Evaluation of Sources
Source A, Mein Kampf , was published prior to WWII began in 1939 and the Irish editor James Murphy was the authorized translator of Hitler’s speeches. The book’s function is to publicize Hitler’s ideology to the masses. This version of the book is useful as Murphy consulted Hitler for the precise significance and English translation. It is heavily prejudiced towards Nazi views because Murphy was an official propagandist on behalf of them. In the beginning he claims that Hitler was under “emotional stress” when writing Mein Kampf13. In spite of this, the book is an insight into Hitler’s wits, written in his own terminology, and providing quotes to investigate as to the importance of beliefs and Lebensraum. Its limitations loll in its publication date and content; Hitler is often unclear on his view on how to continue with his plans, and as a primary source it gives only one story of events. The book was published before the start of World War II, and as a result Hitler could not comment on changes that may have occurred in his ideas during that time.
Source B, a historical journal, dates from 1999 and an assortment of historians writes an analysis of 7 different books on the start of WWII. The author, Philip M. H. Bell, is a senior research colleague at the University of Liverpool and an expert on European international relations during the 1930's and 1940's. The source's intent is to critically assess equally revisionist and traditionalist point of view, which Bell does well by taking into account the background of each author and the strong point of the historical evidence they present for their arguments. Bell outlines Hitler's Lebensraum thoughts and other authorities on his foreign policy, providing comprehensive conditions to WWII. As Bell is English, he has an evident degree of objectivity as of the events, and is able to note on biases from Soviet and German perspectives. Until now the books and theories it reviews restrict the journal; all of the authors are Western and there is no consideration of Oriental or Russian sources. The speculations under deliberation are all modern-day ones, which hamper their validity in respect to the lapse of time, but enable them to represent a better portrait of events than past historians.
Analysis
There are four main causes attributed to Operation Barbarossa:
- Hitler assumed Russia was weak and easy to triumph over as a result of the Winter War
- Ideological differences among Russia and Germany
- Russian assault on the border
- German military upsurge
The strongest verification on behalf of the first grounds lies in the change in Hitler’s plans for the assault. He had originally designed to invade before the winter, a lesson he drew from the losses sustained by Soviets during the Winter War. As the Russians hadn’t achieved a absolute defeat over a minor army, Hitler had excellent reason to trust that his army of 3 million men would crush Russian forces. News of the Russian failure with defensive gains assured Hitler that if he couldn’t triumph over all of Russia, he would at least obtain something. It is debatable whether Hitler would have invaded Russia solely because the Winter War had weakened them. Russia’s large army and the area to be dominated would have presented extensive obstacles.
The second reason is more persuasive. According to Mein Kampf, Hitler determined before 1939 that Russia would be the purpose of his colonial plans. His chatter of establishing colonies in Russia was a consequence of his belief that Bolshevism offered a danger to the safety of the Third Reich. Woodruff D. Smith bickered that Germany “deliberately went to war in the East to achieve an end, Lebensraum”. This observation is shared and long-drawn-out by Geoffrey Stoakes, who believes Lebensraum would have finished Germany the “master” of Europe. These ideological differences predestined that a war was to be anticipated as long as attitudes towards each one of other remained hostile (regardless of the outcome of other wars, such as the Winter War). The opinionated connotation of the war and supremacy over Europe are stronger motives for incursion than mere weakness on the branch of the Russians.
Allegations of German military buildup on the border are dismissed as unsupported by Jorgen Forster, who accepts as true that Hitler feared concessions to the Soviets more than Stalin’s tanks. This position is extremely one-sided as it is complicated to know what exactly Hitler was afraid of, since Mein Kampf aimed to paint an image of a brave leader. There are other opinions for antagonism on the German side. Their drive for expansion was an aggressive notion that was bound to be resisting at some point. German emphasis on rearmament threatened the security of Russia and all of Europe.18 This argument is equivalent to that of placing all blame for WWII on Germany; idealistic in light of other factors at the era.
Revisionists see Russian aggression as the trigger of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler prepared mass militarization on the basis of reported Russian movement, acting under a “security dilemma” according to Norman Rich. Adolf von Thadden, a German nationalist historian, believes there was considerable evidence of Soviet military buildup for Hitler to have had legal reasons for launching a preventative strike on Russia18. Although his views are right wing, the cross over of Soviet troops into German territory and mass mobilization of Russian soldiers in the state can be seen as valid reasons for Germany to stand up for itself.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Winter War played a role in the development of Operation Barbarossa, with Hitler relying on accounts of Soviet army “Achilles' heel” and trying to diagram the invasion before the severe winter came. The fatalities suffered by the Soviets in the Winter War led Hitler to develop into overconfident of Germany’s capabilities. However, Russia’s partial defeat was not the aim behind the invasion. The ideological differences connecting the two nations and Russia’s aggression caused anticipatory measures to be taken by Germany, which ultimately led to its’ defeat in WWII. Even so, planning for Operation Barbarossa commenced during the Winter War and Hitler relied on old armed forces intelligence gathered all through the Winter War to draw up his plans, so it can be said that the war picked up the pace Hitler’s plans.
List of Sources
Books
Juutilainen, Antti And Jari Leskinen, ed. Talvisodan Pikkujättiläinen. Finland: WSOY, 1999.
Young, Peter, ed. The World Almanac of World War II: The Complete and Comprehensive
Documentary of World War II. USA: Bison Books, 1981.
Historical journals
Bell, Philip M. H. Untitled Review. The Historical Journal, Vol. 32 No. 3 (1999). Gorman, James. “Endangered Species.” Review of The Last American Man, by Elizabeth Gilbert. New York Times Book Review, June 2, 2002.
Erickson, John. “Untitled Review”. Review of Germany and the Second World War Vol. IV: The Attack on the Soviet Union, by Horst Boog, Jurgen Forster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf- Dieter Muller and Gerd R. Ueberschar. The English Historical Review, Vol. 115 No. 460 (2000): 167
Hilderbrand, Klaus. “Hitler’s War Aims”. The Journal of Moden History Vol. 48 No. 3 (1976). Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf. "The Third Reich, 1933-1945: A Sketch," in Contemporary Germany: Politics and Culture, ed. Charles Burdick, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, and Winfried Kudszus (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984)
Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf. "The Third Reich, 1933-1945: A Sketch," in Contemporary Germany: Politics and Culture, ed. Charles Burdick, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, and Winfried Kudszus (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984)
Nikolaieff, A. M. “The Red Army in the Second World War”. Russian Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (1947).
Website
Barnes and Noble. "The Origins of the Second World War in Europe".
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-Origins-of-the-Second-World-War-in-Europe/Bell-PMH- Bell-PMH/e/9780582304703/?itm=2 (accessed 7 Apr 2011)
Lieutenant General Dukhanov. “The report of the Ninth Army commander to the High Commander of the Leningrad Military District on steps and advancing of troops in the planned offensive”. Trans. Pauli Kruhse and Lahja Huovila. In The State War Archives of Russia 10 (1939). http://www.histdoc.net/history/doklad.html (accessed 13 Apr 2011)
Noakes, Jeremy. “Hitler and 'Lebensraum' in the East”. BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_lebensraum_05.shtml (accessed 16 Apr 2011)
“Operation Barbarossa”. Olive-Drab, http://www.olive- drab.com/od_history_ww2_ops_battles_1941barbarossa.php (accessed 4 Apr 2011)
“Operation Barbarossa”. Spartacus Educational. http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSbarbarossa.htm (accessed 4 Apr 2011)
Ries, Tomas. “Lessons of the Winter War”. Virtual Finland: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25937 (accessed 5 Apr 2011)
Evaluation of Source
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Edited by James Vincent Murphy (London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd, 1939), http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt (accessed 7 Apr 2011)
Tomas Ries, “Lessons of the Winter War”, Virtual Finland: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25937
Lieutenant General Dukhanov, “The report of the Ninth Army commander to the High Commander of the Leningrad Military District on steps and advancing of troops in the planned offensive”, trans. Pauli Kruhse and Lahja Huovila, in The State War Archives of Russia 10 (1939) http://www.histdoc.net/history/doklad.html
PeterYoung,ed.,TheWorldAlmanacofWorldWarII:TheCompleteandComprehensiveDocumentaryofWorldWar II (USA: Bison Books, 1981), 110
Dr.TomasRies,“LessonsoftheWinterWar”,VirtualFinland:MinistryforForeignAffairsofFinland, http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25937
Jari Leskinen and Antti Juutilainen, ed., Talvisodan Pikkujättiläinen (Finland: WSOY,1999), 811
Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSbarbarossa.htm
Peter Young, ed., The World Almanac of World War II: The Complete and Comprehensive Documentary of World War II (USA: Bison Books, 1981), 109-11
Klaus Hilderbrand, “Hitler’s War Aims”, The Journal of Moden History Vol. 48 No. 3 (1976): 529
A. M. Nikolaieff, “The Red Army in the Second World War”, Russian Review Vol. 7 No. 1 (1947): 52
“Operation Barbarossa”, Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSbarbarossa.htm
Jeremy Noakes, “Hitler and 'Lebensraum' in the East”, BBC,
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, "The Third Reich, 1933-1945: A Sketch," in Contemporary Germany: Politics and Culture, ed. Charles Burdick, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, and Winfried Kudszus (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 36
Adolf Hitler, “Mein Kampf”, ed. James Vincent Murphy (London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd, 1939), http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt
P. M. H. Bell, Untitled Review, The Historical Journal, Vol. 32 No. 3 (1999)
Barnes and Noble, http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-Origins-of-the-Second-World-War-in-Europe/Bell-PMH- Bell-PMH/e/9780582304703/?itm=2
Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSbarbarossa.htm
“Operation Barbarossa”, Olive-Drab, http://www.olive- drab.com/od_history_ww2_ops_battles_1941barbarossa.php
Philip M. H. Bell, Untitled Review, The Historical Journal, Vol. 32 No. 3 (1999): 742-743
John Erickson, Untitled Review, review of Germany and the Second World War Vol. IV: The Attack on the Soviet Union, by Horst Boog, Jurgen Forster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Muller and Gerd R. Ueberschar, The English Historical Review, Vol. 115 No. 460 (2000): 167
Klaus Hilderbrand, “Hitler’s War Aims”, The Journal of Moden History Vol. 48 No. 3 (1976): 529