. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995.
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Robson, Mark. Italy: Liberalism and Fascism 1870-1945. Second Edition. London: Bookpoint Ltd, 2000.
Journal Articles:
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Wilkinson, Richard. "Pierre Laval: The Man in the White Tie: Richard Wilkinson Exposes Prejudice and Myth in Assessing the Career of a Key Figure in Modern French History." History Review 48 (2004): 1.
Web Pages :
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"Ethiopia." Answers. 01 January 2003. CIA World Fact Book, 2004/Ethiopia. 23 Mar 2008 <http://www.answers.com/topic/cia-world-fact-book-2004-ethiopia>.
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"League of Nations." Wikipedia. 22 Mar 2008. Wikipedia. 23 Mar 2008 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Nations>.
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United Nations, "Geneva Convention." United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2002. United Nations. 12 Mar 2008 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>.
Speeches:
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Statement on Encouraging Peace in Ethiopia.” The League of Nations. August 1 1935.
- Selassie, Haile. “Appeal to the League of Nations.” The League of Nations. June, 1936.
Official Documents:
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Proclamation 2141 Prohibiting the Export of Arms and Ammunition to Ethiopia and Italy.” October 5 1935.
Appendices:
Appendices
Appendix 1: (Map of Italian possessions in 1940)
Knight, Patricia. Mussolini and Fascism. First Edition. London: Routledge, 2003.
Appendix 2: (Source A)
Whereas Section 1 of a Joint Resolution of Congress, entitled "Joint Resolution Providing for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerent countries; the prohibition of the transportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war by vessels of the United States for the use of belligerent States; for the registration and licensing of persons engaged in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing arms, ammunition, or implements of war; and restricting travel by American citizens on belligerent ships during war," approved August 31, 1935, provides in part as follows:
"That upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between, or among, two or more foreign states, the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States, or possessions of the United States, to any port of such belligerent States, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, a belligerent country."
And whereas it is further provided by Section 1 of the said Joint Resolution that—
"The President, by proclamation, shall definitely enumerate the arms, ammunition, or implements of war, the export of which is prohibited by this Act."
AND WHEREAS it is further provided by Section 1 of the said Joint Resolution that—
"Whoever, in violation of any of the provisions of this section, shall export, or attempt to export, or cause to be exported, arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States, or any of its possessions, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and the property, vessel, or vehicle containing the same shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 1 to 8, inclusive, Title 6, Chapter 30, of the Act approved June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 223-225; U.S.C., Title 22, Secs. 238-245) ."
Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred on me by the said Joint Resolution of Congress, do hereby proclaim that a state of war unhappily exists between Ethiopia and the Kingdom of Italy; and I do hereby admonish all citizens of the United States or any of its possessions and all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States or its possessions to abstain from every violation of the provisions of the Joint Resolution above set forth, hereby made effective and applicable to the export of arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States or its possessions to Ethiopia or to the Kingdom of Italy, or to any Italian possession, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use of, Ethiopia or the Kingdom of Italy.
And I do hereby declare and proclaim that the articles listed below shall be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purposes of Section 1 of the said Joint Resolution of Congress:
CATEGORY I
(1) Rifles and carbines using ammunition in excess of cal. 26.5, and their barrels;
(2) Machine guns, automatic rifles, and machine pistols of all calibers, and their barrels;
(3) Guns, howitzers, and mortars of all calibers, their mountings and barrels;
(4) Ammunition for the arms enumerated under (1) and (2) above, i.e., high-power steel-jacketed ammunition in excess of cal. 26.5; filled and unfilled projectiles and propellants with a web thickness of .015 inch or greater for the projectiles of the arms enumerated under (3) above;
(5) Grenades, bombs, torpedoes, and mines, filled or unfilled, and apparatus for their use or discharge;(6) Tanks, military armored vehicles, and armored trains.
CATEGORY II
Vessels of war of all kinds, including aircraft carriers and submarines.
CATEGORY III
(1) Aircraft, assembled or dismantled, both heavier and lighter than air, which are designed, adapted, and intended for aerial combat by the use of machine guns or of artillery or for the carrying and dropping of bombs or which are equipped with, or which by reason of design or construction are prepared for, any of the appliances referred to in paragraph (2) below;
(2) Aerial gun mounts and frames, bomb racks, torpedo carriers, and bomb or torpedo release mechanisms.
CATEGORY IV
Revolvers and automatic pistols of a weight in excess of 1 pound 6 ounces (630 grams), using ammunition in excess of cal. 26.5, and ammunition therefor.
CATEGORY V
(1) Aircraft, assembled or dismantled, both heavier and lighter than air, other than those included in Category III;
(2) Propellers or air screws, fuselages, hulls, tail units, and under-carriage units;(3) Aircraft engines.
CATEGORY VI
(1) Livens projectors and flame throwers;
(2) Mustard gas, lewisite, ethyldichlorarsine, and methyldichlorarsine.
And I do hereby enjoin upon all officers of the United States, charged with the execution of the laws thereof, the utmost diligence in preventing violations of the said Joint Resolution, and this my proclamation issued thereunder, and in bringing to trial and punishment any offenders against the same.
Franklin D Roosevelt’s “Proclamation 2141” (October 5 1935).
Appendix 3: (Source B)
'L'Accord Laval-Hoare'
So far as I am aware, no historian defends the Hoare-Laval pact. Yet there is a case for the pact in general and for Laval's conduct in particular. As a realist Laval never forgot three 'given' facts. First, Mussolini's Italians had invaded Abyssinia and, unless something was done quickly, would conquer the whole country. Secondly, the League of Nations faced terminal decline. After Abyssinia's emperor Halle Selassie had appealed to the League against Italian aggression, Article 16 of the Covenant had been adopted which in theory committed member states to economic sanctions, and then to force. But in practice the sanctions imposed did not include oil--the only commodity which Mussolini could not do without. This was because it was believed that oil sanctions would prompt Mussolini to declare war on Britain and France, the main upholders of the League. Thirdly, the British government was determined not to go to war with Italy--and France would not fight alone.
It was all very sad. Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia supported by bombing and poisoned gas was exploitation of a backward people. The League's claim to be an international policeman was worryingly threadbare. As for the British, 'our man in Addis Ababa' Sir Sidney Barton got it right: 'Personally I can think of only one course likely to prevent perpetration of an international crime and that would be for England and France to tell Italy that she cannot have Ethiopia'. The refusal of the British government to implement this advice left Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, speechless. It was Laval's great merit, while deploring these unpleasant facts, that at least he accepted them.
What was to be done? One alternative was to do nothing while Mussolini completed his campaign and the League was totally humiliated. No doubt another commission would report, along the lines of Lytton's whitewash after Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931. The other alternative was to do a deal which would preserve some of Abyssinia for its emperor and some credibility for the League. This was the rationale behind the pact negotiated by Hoare and Laval in Paris on 8 and 9 December 1935. Its essence was that Italy would keep the land which she had so far conquered while Abyssinia would be compensated with access to the sea. Laval stressed that the terms agreed in Paris were merely proposals to be submitted to Mussolini, Haile Selassie and the League. Were they too generous to Mussolini? Laval argued that, as the Italians were winning, they could hardly be expected to call off their campaign for anything less. He was probably right. But the pact was leaked to the Paris press. The British public had an attack of righteousness. Baldwin's government disowned both pact and Foreign Secretary, who resigned in tears. 'No more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris', quipped the dying George V. The pact was dead and buried.
Two points are worth reiterating. First, Hoare-Laval was in the circumstances a reasonable project. At least something would have been saved from the wreck. In the event, the results of the plan's abandonment were far worse: the conquest of Abyssinia, Mussolini's alliance with Hitler, Hitler's opportunistic remilitarisation of the Rhineland a few weeks later. As for the League, 'half a League, half a League onwards', joked a cynic. Second, Britain comes badly out of the whole wretched business. There was little excuse for the government's pusillanimous abandonment of the plan which in essence it had approved beforehand.
Laval, on the other hand, emerges with credit. He displayed consistent realism and pursued consistent objectives: the preservation of the Stresa Front in which France, Britain and Italy opposed German rearmament, the curtailment of Abyssinia's ordeal, the preservation of the League of Nations, the maintenance of Anglo-French cooperation. Leon Blum ranted: 'You have reduced everything to your minor jobberies', while he himself advocated military alliance with the USSR. But Laval's scepticism was justified by later events: the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the partition of Poland.
Fragment of the article "Pierre Laval: The Man in the White Tie: Richard Wilkinson Exposes Prejudice and Myth in Assessing the Career of a Key Figure in Modern French History,” by Richard Wilkinson of The History Review (2005).
