- Evaluation of Sources
The Resolution would be very valuable to a historian in answering the debate of whether or not Johnson was responsible for escalating the war, as such an act could only be passed at the requirement of the President, and therefore it shows that LBJ egoistically approved of armed combat in Vietnam as long as it wouldn’t jeopardize his political agenda and campaign. This document is useful to a historian as it shows the political reasoning behind America’s involvement in Vietnam, in accordance to world peace and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. However, it’s usefulness is limited, as it does not give insight into hidden intentions, or into what was truly going on behind the scenes.
Due to continuance in the escalation of the war after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and a lack of explanation from the government, increasing numbers of American’s started questioning the US role in Vietnam. Therefore, on the 7th of April 1965, Johnson delivered a speech at John Hopkins University. The purpose of this speech was to justify and explain the conflict in Vietnam and the increasing US involvement: “[Americans and Asians] are dying for a world where each person may choose its own path to change”. He further explains that the US “have a promise to keep” as they have “made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence” – abandoning this, he continues, would be “an unforgivable wrong” and it would “shake the confidence of all these people in the value of American commitment”. This source is useful as it gives us insight into Johnson’s moral reasoning of US involvement in Vietnam. However, it is presents limitations in showing LBJ’s true thoughts on the matter: Since this was a public speech written to raise the people’s support and morale, it is biased in only presenting the positive side of the war. The President’s real opinion at the time, based on reports, may have been different. Also, it is restricted in the fact that it doesn’t show any statistics or fact about the war: it is simply based on American values and principles.
- Analysis
In answering the question of “Was Johnson solely responsible for the escalation of the war in Vietnam?” it is vital to consider this conflict on a historical, global, political and moral scale. Also, it is vital to take into consideration Johnson’s personality, as well as any other persons and factors that may have affected the situation.
In concordance to the Cold War, initial involvement in the Vietnam War can be considered inevitable. China’s ‘fall’ to communism in 1949 made the Americans frightened by the prospect of a communist Southeast Asia, following Eizenhower’s warning of the vulnerability of this area to the ‘domino effect’. During Kennedy’s years of presidency, who considered Vietnam to be “the place to make [America’s] power credible”, the number of “advisors” in Vietnam rose considerably. So by the time Johnson took over from Kennedy in 1964, the number of American advisors in Vietnam rose to over 16000, most of which were already engaged in combat.
So it is vital consider that, when Johnson came into power, he was put in charge of an already over-escalated war. But Kennedy limited involvement to advisors: his policy drew the line on US combat, while LBJ policy of Graduated Pressure lead to an immense escalation.
Historians partly justify Johnson’s decisions in Vietnam as the actions of an unprepared, inexperienced President. Also, having realized his life-long dream through the death of his president, he pledged continuity to Kennedy’s policies, refusing to be “the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went”.
It is important to note the viewpoint that Johnson was “preoccupied with the election and committed to taking only the minimum action necessary to keep South Vietnam from going Communist”, especially considering how carelessly Johnson handled the affairs in Vietnam. McNamara, whose tactic of Graduated pressure was based on the Cuban Missile Crisis, dominated the policy-making process regarding this conflict. And while some historians argue that this means that LBJ shouldn’t be made responsible for the escalation of the war since he didn’t have much of a say in the tactical region of this war, he should have taken more initiative.
On the other hand, there is evidence to support the idea that, in reality, Johnson did not mind this war: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution stands as a turning point in the Vietnam war, giving USA the legal means to start an ‘unofficial war’. The resolution, passed by congress on August 10th 1964 gave the president the right to further escalate the war, which, as figures show, was exactly what he did. Historian Newman suggests that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was evidence of a second master plan, of Johnson carefully clearing a path to escalation.
Characters such as General Taylor and William Westmoreland played a joint role in convincing Johnson that escalation was necessary by providing false statistics that ‘proved’ their hypothesis while omitting some of the more pessimistic findings. They exploited Johnson by giving illusions of imminent victory: during the aftermath of the Tet attacks he announced that the enemy had suffered a “colossal military defeat….the US had never been in a better position in South Vietnam”, while in reality the PLAF (Peoples Liberation Armed Forces) suffered approximately 40,000 deaths, compared to the 1,100 Americans and 2,300 ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam). The two generals can be considered to have given consensus to Johnson for escalating the war by giving him false indication of the US position in Vietnam and taking the conflict in their own hands.
A skeptic Johnson was now standing responsible to a country who started asking for an answer: In public he continued to express an optimism that he didn’t feel. In his speech at John Hopkins University, April 7 1965, he attempts to justify American involvement in Vietnam despite the situation:
“We are there to strengthen world order. (…) we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence (…) to abandon [Vietnam] would be an unforgivable wrong”
In this speech we witness Johnson trying to convince not only the nation, but also himself, that this war was going to end soon, with a victory where America has achieved its goal of “strengthening world order” and “the independence of South Vietnam, and it’s freedom from attack”. LBJ has come to realize what he had done, but now there was no point of return. It was the time to stop. Instead however, he approved of the continuation of the escalation of the war.
- Conclusion
Historian Robert Divine noted, “Vietnam can only be understood in relation to the Cold War”. And that is ultimately because, to understand and analyze the US involvement in Vietnam, it is vital to understand the core of their reasoning for entering this conflict from the wider context, to understand that Vietnam was seen as a war of honor, a chance for the USA to display their commitment to fighting communism. But LBJ appeared, throughout his presidency, to take too little interest in this commitment. In this way, Johnson is highly responsible for the over escalation of this war: a president’s duty isn’t simply his political agenda, but every aspect of his country’s affairs.
On the other hand, Johnson was inevitably insecure, and due to the circumstances of him becoming president he felt that he needed to prove himself. There characteristics also lead to the escalation of war, as Johnson’s inexperience was taken advantage of by figures such as General Taylor and William Westmoreland deceived the president to the point where he was hiding behind a ‘regime of lies’. Furthermore, McNamara rather than Johnson himself made all the policies regarding this conflict. However, documents such as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution do support the idea that the president did know what he was doing, and in reality he didn’t mind a war, as long as the country didn’t know the truth. In speeches such as the 7th of April 1965 John Hopkins University speech Johnson attempts to encourage faith in a war that was already lost.
The Vietnam War was never fully under Johnson’s control – there were a great number of people around him influencing the decisions regarding US involvement and escalation. Therefore Lyndon B. Johnson was partly responsible for the escalation of the War in Vietnam, together with pressures, insecurity, and untrustworthy generals and a lack of experience.
- List of Sources
Robert D. Schulzinger, “A Time for War: The United Stated and Vietnam, 1941-1975”, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998
Halberstam, David, “The Best and the Brightest”, New York: Fawcett, 1993
Paul Fussell (ed.), “The Bloody Game”, London: Scribner’s 1991
Robert Divine, “Vietnam: An Episode in the Cold War”, 1997
Lloyd Garder, ed., “Vietnam: The Early Decisions”, 1997
McMaster, H.R., “Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam”, New York: Harper Perennial, 1998
Dallek, Robert, “Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President”, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004
Robert A. Divine, “Eisenhower and the Cold War” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981
Mark Taylor, “The Vietnam War in history, literature and film”, British Association for American Studies, 2003
DeGroot, Gerard J., A Noble Cause? : America and the Vietnam War, London: Longman, 2000
Robert D. Schulzinger, “A Time for War: The United Stated and Vietnam, 1941-1975”, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr offered exact figures in “Robert Kennedy and his Times”, 1978
Ronald H. Spector, “Advice and Support: The early years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960), 1985
“The Cold War, A History Though Documents” by Edward Judge, John Langdon, 1998
Michael Beschloss, “Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White House Tapes, 1964-1965”, 2002
Karnow, “Vietnam”, p. 265, quoted in McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p. 23
Extract from John F. Kennedy’s speech to the graduating cadets of the West Point class of 1962, quoted in “The New York Times”, 7th June 1962, p.26. Taken from McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p. 32
McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p. 40
McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p. 50
Robert A. Divine, “Eisenhower and the Cold War” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 37
Dallek, Robert, (2004), Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President, New York: Oxford University Press, p59.
McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p. 40
McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p.57.
DeGroot, Gerard J., (2000), A Noble Cause?: America and the Vietnam War, London: Longman, p168.
At a television news conference on 7th April 1954, Eisenhower said: “You have a row of dominoes set up and you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is certainly that it will go over very quickly… the loss of Indochina will cause the fall of Southeast Asia like a set of dominoes.” Cited in Robert D. Schulzinger, “A Time for War: The United Stated and Vietnam, 1941-1975”, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998
Karnow, “Vietnam”, p. 265, quoted in McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p. 23
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr offered exact figures in “Robert Kennedy and his Times”, 1978: “When Kennedy became President, there were 685 American military advisers in Vietnam. In October 1963, there were 16,732”. Others have been more tentative. The approximate figure of 700 is taken from Ronald H. Spector, “Advice and Support: The early years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960), 1985; Reeves suggests in a figure of 17,000 for 1963 in “President Kennedy” p. 614. The imprecision of the figures springs from American unwillingness to admit the extent to which the Geneva Accords of 1954, which limited the size of military advisors efforts in North and South Vietnam, were being breached. Whether Schlesinger’s figures are entirely accurate or not, the essential point is that under Kennedy there was, as Schlesinger noted, ‘a formidable escalation’.
Robert A. Divine, “Eizenhower and the Cold War” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 37
H. R. McMaster, “Dereliction of Duty”, 1997
Mark Taylor, “The Vietnam War in history, literature and film”, British Association for American Studies
McMaster, H.R., (1998), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, New York: Harper Perennial, p.57.
DeGroot, Gerard J., (2000), A Noble Cause?: America and the Vietnam War, London: Longman, p168.
Copy of the original text of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution found in “The Cold War, A History Though Documents” by Edward Judge, John Langdon, 1998, p. 140
Robert Divine, “Vietnam: An Episode in the Cold War”, in Lloyd Garder, ed., “Vietnam: The Early Decisions”, p.4
