Tension between the countries increased as both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung tried to reunify Korea under their own political ideology. The situation worsened in 1949 when US troops left Korea while the USSR continued sending military aid in preparation for a southern invasion by North Korea.
The Course of the Korean War
On June 25, 1950, North Korean People’s Army (KPA) crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. Around 9:30 a.m., Kim Il Sung announced that South Korea had committed armed aggression against North Korea and the invasion was simply a response to the aggression (Hastings 53). Only a few hours later, The United Nations Security Council stated that North Korea had acted unjustly and unanimously agreed on UNSC Resolution 82. This action required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members, which included the USSR; however, the USSR had boycotted the Council to prevent the remaining four nations from taking any action against North Korea. As a result, the unanimous vote was garnered from only the remaining four nations on the Council.
President Harry S. Truman quickly directed “U.S. air and sea forces to give the ROK government troops cover and support” (Qtd. by Ridgway 23) and on June 30, he gave Douglas MacArthur “full authority to use the ground forces under his command” (23) with 2,000 American soldiers. As the CIA report of June 28 states, the United States believed that “the invasion of the Republic of Korea by the North Korean Army was undoubtedly undertaken at Soviet direction” (Hastings 58) to eliminate the last remaining anti-Communist bridgehead in northern Asia. As National Security Council Report 68 of 1950 stated, Truman was determined to reinforce the American containment of communism without question.
While the North Korean Army was well-armed with 133,000 soldiers, weapons and tanks such as T-34, the ROK Army had only 98,000 men, of which only about 30 percent possessed individual weapons (Appleman 35). Because of the ROK Army’s lack of preparation, by August KPA could push the ROK Army to Pusan, the extreme southeastern part of Korea. To protest, the US Army destroyed the passage lines of military supplies to KPA. In addition, by the end of August, the ground troops of the ROK had outnumbered the KPA 180,000 to 133,000 (Kaufman 49). The ROK and US armies were ready to counterattack.
On September 15, 1950, United Nations force landed on Inchon, located about twenty miles from Seoul. The force was largely composed of the US Army soldiers under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. The next day, the Eighth Army of the United States conducted an offensive against the KPA in the Pusan Perimeter, dismantling the KPA by September 19. By September 28, the UN force recaptured Seoul and pushed the KPA behind the 38th parallel. Overturning the tide of the war, the UN decided at the General Assembly on October 7 that it would pursue “Korean unification through military means” (86), eliminating the Communist segment. The US Army and the ROK Army captured Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, on October, 19, 1950.
When South Korea was about to unify Korea with military force, Kim Il Sung persuaded Mao Zedong, the leader of China, to aid North Korea. Worried that the US Army would attack China after North Korea, Mao Zedong ordered China’s People’s Volunteer Army to intervene in the Korean War, changing the Korean War from a civil war to a proxy war during the ongoing Cold War. With military aid from the USSR and China, the KPA could halt the further expansion of the ROK and US armies. The KPA and PVA took control of Seoul on January 4, 1951. In addition, on April 11, 1951, Truman relieved General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander in Korea, due to their strategic disagreement and MacArthur’s insubordination. Truman then appointed General Ridgway as the new Supreme Commander in Korea.
By mid 1951 and amidst ongoing combat and fluctuations of dominance over the 38th parallel, armistice negotiation began. Finally on July 27, 1953, the Commander-in-Chief, the United Nations Command, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers signed the Korean Armistice Agreement, maintaining a divided Korea and creating a 2.5 mile wide Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 38th parallel. However, the President of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, refused to sign the agreement and South Korea did not participate in armistice.
The Controversies Regarding the United States’ Intentions during the Korean War
For nearly half a century there has been ongoing debate whether the statue of General Douglas MacArthur should be removed from the Inchon Harbor. In spite of his fame as a war hero, the current generations of young South Koreans tend to be increasingly nationalistic and suspect the motives of the US, especially the Truman administration and MacArthur. These young people protest that MacArthur’s statue is a “symbol of foreign occupation” (Choe, par. 4). On the other hand, the veterans of the Korean War or the older generations who lived through it still appreciate MacArthur and the United States as a whole for “taking out the Reds”; thus, they consider the statue a “symbol of our alliance with the Americans and a hero who saved our nation from communism” (par. 5).
What were the true intentions of the United States’ intervention by President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War? Did Truman and MacArthur fight on behalf of their personal or national interest or on behalf of Korean citizens?
- President Harry S. Truman and General MacArthur as the Saviors
North Korean People’s Army (KPA) invaded South Korea at four o’ clock on June 25, 1950, triggering the Korean War. In contrasting to KPA, which was well armed and organized with tanks and weapons, the ROK Army was poorly equipped and hardly prepared for the war. E.J. Kahn, Jr.’s report in the New Yorker demonstrates the inadequate preparation of the ROK Army:
The 96,000 R.O.K [Republic of Korea] soldiers who opposed them were so far from being fully trained that none had ever taken part in any military maneuver more elaborate than a battalion exercise. By July 25, 50,000 of the 96,000 had become battle casualties, and because of the exigencies of the situation at that time, they had to be replaced by men only four or five days removed from civilian life. (Qtd. by Rovere and Schlesinger 112)
As Kahn Jr. emphasized in his report, the ROK Army’s ability to defend itself from KPA with military aids from the USSR was severely lacking. It was only a matter of time until the South would fell to North Korea if the United Nations – pushed by the United States -- had not helped South Korea.
Only four days after KPA’s invasion of ROK, President Harry S. Truman sent General Douglas MacArthur as the Commander-in-Chief with all three branches—air force, naval force and land force—of the American military to South Korea. In addition, on October 7, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a resolution (suggested by the United States) that “authorized the taking of ‘all appropriate steps’ to ensure ‘conditions of stability throughout Korea,’ and ‘the establishment of a united independent and democratic government’” (Smith 146). Throughout the war, the Truman administration and MacArthur helped the ROK to secure its government and citizens.
The most significant event which ensured the status of MacArthur as the war hero of South Korea was the amphibious Inchon landing known as “Operation Chromite” on September 15, 1950. By August, KPA pushed the ROK Army to Pusan city, the extreme southeastern point of Korea, threatening the ROK. When MacArthur ordered Admiral James T. Doyle, his amphibious expert, to examine the technical details of a landing at Inchon, Doyle stated, “Our research listed every known geographical and naval handicap—Inchon had ‘em all” (Qtd. by Willoughby and Chamberlain 368). The Marine Division staffs also sent MacArthur a letter which strongly opposed his plan; they maintained that Inchon had too low a tide to operate and that when the tides were at their highest, North Korea would prepare for the attack in advance. In addition, they also argued that “Two additional problems were mentioned: one tactical—in the appearance of Russian magnetic mines; the other political—the possible intervention of China” (Qtd. by Willoughby and Chamberlain 369). However, in spite of oppositions, MacArthur envisioned the success of the Inchon landing with his keen insight and ingenuity.
Finally, on September 15, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur and the UN Army successfully administered the landing at Inchon Harbor. The Eighth Army remained in Pusan Perimeter conducting an offensive against the KPA and dismantling it by September 19. Because of MacArthur’s success, by September 28, the UN force was able to recapture Seoul and push the KPA behind the 38th parallel. On October 19, 1950, MacArthur also captured Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, and proceeded further into Yalu River. MacArthur not only broke a deadlock but also completely turned the turned the tide of the war to South Korea’s favor. MacArthur was indeed a courageous military leader with great wisdom and insight.
MacArthur’s success in the Battle of Inchon bought myriad praises. General Matthew Ridgway wrote that “for boldness in concept, for competence in professional planning, and for courage, dash, and skill in execution, this operation ranks high in military annals” (Goulden 232). Even after his greatest victory, MacArthur vigorously worked to improve the situation of South Korea. He tried to expand the war with China in order to unify North and South Korea as one independent, democratic nation; he told General Walker that “Our diplomacy must be capable of convincing Red China and the Soviet Union that we had no ambition, no mission further than to clear Korea and give it a chance for its own independent existence” (Qtd. by Willoughby and Chamberlain 377).
On the whole, without the aid of Truman and MacArthur, KPA may have succeeded in unifying Korea under communism as it pushed deep into Pusan.
- President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur as the Self-Interested
Other historians hold the opposing view that the principal intentions of Truman and MacArthur were personal interests. For example, they argue that MacArthur’s desire to extend the war was not to protect Korean citizens but to gain notoriety and out of fear of the Soviet Union.
As was the case when Korea was divided in 1945, a decision-making structure that totally and intentionally ignores the opinions of any single Korean -- including the current Korean Commander-in-Chief of the military forces in Korea -- is applied now to nuclear-war strategies in Korea. […] The decision-making structure still is not only an obstruction of internal justice, but it is a violation of international justice and of the sovereignty of Korea. (Noh 133)
As the excerpt illustrates, the division of Korea was originally caused by the great powers and not by Koreans. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and China’s anti-Communist Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek agreed to administer Korea on the basis of a four-power trusteeship until it acquired self-rule as they did for Germany. In July 1945, Roosevelt’s successor, President Harry S. Truman, Stalin and Churchill attended the Potsdam Conference and again agreed to establish American-Soviet occupation of Korea following the surrender of Japan (Wainstock 3).
General MacArthur, the commander in charge of the Japanese surrender, did not want to be overwhelmed by Korea and made a critical mistake of ignoring the situation, appointing Lt. General John R. Hodge to command Korea and allowing Japanese troops to maintain order of Korea for two months. In General Order No. 1 in 1945, MacArthur stated that:
I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38 degree north latitude and the inhabitants thereof....All powers of government...will be for the present exercised under my authority. All persons will obey promptly all my orders...Acts of resistance...will be punished severely. (Qtd. by Buhite 95)
His statement clearly illustrates his lack of understanding of the Korean situation. The wartime crimes conducted by the US Army support this argument. According to Bruce Cumings in Parallax Visions Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations (Asia-Pacific), the US Air Force incendiary bombed every North Korean city and used napalm in the oceans. A myriad of innocent civilians were killed. “The overall civilian-to-soldier kill ratio for World War II was 40 percent; in Korea, it was 70 percent” (64). Also, the US Air Force terrorized North Korea by dropping atomic bombs from B-20s to test the usefulness of them in the war.
In addition, MacArthur strongly believed that the US should use atomic bombs in Manchuria to fight China. When both Truman and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) denied permission for the bombing, MacArthur made a bizarre statement that “If I were still not permitted to attack the massed enemy reinforcements across the Yalu, or to destroy its bridges, I would sever Korea from Manchuria by laying a field of radioactive wastes—the byproducts of atomic manufacture—across all the major lines of enemy supply” (Qtd. by Goulden 455). The Senate hearing on May 3, 1951, revealed the true intentions of Truman administration and MacArthur:
McMahon. Have you thought about the possibility of the Russians launching a surreptitious attack on the United States and its vital production centers, through atomic sabotage?
MacArthur. In a general way only. Once again, that isn’t my theater of responsibility, Senator.
McMahon. I understand that, General. I am just trying to introduce a few of the considerations that the JCS and their Commander in Chief…must have in mind in determining what kind of action should be taken in any specific theater. (Goulden 525)
The Truman administration refused to use atomic bombs in order to avoid any military conflicts with the USSR, not to protect innocent civilians of China or Korea, refuting its initial intention of entering the Korean War to bear no more appeasement to the USSR. This refusal was due to “the Administration’s concern lest the Soviet Union might precipitate World War III. The government insisted that the United States must not offer the Russians any pretext for intervention” (Spanier 260-1). Truman also wrote later that:
Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This means that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into full-scale all-out war. (Qtd by Spanier 261)
In addition to Truman, MacArthur also stated that his priority was not to protect Korea but to win the war. His ignorance was made clear during the hearing and it was not surprising to many officials or historians. William H. Chafe, the history professor at Duke University and the author of The Unfinished Journey America Since World War II, states:
Like a spoiled child, MacArthur repeatedly insisted that he alone knew what was best, and that if he did not get his way, the burden for failure would rest on his superiors… According to many, it was MacArthur’s stupidity-and, in particular, his total miscalculation of the Chinese-that caused the worst disasters of the war. Supposedly, better generals would fight better wars. (Chafe 249)
The reason MacArthur kept maintaining the unification of Korea with military force in contrast to Truman’s hesitation for further attack on China was likely due to his disobedience to Truman and to boost his career.
Finally, in 1954, the US gave up its goal to establish a “united independent, democratic Korea” as they promised earlier at the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 7, 1950. On July 27, 1953, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers signed the Korean Armistice Agreement. However, when Syngman Rhee refused to sign and kept arguing for unification of Korea, Special Envoy Robertson persuaded Rhee to go along with the UN. Rhee finally wrote to Robertson on July 9 that although he would not sign the armistice, “we shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures or actions taken under the armistice are detrimental to our national survival” (Goulden 644). Truman’s and MacArthur’s personal interests potentially led to the division of Korea.
Conclusion
Even after the investigation, the question still remains unsolved: What were the intentions of President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur regarding the United States’ intervention during the Korean War?
First and foremost, without the intervention of the United States led Truman and MacArthur, the defeat of South Korea was rather clear, considering the lack of preparation in the beginning of the Korean War. While North Korean People’s Army was well-equipped with technology, the Republic of Korea Army possessed no tanks or airplanes. If not for Truman’s quick decision to send in US troops under the leadership of MacArthur, much evidence exists that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would probably have united Korea under communist ideology. MacArthur’s great success in the Inchon landing supports this claim.
In addition, Truman and MacArthur did try to unify and establish the united, independent Korea. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the successor of Truman, persuaded Syngman Rhee, the President of South Korea, to accept the armistice at the end of the Korean War, the initial intention of the United States on October 7, 1950, in the General Assembly of the United Nations was to unify Korea under a democratic government.
It is unfortunate that Korea remains divided and still the Korean War is theoretically continuing, with temporary peace. MacArthur once stated that “there is no substitute for victory.” If so, no victory was achieved in the Korean War. In addition, the war crimes that MacArthur conducted and his dogmatic insistence to use atomic bomb in Manchuria, China, and North Korea undermined his intention to truly help the people of Korea.
The legacies of the Korean War are hollow: the firm division of North and South Korea, 38th parallel and the temporary, unsecured peace. It is the job of the current young generation of Koreans to seek improved relations between North and South Korea and to appreciate past US intervention despite questionable intentions.
References and Bibliography
Appleman, Roy E. United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S.G.P.O., 1992.
Buhite, Russell D. Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in America’s East Asian Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008.
Chafe, William H. The Unfinished Journey America Since World War II. New York: Oxford UP, USA, 2002.
Choe, Sang-Hun. “Tussle Over MacArthur Highlights Split Over U.S.” The New York Times. 16 Sept. 2005. Web. 17 Nov. 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/world/asia/15iht-korea.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=macarthur%20statue%20korea&st=cse>.
Cumings, Bruce. Parallax Visions Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations (Asia-Pacific). New York: Duke UP, 2002.
Goulden, Joseph C. Korea, the Untold Story of the War. New York: Times Books, 1982.
Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.
Hunt, Frazier. The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1954.
Kaufman, Burton I. “June to September, 1950.” Map. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1986. 46.
---. Korean War Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1986.
---. “September to November, 1950.” Map. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1986. 79.
MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences: General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur. New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company, 1964.
Noh, Jong-Sun. “The Effects on Korea of Un-Ecological Theology.” Liberating Life Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology. Birch, Charles, William Eaken, and Jay B. McDaniel, eds. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990. 125-136.
Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1967.
Rovere, Richard Halworth, and Arthur Meier Schlesinger. General MacArthur and President Truman the Struggle for Control of American Foreign Policy. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 1992.
Smith, Robert. MacArthur in Korea: the Naked Emperor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc, 1965.
Stone, I. F. The Hidden History of the Korean War. New York: Monthly Review P, 1969.
Wainstock, Dennis D. Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War (Contributions in Military Studies). New York: Greenwood, 1999.
Whelan, Richard. “Chinese Communist Intervention: October 25, 1950~January 25, 1951.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 244.
---. “Korea.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. Xi.
---. “Landing at Inchon: September 15, 1950.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 187.
---. “Stalemate: April 1951~July 27, 1953.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 309.
---. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990.
Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1964.
Willoughby, Charles A., and John Chamberlain. MacArthur: 1941-1951. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc, 1954.
Appendix A
Whelan, Richard. “Korea.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. Xi.
Appendix B
Kaufman, Burton I. “June to September, 1950.” Map. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1986. 46.
Appendix C
Whelan, Richard. “Landing at Inchon: September 15, 1950.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 187.
Appendix D
Kaufman, Burton I. “September to November, 1950.” Map. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1986. 79.
Appendix E
Whelan, Richard. “Chinese Communist Intervention: October 25, 1950~January 25, 1951.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 244.
Appendix F
Whelan, Richard. “Stalemate: April 1951~July 27, 1953.” Map. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 309.
Appendix G
This document is the excerpt of the letter from Marine Division staffs to General Douglas MacArthur to discourage him to conduct Inchon landing by providing disadvantages:
We regarded this maneuver as very hazardous since it required a landing in the heart of a city. When we first looked at Inchon, we thought it preposterous—the city was poison!
The ability of our troops to gain sufficient ground for a beachhead was obviously restricted, while all the advantages of shoreline defense lay with the enemy. There was hardly enough time to organize for the night. The Marine landing was scheduled at 5:30 in the afternoon. Sunset was at a quarter to seven…The biggest navigational handicap was the incredible tidal conditions—easily the worst in the Far East. The average rise and fall of the sea was 29 feet. The sea approach to Inchon is a land-locked “pocket.” The Yellow Sea surges into narrow channels; the tides are “piled up.” On September 15, the tide rose to its full height of 30 feet in six hours; in the next six hours the tide fell to only six feet.
Any landing had to be made at high tide. The American landing craft required from 23 to 29 feet to clear mud flats. The planners calculated that there were only three possible dates in the fall of 1950 “when the tides would be right”: September 15, October 11, and November 3. Conversely, the Reds were equally aware of the practical implications of these dates.
Two additional problems were mentioned: one tactical—in the appearance of Russian magnetic mines; the other political—the possible intervention of China. Chinese entry into action on or about the date of the Inchon landing might become fetal. Speed in timing and execution might neutralize the menace. Even then, however, it was perfectly understood that half a dozen American Divisions could hardly undertake to offset the half-million Chinese, even then known to be on the move through Manchuria and toward the Yalu. (Qtd. by Willoughby and Chamberlain 369)
Appendix H
This document is the excerpt from Bruce Cumings’ Parallax Visions Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations (Asia-Pacific), published in 2002. Cumings provides the misconducts of the United States Army during the Korean War:
- The U.S. Air Force reduced every North Korean city to rubble by incendiary bombing that involved the use of oceans of napalm (which even Churchill criticized), killing hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians (the overall civilian-to-soldier kill ratio for World War II was 40 percent; in Korea, it was 70 percent).
- In May and June 1953 the U.S. Air Force demolished huge dams in North Korea, flooding many square miles of farm territory and thus denying food to the enemy-something that had been planned for Japan but was not done on the grounds that it was against the laws of warfare.
- Through Operation Hudson Harbor in the fall of 1951, the U.S. Air Force terrorized North Korea by dropping dummy atomic bombs from B-29s in tests to see whether the bomb could be used in battlefield conditions.
- General Ridgway requested permission to use chemical weapons against North Korean and Chinese forces in the winter of 1950-1951, only to be turned down by MacArthur.
- Both MacArthur (December 1950) and Ridgway (May 1951) asked Washington for permission to use more than twenty atomic bombs against North Korea and China.
- Truman denied those requests, but sent the atomic cores of the bombs (for the first time) to the northeast Asian theater, to assemble and ready atomic bombs for possible use against North Korea and China, he issued operational orders to do so in April 1951, should major new Chinese forces join the fighting, but the order was never carried out because MacArthur was relieved a few days later. (Cumings 64)
See Appendix B for reference map: “June to September, 1950.”
See Appendix C for reference map: “Landing at Inchon: September 15, 1950.”
See Appendix D for reference map: “September to November, 1950.”
See Appendix E for reference map: “Chinese Communist Intervention: October 25, 1950~January 25, 1951.”
See Appendix F for reference map: “Stalemate: April 1951~July 27, 1953.”
See Appendix G for reference text.
Jong-Sun Noh, the author of “The Effects on Korea of Un-Ecological Theology,” studied at Yonsei University, Harvard Divinity School, Yale Divinity School, and Union Theological Seminary in New York. He is highly biased, believing that the United States should take all blames for dividing divine entity of Korea.
Bruce Cumings is the Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Service Professor in History at the University of Chicago. He specializes in modern Korean history and international relations and history in East Asia. Although he is sometimes criticized as pro-North Korea, his expertise and his experience in Korea provide profound analysis on the Korean War in his books including Parallax Visions Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations (Asia-Pacific).
See Appendix H for reference text.