Over the next two weeks the original Fourteen Points underwent significant analysis and alteration by the Allied government while the German government had completely lost its grip over its population following a mutiny by the navy and an internal socialist revolution uprising from the east. The Allied government made two major alterations to the Fourteen Points as well as several new armistice terms. The first was the complete removal of the second point, which revolved around the freedom of the sea, and more controversially was the addition of the term that Germany will be forced to pay reparations as a result of the war. The removal of the second point was due to the fact that Britain wanted to maintain the blockade over Germany and the addition of the reparations term was mentioned throughout the peace conference on several occasions however only by Italy and the British. It was only after America and Britain denied France’s demand for the nullification of war debts that France started to argue for a high reparations settlement. This change of heart was demonstrated by several different nations over a number of different conferences. The whole idea of reparations all came down to the fact that Europe was bankrupt and almost every nation that had received financial assistance over the war was in debt. Historian A.J.P Taylor supports this statement with “Most countries counted on receiving vast sums from Germany.” That week the final terms were formulated and presented to Matthias Erzberger at the Rethondes conference at Compiegne where the severity of some terms were lessened after Matthias played the “Bolshevik card” and argued that complete co-operation to these terms would result in a takeover by the socialist revolution. The final version of the Armistice Treaty was signed on the 11th of November by Germany’s delegation of civilian politicians and went into effect that day. This preliminary step of the peace movement set the foundations for the Treaty of Versailles and officially marked the end of the First World War. The Great War was over however the legacy it left behind on Europe’s political, social and economic influences would once again only result in bloodshed.
For the first time in 4 years not a shot was heard along the western front, however all around the world celebrations were taking place for millions of people. No matter what side or nation they represented a whole new world had opened up for them, as J.M Roberts analyses “(everyone)…suddenly felt released from a great shadow” and were “…free at last from the terror of a scourge which had flailed across Europe for fifty-two months.” The Allies had victory to celebrate and the German’s; mostly unaware of the consequences, rejoiced the end of the war. The German general public was consistently fed propaganda throughout the Great War, which portrayed their operation as a defensive and un-aggressive one, which they were winning. As a result of this, A.J.P Taylor describes “Virtually all the Germans assumed that with the Armistice the war was over and as good as forgotten;” and that they “had been fighting a war of national defence and had atoned for their faults.” Contributing to this clouding of judgement was the misinterpretation of the Armistice’s Fourteen points by fault of the German government, despite its release dating almost a year ago. An example of this is mentioned by A.J.P Taylor “The Germans…did not grasp that the 13th Point inevitably meant the loss of German territory to Poland…” This meant that as early on as the Armistice Treaty, even the German government was unaware of the real meaning of what the points implied. The combination of these two factors contributed to a completely different reaction by the government and its people the following year when the Treaty of Versailles was signed.
In January 1919 the Paris Peace Conference was founded by a council of 32 nations with the aim of discussing and analysing the peace settlement that would be imposed on the Central Power of Germany. This conference was useful however was ultimately deemed a failure due to a number of contributing factors. Firstly, the location of the conference was inappropriate for the formulation of a peaceful treaty. France was seen as one of the most hostile and aggressive nations towards Germany since the Napoleonic Wars. As a result of this, holding the conference in this countries capitol started to formulate a treaty of revenge rather than one of peace. Secondly, the time period in which the conference was held in was considered to be quite inappropriate. This is because Europe was only just starting to recover from the Great War, and the armistice created a chain reaction to other parts of Europe resulting in revolutions, civil wars, post-war disease and poverty causing a hurried conference instead of a carefully revised one. Finally, although the Armistice had been based around Woodrow’s Fourteen Points, this template was extremely hard to follow due to a conflict of interest. During the War years several treaties and policies were signed in order to ensure the Allied victory over Germany. In order to fulfil one treaty, another would be altered, which would set off a chain of moderations resulting in no progress. This process is described by A.J.P Taylor as “Wilson’s 14 Points dissolved under pressure from the secret treaties and election pledges made during the war and overall was the ardent desire to make Germany pay.” Every nation involved “…assumed that it would gain from the war and be secure forever”. These contributing factors resulted in the framework of the Treaty of Peace to be more of a plot of revenge benefiting some countries and destroying others, which resulted in the Council of Thirty-Two being reduced to the Council of Ten and finally “The Big Three”
“The Big Three” Great powers of the world formulated the final version of the Peace Treaty in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. Over 4 months the council formulated and planned the treaty until deemed satisfactory by all 3 parties on the 28th of June. That same day the Treaty of Versailles was handed to the German representatives where they didn’t have a choice but to sign it. By this time Germany had undergone severe military destabilisation and consisted of a democratic republic and as a result of this was handed a ‘diktat’ rather than a negotiation. Stephen J. Lee supports this argument with the statement that “…the treaty was a diktat, forced upon a defeated power, rather than a negotiated statement.” The Treaty of Versailles consisted of a complete revamp of Wilson’s Fourteen Points to the point where only a number remained. The main consequences of the Treaty of Versailles saw the Germany army limited to 100,000 men with conscription abolished. The navy was slimmed down to a coastal force of 36 vessels with the building of battleships, submarines, tanks and military aircraft outlawed. Germany also lost 13% of its territory and most controversially some of its land in Eastern Europe. On top of this Germany was sentenced to a reparations fee, estimated at 1 million pounds at the time, however later on raised to 6.6 million pounds.
In summary the Treaty of Versailles came as a great shock and horror to the German government and its people. The German general public was furious at the harshness of the terms and more importantly at its government for allowing such a ‘slave treaty’ to happen. This is due to the build up of misguidance and confusion throughout the war as well as the peace movement. The first factor influencing the German’s reaction was the consistency of propaganda fed to the public. This led the German population to believe that they were defending against the aggressive western powers and worst of all that they were winning the fight. The German government had painted such a lucid picture of the Western Powers that its people believed that because it called an armistice the terms would reflect this leniency. Frank McDonough supports this argument in the claim that “Most Germans had little idea of the size of the German defeat, and believed that because Germany had requested an armistice, a lenient settlement would follow.” Secondly the Germans had failed to interpret the Fourteen Points from the very start of the Armistice Treaty. They deemed the terms as ‘too vague’ and did not completely understand the consequences of them.
The German population could not have been further from the truth and this is reflected through the Treaty. The Allies recognised that Germany had launched an “aggressive war” and deemed it necessary to teach the Germans “…by bitter experience that aggression did not pay”. Many historians such as Mark McAndrew view the Treaty of Versailles as “harsh enough to cause German resentment, but not punitive enough to stop Germany from activity seeking to overturn its clauses”. Others also shared the opinion of the Treaty of Versailles as a harsh and unfair policy, such as 1920’s historian W.H Dawson who described the harshness of the treaty, which stole German territory in a way that discriminated blatantly in favour of non-German populations. Dawson clarifies the German post-war status as “Literally bleeding. From them oozes out the life-blood, physical, spiritual and material of large populations.” Although the Treaty of Versailles was initially formulated as a policy of peace, the end result was far from this due to the influence of previous war treaties as well as the war guilt clause, which put the outbreak of the war on Germany’s shoulders. As a result of this instead of a long-term peace movement the Treaty simply blamed everything over the last 4 years on Germany, completely stripped the country of any power it had left to secure and reinforce the countries of the Allies. The Treaty of Versailles was not realistic from the start however acted as a short-term peace policy but ultimately led to hyperinflation in the German economy as well as a more devastating war 20 years later.
Bibliography:
Books:
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Lee, S.J, European Dictatorships 1918-1945, Routledge, London 1999, p. 11 – 13.
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McAndrew (Thomas & Cummins), Mark, The Great War, Cambridge, Cambridge 2001, chapters 23/24.
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McDonough, Frank, The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, Cambridge, Cambridge 2007, p. 46 – 51.
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Roberts, J.M, The Twentieth Century No. 32, Europe 1971, p. 870.
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Taylor, A.J.P, The History of World War 2, Routledge, London 1970.
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Taylor, A.J.P, “The Paris Conference”, in Roberts, J.M. (ed), Purnell’s History of World War 2, Random Press, Oxford 1972, pp. 275-292
Internet:
Taylor, A.J.P, The History of World War 2, Routledge, London 1970, p 23.
http://hsc.csu.edu.au/modern_history/core_study/ww1/overview1918-21/page148.htm
Roberts, J.M, The Twentieth Century No. 32, Europe 1971, p. 870.
Lee, S.J, European Dictatorships 1918-1945, Routledge, London 1999, p. 12.
McDonough, Frank, The Origins of the First and Second World Wars, Cambridge, Cambridge 2007, p. 51.
McAndrew, Mark, The Great War, Cambridge, Cambridge 2001, p. 225.
