To what extent was Germanys defeat in WW1 due to the Allies strengths and successes?

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To what extent was Germany’s defeat in WW1 due to the Allies’ strengths and successes?

Germany’s defeat at the hands of the Allies in WW1 lies more so in the failures of the German armed forces than the strengths and successes of the Allies. Historians have linked two key causes, the miscalculations of German strategies and failed battle tactics, as well as the greater strength of the Allied forces and their multiple successes as the reasons for Germany’s defeat. Of the two, Germany’s countless mistakes hold a far greater responsibility for it’s own defeat, as it allowed the Allies to have the upper hand too many times. Had Germany been more prompt and successful on the battlefield, it is quite possible that they could have held off the more numerous forces of the Allied militaries whilst engaging them on fewer fronts.

The total amount of troops available to Allied forces during World War One was in excess of forty-two million mobilized personnel and was undoubtedly a definite factor in the defeat of Germany. This is significantly greater the twenty three million troops that were mobilized by the Central Powers. A superficial examination of these figures highlights the sheer strength that the Allied forces had over those of the Central Powers, however this was not the case, as the Allies suffered a casualty rate of approximately 44% of all forces, not including prisoners of war.  Allied strength alone therefore could not have resulted in Germany’s defeat in World War and did not play a key role in Germany’s surrender.

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The successes of the Allied armies had little to do with Germany’s defeat considering the fallacies entertained by German strategists, whose hopes of erasing the possibility of a two-front war saw the Kaiser’s forces critically delayed and overstretched due to miscalculations in the Schlieffen Plan. Belgian resistance, of which the Germans hoped there would be none, was exceptional in delaying German advance in to Brussels by two weeks. This allowed critical time for the British Expeditionary Force to land in key ports and begin organizing and fortifying areas of tactical interest as well as advancing to meet the enemy ...

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