people that they now had “liberty, peace and rights” and in 1959 still spoke of rights
and freedom. However, Encinosa describes how in 1960, Castro became an ally of
the communist with the betrayal of his former democratic beliefs and allies. Cachan
writes of how on the other hand, Stalin had always been devoted to communism
since and before his entrance to the Bolshevik party. Under Lenin, and later Stalin,
the party did not change its communist stance, although constant adaptations were
made, such as Lenin’s Economic Policies and Stalin’s ‘Revolution in One Country’
policy. Hence the difference in the introduction of communism was that under Stalin,
Russia continued the Bolshevik Party’s communist stance; whereas Castro switched
alliances from his original democracy to communism in 1960.
Party policies also played a crucial role in the rise of Castro and the Bolshevik Party
(first Lenin, then Stalin). A similarity can be seen with the party promises of Cuban
“Liberty, peace and rights” and the Soviet “Peace, bread and land,” although they
were of different ideologies at the time. Sweig describes how Castro’s promises of an
honest government and ‘Liberty, peace and rights’ appealed to the Cuban people,
who had rarely experienced such concepts during their 48 years as a independent
country. Lee writes how similarly the Bolshevik party’s promises of ‘peace, bread and
land’ held appeal for the Russian people, who were impoverished by the
continuation of involvement within the war. Cachan writes of how Stalin’s
‘Revolution in one country’ stance of communism also was of great appeal to
Russians who in their state of chaos did not have the resource to follow Lenin and
Trotsky’s view of communism throughout the world. Thus although it had not been
in keeping with traditional views to communism, Stalin focused the revolution into
Russia, and so increased the rate at which it would recover from the effects of war.
Both Castro’s and Stalin’s policies laid the foundation for which they gained
popularity and rose within their respective single party states.
A crucial aspect in the rise of both Castro and Stalin was their propaganda. The main
difference between their respective propaganda lay in the fact hat Castro needed no
other weapon than his voice, whilst Stalin was not a strong orator, and relied on
other methods of propaganda also. Skierka speaks of Castro’s surpassing ability,
which he was able to wield at will to draw forth any emotion he desired. An example
of this is Castro’s speech against President Urrutia, which aroused the Cuban people
to the extent that Urrutia was forced to flee before he was lynched. Castro’s
speeches were long and constant- two-four hours, two-three times a week. These
often undermined the authority of the democratic government, whilst winning
support for Castro himself.
In contrast, Stalin’s speeches did not draw the response that Castro commanded.
Often a mixture of coercion was assimilated during his speeches, with the last to
react appropriately would be shot by guards. Tucker writes of how Stalin utilised
photos as a method of propaganda to manipulate the viewer’s perspective, as in the
1920 phot of Lenin giving a speech, from which Stalin removed Trotsky and Kamenev.
Cults of personality were another major form of propaganda for the two men, but
particularly for Stalin. Lee illustrates how Stalin’s image dominated everyday life in
the Soviet Union, with paintings, posters and busts of Stalin all over Russia. Stalin
also published ‘Short Course’ in 1938, in which he rewrote the history of the
communist party to show that he had never been wrong, and that he had played a
crucial role within the 1917 revolution. This became as a bible for younger members
of the party, whilst young children were taught to pray before meals to thank
‘Comrade Stalin’ for the good that he had achieved for Russia. Castro’s cult of
personality was determined by his skills as an orator, unlike Stalin, he had no need of
other forms of propaganda. Oppenheimer writes of how, in fact, Castro’s cult of
personality would prove to be more beneficial for Che Guevara more than Castro
himself. Although both men used propaganda as a significant tactic to gaining power,
the difference is visible between Stalin’s extravagance and Castro’s simple reliance
on his talent.
Political manoeuvring was also important for both Castro and Stalin. Both men
possessed characters which could not stand anyone of superior talent to themselves,
and would let nothing stand in the way of their goals. Neither had any scruples in
betraying friends and allies to gain power. Their political manoeuvring would allow
them to increase in status and power, whilst also removing political opponents and
any other groups or persons which could become possible threats to their rule. Both
Castro and Stalin were placed in positions in which they were not recognised leaders,
but where they still had great influence. Stalin’s role as General Secretary of the
Cabinet in 1922 enabled him to control promotions and ranks in the Soviet Union. He
surrounded himself with people who linked their careers with him and supported
him; men who were young, unexperienced and poorly educated, and thus securely
loyal to him. Castro’s role as Delegate General of the President to the Armed
Organisation, allowed him to use his speeches to undermine the authority of the
Democratic government and thus prevent the Democratic government from fulfilling
the aims of the revolution. Castro then denied all accusations of having any power.
Thus both men used their pre-power positions to weaken the government and
increase their support.
Stalin and Castro’s political manoeuvring continued to their removal of their
opponents. Oppenheimer continues to describe how Castro’s emasculation of the
authority of the government led to the resignation of Premier Miro. Castro then
displaced President Urrutia with the use of a political coup, after which he destroyed
the revolution movement that had fought for democracy. Castro then removed all
counter –revolutionaries, who were condemned by Castro’s mobs, shot or given long
prison terms. Several of his rivals were executed, died in plane crashes, fled into exile
or settled into obscurity. These he replaced with others who were more complacent,
and would offer no blockades to his power. Stalin used changing alliances with his
political members to remove his opposition. First affiliating with Kamenev and
Zinoviev to disadvantage his greatest rival Trotsky, and to protect himself from
Lenin’s testament; Stalin then affiliated with the right-winged Bukarhin, and
denounced Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky by accusing them of being anti-Leninist
and factionist. Zinoviev and Kamenev rejoined Stalin and Trotsky was arrested and
sent into exile. In the same year, Stalin disagreed with the right wing, and Bukarhin
was dismissed. Although the tactics used were different, with Castro acting by
himself and Stalin using other people, both acted in removing political opponents.
The last tactic used by Stalin and Castro to remove opponents and gain power
involved that of purges. Shrieka describes how Castro decimated the army, with top
commanders fleeing abroad or into asylums in foreign embassies, and lesser officers
being imprisoned with several hundred charged as ‘war criminals’ and brought to
trial before Revolutionary Tribunals. Soldiers were replaced by illiterate peasant
rebel forces, who became the new army of Cuba. Similarly, Lee illustrates how under
Stalin, purging became a ritual of arrest, false accusations, condemnation and either
imprisonment in labour camps or execution. Beginning with the murder of Kirov
(whom Stalin saw as a rival) to his ‘show trials’, beginning in 1938 and involved
Kamenev, Zinoviev and 14 others; Stalin’s purges removed any possible rivals,
politically and otherwise. Stalin also focused on coercion to force others to do his will,
with the use of secret police (NKVD). Unlike Castro, he was also unable to abandon
his purges due to his that a period of respite would allow opponents to rise against
him. Thus, as with propaganda, Stalin’s purges were on a wider scale and more
numerous than Castro.
Overall the circumstances, methods and characters of the two dictators were alike,
in that the process that they rose to power have many similarities including their
countries’ respective revolutions which provided their parties the settings in which
they could rise; their use of propaganda, political manoeuvring and purges; their
policies and the introduction of communism into their countries. However although
the general trend to dictatorship is parallel; it is evident that the level at, or the
specific tactics used differ between Castro and Stalin, which define the differences in
their countries, their personalities and circumstances in their rise to power.
