Historiography:
- 3 main principles of the Declaration of Principles ensured that both parties wouldn’t take advantage over the other, lead to maintaining their current relations
-
Oslo had a positive domino effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict
- King Hussein: chance to improve relations with US, which was damaged because of Jordan’s alliance with Iraq during the Persian Gulf War
- Hafez al-Assad : his reassessment to improve Syria-Israel relations
- A preparation for final negotiations for borders and security of the Palestinian state, but there was still disagreement on Palestinian return to homeland and Jerusalem as a capital
- Oslo Declaration of Principles was vague and cautious when attempting to negotiate the final outcomes of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees
- Significance in the recognition of both parties’ legitimacy and the right to exist
Camp David Peace Talk (2000)
- Mediator : US
- Place: Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, on July 11 near the end of Clinton’s presidency
- Focus of negotiation
- Final settlement of Palestinians and Israel
- Palestinian right of return
- Jerusalem as a religious and political capital
-
Arafat refused Barak’s suggestion, of Israel giving back most of West Bank occupied territory since 1967 and the Muslim and Christian areas in Jerusalem
- (July 18) Barak proposed limited Palestinian resettlement in Israel under international supervision
- Arafat’s view
- Palestinian right over East Jerusalem and their homeland, indicating his refusal to acknowledge Israel’s existence
- East Jerusalem was part of Israel’s promise of “land for peace”
- Israel refused to give up East Jerusalem
- Arafat wanted control over the Haram al-Sharif
- Clinton, US President, stated that both Palestinians and Israel accepted his proposal and both sides reached a limited agreement
- Produced the Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David on July 25, 2000
Aftermath and Significance:
- Steady growing Israeli settlement on the West Bank since the Oslo Accords, reached its peak in 2000
-
(September, 2000) clash between Palestinian refugees and Israeli soldiers in Jerusalem, suicide attacks on Israel settlement in West Bank and Gaza, known as the Intifada
- Camp David was part of a series of bilateral talks between Israel, Syria, and the Palestinians, mediated by the United States, had the potential to extend beyond Oslo
Historiography:
- Camp David was too hasty since Clinton’s presidency was ending
- Palestinian capitulation lead to failure to reach a final agreement,
-
a peace ceremony intended for Clinton’s glory and to cover his Lewinsky scandal
- the approach of Barak and Clinton was ambiguous, meaning Israel had no definite plan
Section C: Evaluation of Sources
Source 1: The Oslo Declaration of Principles, September 13, 1993
The Oslo Declaration of Principles is a primary source drafted by the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization on September 13, 1993. The purpose of this declaration is for Israel and the Palestinians to recognize their legitimacy and mutual rights of existence and to commit themselves to negotiating a permanent settlement to improve relations between the two parties. The value is that it provides candid insights into some of the important issues that were discussed, such as troop withdrawal, in the meeting between the two sides, and it also reflects the perspectives of the people, such as Rabin and Arafat, involved in the negotiation. The limitations of this primary source include its vagueness in its proposal for negotiation. Instead of providing a definitive solution over some of key issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the problem of Palestinian refugees, this document only serves as a framework for future peace talks due to its lack of details. Also, the document may not reflect the real discussion during the Oslo process, since it is a declaration released to the public.
Source 2: The Trilateral Statement issued by the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians on the Camp David Summit, July 25, 2000
The Trilateral statement is a primary document issued cooperatively by the United States, the Israelis, and the Palestinians on July 25th, 2000, the last day of the Camp David Summit. The purpose of this statement is to display the principles aimed to guide the negotiations on permanent status between Israel and the Palestinians that the three parties, which included the United States, agreed upon during the summit. This document is valuable in revealing the negotiation over the essential issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, during the meeting. The limitations include its lack of outcomes and scope in the measures proposed for permanent future negotiations. Also, it may have been manipulated to hide the actual views of the negotiators, so that the information released to the public would not be controversial.
Section D: Analysis
The Oslo Accords and the Camp David Summit were intended to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Oslo Accords was part of the overall negotiation to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1990s. This negotiation happened after the Persian Gulf War, in which there was tension between US, who supported Israel, and the Arab states, when Jordan allied with Iraq during the war. On the other hand, Camp David, which failed to in determining a final solution for the conflict, was a relatively hasty peace talk. It was important to address it happened when the US President tried to recover from his Lewinsky scandal.
The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David in July 2000 was mainly between President Clinton of the United States, the Israeli Prime Minister Barak, and Arafat the PLO leader. It was an unsuccessful attempt in achieving “an agreement on permanent status” to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in which there had been a parallel effort to achieve peace since the 1970s, and as a build-up upon the positive results of the earlier 1978 Camp David Accords, there was confidence in achieving negotiation. However, due to various reasons suggested by historians with different perspectives, Camp David was a failure in attempting for the final settlement of the conflict.
Occurring at the end of Clinton’s presidency, there was a sense of urgency in the negotiations. This was because of Clinton’s desire to produce a peace ceremony based on Palestinian capitulation that would “forever enshrine his presidency” and camouflage Lewinsky scandal. Despite the pressure he put on Israel and Arafat, and due to the unprepared status of the both sides to “give up their dreams”, the negotiation failed. As supported by Dore Gold, the President of the , the summit failed in addressing the different views of the two sides over Jerusalem.Mahmoud Abbas, the current chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, also supported the idea that Camp David was unable to settlement the opposition between the Palestinians and Israelis.
It was expected that the Camp David Negotiations would reach a more definitive proposal. Originally, Clinton’s plan was to extend the 1993 Oslo Accords to achieve an agreement of the coexistence of a Palestinian state with Israel. However, the summit, considered to be a continuation of Oslo, failed to go beyond the peace talk of 1993. In addition, its aftermath of increasing clash between the Palestinians and Israelis was contradictory to its objective of achieving peace.
For the Oslo Accords, Tyler’s argument recognized that Oslo didn’t achieve an agreement on the problem of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem. While Tyler was an experienced journalist who had access to different sources of information, the strength of his interpretation lied in looking at the major outcomes of the Oslo Accord. Although Tyler had a relatively negative attitude towards the flaws in the Middle East peace process, he acknowledged the significant domino effect Oslo has on the overall scope of Arab-Israeli relations. He mentioned that there was the reassessment of Jordan and Syria in their relations with Israel. Tyler’s interpretation was able to reflect the interrelation between the Palestinians, Israel, and other Arab states, which could have a huge impact on the extensive negotiations of Oslo, such as in the Gaza Strip-Jericho Area Agreement.
However, Helmick’s interpretation was that the Oslo Accord was not a functional agreement. Although the Declaration of Principles recognized the legitimacy of both Palestinians and Israel, it was too open-ended in trying to achieve a definitive plan. Although Helmick worked for many years as a mediator in various political conflicts, his interpretation only focused on the core of the Oslo. On the other hand, Ben-Dor’s essay on the Middle East Peace Process provides a broad context of the Oslo Accord. He mentioned that the Paris Protocol, which could be considered a close extension of Oslo, emphasized on the economic cooperation between Israel and Palestinians. His argument was strong in focusing on the overall influence of the Oslo Accord while considering other historical views as well. Overall what was realized is that the Oslo Accord was a negotiation primarily between the two parties with little external pressure (such as the US), and it was a breakthrough in trying to resolve the conflict on both diplomatic and economic levels. There was the consideration of dealing with the political opposition between the two sides and the social and economic stability of both peoples. Ben-Dor’s argument was strong and reliable in helping to answer our investigation.
Section E: Conclusion
While both the Oslo Accords and Camp David had the same objective of promoting peace and reaching a non-temporary agreement, they produced different outcomes that had huge impacts on the Palestinian-Israeli relations. The Oslo Accord was significant in trying to reach an agreement between the Palestinians and Israel from both political and economic aspects. It had the aim of promoting peace between the two authorities and achieving stability for the civilians. Conversely, the urgency and desperation in Camp David contributed to its fatal flaw of struggling to reach a final agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis, leaving many key issues, such as Jerusalem, to be unresolved. While the Oslo Accord provided an opportunity to thaw the tension between the two sides, Camp David lead to nowhere but escalation of violence.
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