Venezula Dictatorship

2. Economical Issues

• prosperity is only on the surface; considerable unemployment rate although no exact statistics released due to censorship
• a great share of oil revenues were extracted for government insiders
• Minimized Labor Unions; 1053 unions before military regime; 1950 only 387
• Because of the focus on petroleum industries, other trades (ie. Dairy, vegetable, sugar, meat, fish) suffered; textile production decreased by an average of 10% annually

3. Political Issues

• Jiménez jailed many political leaders (especial AD party) to create fear and force people to support the government
• Junta of 1948 were occupied by military men only
• Established Guasina concentration camp
• Falsely reported election results of 1952 and skewed plebiscite of 1957

4. Reactions toward Dissatisfaction of Jiménez’s Government

• the Archbishop issued pastoral letter in 1957, legalizing opposition toward the government; church properties were invaded and priests, arrested

D. Miscellaneous

• Criticism in disorganization of Jiménez’s government is not justified because rulers before and after him were just disorganized
• military only occupied Department of Defense and Communication; other departments all had civilian involvement

Part C Evaluation

The interview, between the historian Robert J. Alexander and Rafael Caldera, was a primary source collected in the book The Bolivarian Presidents. The interview took place in Caldera’s office in Caracas on June 25, 1954. In the conversation, Caldera severely criticized Pérez Jiménez’s disorganized, despotic, and oppressive government. The interview was a valuable source that provided readers with first-hand knowledge of the effects of the military regime. Important historical evidences about people’s attitudes toward the dictatorship were illustrated, especially since the interviewee provided a lot of detailed examples of citizens’ dissatisfations and international concerns towards the government. However, the source’s high degree of subjectivity was a limitation . The interviewee, Rafael Caldera, a member of the government oppostion party, might have manipulated the truth in order to win public support and physical experiences could have influenced his memories. The interviewer also admitted that he didn’t use a recorder during the interview although he had taken down notes immediately after the conversation. Some of the interviewee’s key ideas might have been forgotten despite the short interval. Furthermore, the interview was originally conducted in Spanish and meanings were lost during translation.

        Historian Winfield Burggraaff’s The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics 1935 – 1959, written in 1972, was used as a secondary source. The book illustrated the beneifts of the military dictatorship of 1948 – 1958. This source was valuable as different attitudes toward the regime were provided while most sources had criticized the dictatorship. Through another approach, readers could analyze the military regime through different interpretations. Burggraaff used governmental statistics and interviews to support his assertion. Governmental statistics provided raw facture evidence of the social trends in the military rule. These sources were more reliable than others as they were not meant for public disclosure. These records provided a candid glimpse into the inner-workings of the government. Futhermore, interviews demonstrated citizens’ opinions of the military regime. However, public disclosure of governmental statistics could have been manipulated in order to maintain government image. Limited sampling and marginal errors in statistics should also be taken into account. High subjectivity in interviews were inevitable and the interviewees might have forgetten some details after a long period of time. Burggraaff  also admitted that some government papers he had hoped to obtain were inaccessbile. Furthermore, all sources he used were in Spanish and meaning might have been lost in transition.

Part D Analysis

Venezuela was governed by the Acción Democrática Party before the military coup d’état of November 1948. This Democratic Party sought to revolutionize Venezuela for citizens’ benefits within three short years. Such considerations for the people gained the party wide-spread popularity but also enemies in the upper echelons of the military, who regarded the active involvement of civilians with disdain. As such, a military coup d’état, not uncommon in the history of Venezuela, transferred power from the hands of the people to the military, or rather to that of a three-man junta, comprised of Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, and Luis Felipe Llovera Páez. Although this decade-long military regime, which lasted from 1948 to 1958, had victories in terms of bettering the country, the administration had nevertheless received heavy criticisms for deliberate ignorance and ruthlessness.

        Formidable backlashes shrouded whichever victories the dictatorship seemed to have achieved in advancing Venezuela, and significantly dimmed any positive light that could have been shone on the regime. The historian Winfield Buggraaff admits that the opening of trade, especially oil, to foreign businesses generated a steady national budget. (Refer to Appendix 1) However, historian Rober Alexander does not think it an advancement because corrupt government officials pocketed much of the money which never reached the citizens. As such, the greater amount of money flowing into the country was in no way beneficial to the people. Economically, Venezuela was wealthier, but citizens enjoyed none of that benefit.

        The military dictatorship rose against Acción Democrática because it opposed the active involvement of civilians in politics. The regime unsurprisingly took great pains to suppress the people from taking part in government matters yet the continued existence of political parties after the dictatorship in 1948 must be recognized. Historians generally agree that although political parties were limited in their power, most were still able to function, with perhaps the exception of the Acción Democrática Party, which illegally continued in the underground. However, what is missing from these rather optimistic views of historian Winfield Buggraaff is the fact that while political parties existed, political leaders opposed to the dictatorship were jailed in harsh environments like the Guasina Concentration Camp as we again learn from Alexander and many were not given audiences with judges. Furthermore, political parties were useless when the leader of the dictatorship, Jiménez, simply reported false election results to keep in power. Perhaps the greatest political contribution that the dictatorship had provided Venezuelans was the realization that a military regime was undesirable, even to those who had benefited under such an administration.

        Socially, the military regime turned Caracas into a glittering, modern city but this was not what the people needed. Due to the opening up of trade, unemployment rate was reduced to 7% from the previous 13% under Acción Democrática. This might at first appear to be a wonderful improvement but one must consider that strict censorship during the regime could skew numbers in an unprofessional manner. Taken into consideration also was the fact that the dictatorship violated trade union freedoms. Therefore, even if the employment rate plummeted, the conditions of employment might not necessarily have been at an acceptable level. As mentioned earlier, the opening up of the market provided a steady income for Venezuela. Jiménez had used some of this many to construct public infrastructure. However, many public infrastructures constructed were of little use and sometimes became more of a burden. Social improvement attempts under the military dictatorship could be summarized as being merely for show without having a real purpose.

The military dictatorship of 1948 to 1958 may or may not have conscientiously tried to improve Venezuela, but the end product was more often disadvantageous to the Venezuela public.

Part E Conclusion

In light of the evidence and evaluation, the military regime of 1948 to 1958 had not impacted Venezuela in a positive manner. Although Venezuela had indeed benefited economically from the opening of various markets, benefits of the economic growth fell under the hands of corrupt government officials instead of the citizens.  Unemployment rates had indeed plummeted, but employees were treated harshly and worker union freedoms had been violated. Other political parties that had existed also proved useless as the dictator had the power to take precedence over the voting results and control the political fate of the country. The military regime must be acknowledged as an important stepping stone towards Venezuelan democracy, however the economical, social, and political changes during this period of dictatorship, which only seemed to improve the country’s situation, did not really make much advancement when examined and analyzed carefully.

Part F: Bibliography

Alexander, Robert Jackson. The Bolivarian Presidents. Westport: Greenwood Publishing         Group,         Inc., 1994.

Alexander, Robert J. The Venezuela Democratic Revolution. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964.

Alexander, Robert J. Venezuela’s Voice for Democracy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.

Blank, David Eugene. Politics in Venezuela. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973.

Burggraaff, Winfield J. The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935 – 1959. Missouri:         University of Missouri Press, 1972.

Diamond, Larry; Hartlyn, Jonathan; Linz, Juan; and Lipset, Seymour. Democracy in Developing

        Countries: Latin America. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999.

Ewell, Judith. “The Extradition of Marcos Pérez Jiménez: Practical Precedent for         Enforcement         of Administrative Honesty?” Journal of Latin American Studies 9 (November, 1977): 291.

Keen, Benjamin and Keith Haynes, A History of Latin America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin         Company, 2004.

Kolb, Glen L. Democracy and Dictatorship in Venezuela, 1945-1958. Hamden: Shoe String

Press, Inc., 1974

Swanson, David L. and Paolo Mancini, Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy.         Westport:         Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.

Yepes, José Antonio Gil. The Challenge of Venezuela Democracy. Trans. Evelyn Harrison, Lolo Gil de Yanes, and Danielle Salti. New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1981.

Appendix I

Table: Government Revenues (mainly from Petroleum)

Original source:

Banco Central de Venezuela, La Economia Venezolana en los ultimos veinticinco anos (Caracas : Banco Central, 1996), p. 223

We see that the government revenue generally increased as the military regime continued .

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