Although Hitler and Mussolini were theoretically partners in the War, Hitler never planned any of his campaigns with Mussolini. Mussolini was very much a junior partner in the War. Mussolini returned the favour with his invasion of Greece (1940). After Hitler launched Barbarossa, Mussolini did contribute a substantial number of Italian troops to the campaign. Mussolini rushed the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (CSIR-Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia) to participate in Barbarossa (July 1941). Initially the 62.000 troops composing the CSIR, which included the ⁴’Black Shirts’ as well, were deployed with Army Group South in the Ukraine where the Russian winter, described by the historian Gary Komar⁵, proved to a great shock to the Italians who were accustomed to a mild Mediterranean climate. Then the Italian Army substantially expanded its commitment to a full army group-the Armata Italiana in Russia (ARMIR-Italian Army in Russia) which was commonly referred to as the Italian 8th Army. The 8th Army was committed to the German Stalingrad offensive as part of German Army Group B (Heeresgruppen B) commanded by General Maximilian von Weichs and it was deployed south of Stalingrad to help protect the German flank as the German 6th Army drove into Stalingrad itself (August 1942). The Soviet counter offensive Operation Uranus drove through the relatively weak German allies (Hungarian and Romanian forces) deployed north and south of the city (November 19). The Italians deployed along the lower Don were not immediately affected. A new Soviet offensive Operation Saturn smashed into the Italian positions and the Italian troops suffered terrible losses. The debacle was in part because they were not equipped with modern armour, mostly the light tanks they used in North Africa therefore about 20,000 Italians were killed and 64,000 captured and most of them perished in camps due to the horrible conditions, while about 45,000 men the Soviets had surrounded managed to fight their way out. The dispirited Italians who were also suffering losses in North Africa withdrew the survivors of the shattered 8th Army back to Italy. Mussolini was not anxious to publicize another debacle as the Italian army was also failing to annex the Balkans because of the Greek resistance and Hitler had to send many divisions from Stalingrad to Greece in order to help Mussolini win that war.
The opinion of German generals, such as Paulus and von Rundstedt, was that the Italian’s failure of conquering the Balkans slowed down the German invasion of Stalingrad between May and July 1942 as the German army had to send several munitions and troops in order to back up Italy against the Greeks fighting Mussolini’s troops and this is confirmed by the German Navy War Diary in which is written that a huge number of weapons and soldiers were sent to the Balkans by Hitler:¹‘the main reason Hitler turned to the Balkans was because Yugoslavia changed camp on him and he wanted to punish them. If the Italians had of been able to take care of Greece on their own it may have shortened the German intervention in the region. Hitler had his chance to take Moscow in either July or August but decided to head south into the Ukraine’. However there are other historians who think the opposite: Corelli Barnett's classic ‘The Desert Generals’ states that the delay was inevitable due to the fact that the Nazi Army was not ready to oppose the Russians yet: Germany's Balkans campaign didn't delay Barbarossa by a single day. While the Germans had originally hoped to jump off before June 22, this proved to be infeasible due to logistical preparations taking longer than expected (logistics were always the German Army's weakest point) and bad weather hampering the construction of airbases in Poland. By the time the stockpiles had been moved up and the airbases completed all the units sent to that Balkans were back in position in Poland and Rumania’.
¹ From ’ Barbarossa: the Axis and the Allies’ written by John Erickson.
² From ‘ The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich’ written by William L. Shirer.
³ The black shirts were the personal army of Mussolini- Fascist division.
⁴ Special divisions trained to fight the enemy in the mountains
⁵ ‘No one, not even someone as rash as Hitler, would invade the Soviet Union in the winter, he argued’.
Evaluation of sources(320)
My first source is the documentary video ‘L’Armata Italiana in Russia’ published in 1985 by Delta Video, a company which is specialized in making historical videos about Italy in the 20th century, under the supervision of the historian Salvatore Prette. The reliability of this source is great as the documents used for the video were taken from the German and Italian National Archives and it also includes the witnesses of three survivors of that campaign. Yet the video despite maintaining a relative neutrality is a secondary source, due to the fact it was published 45 years after the war, and adopts a very revisionist, historically modern, interpretation of the Operation Barbarossa, sympathizing largely with the Italians and trying to describe their defeats as an example of extreme courage. Therefore its interpretations are quite limited and the opinions of Prette have to be distinguished from historical accuracy. Yet, other perspectives are analysed through the video and even taken into consideration, although they are considered such as inaccurate and not very relevant: thus it proves a valuable source of analysis.
My second source is a historical documentary made in 1942 by the black shirts( Mussolini’s personal armed forces) in cooperation with the German Army on the conditions of the Italian soldiers in Russia. This is a primary source as the documentary was published when the Operation had not ended yet and gives a clear picture of what was the opinion of the Axis powers about the Operation Barbarossa. Although the reliability of this source is arguable because of the really subjective interpretation of the war, the detailed description of the lifestyle in Russia makes it an unique source which was also used by Mussolini as a form of propaganda to recruit soldiers for the Barbarossa campaign. The Italian historian Prette commented it⁶[…] other historians seem to agree that the source is valuable in regards to the contents that are showed and analysed.
Analysis()
As Gary Komar and Erickson state the involvement of Italy in the Operation Barbarossa was not considered as a great support from the Germans as they did not see Italy as a powerful country which could really back them up on the battlefield. However they also believe that the attempts ,made by the Italians, of resisting to the Russian counter attacks slowed down the progression of Russian troops and allowed the German’s 6th division to head towards Stalingrad and have a chance to defeat Stalin. Furthermore they both believe that Mussolini’s failure in the Balkans war against the Greeks did not stop the Nazis from attacking Stalingrad⁷ […] and this is supported by other notable historians such as William L. Shirer and Salvatore Prette: they all convey that Germany was not prepared for an assault of that calibre as the one they should have planned in order to take Stalingrad from the Russians.
What was interestingly made apparent in this analysis is that the Axis Allies underestimated the real strength of the Italian Army, which was neither numerous nor particularly strong, but very effective as they held the area around then Don river for months despite the several offensive of the U.S.S.R. That allowed Hitler to advance even further through the Russian defences and it doesn’t have to be
forgotten that many Italian divisions were called to help the 17th German division which had been defeated by the Russian in 1942 and Mussolini’s troops helped the Axis to protect its strategic basis.
By analysing the different conflicts between Italy and U.S.S.R. we gain a further understanding of the effectiveness of the Italian troops in the Operation Barbarossa and of what they had to stand in order to protect her lands.
Conclusion(142)
In this essay I’ve investigated and analysed many aspects in which Italy was involved during the Operation Barbarossa and how the Italians either affected or helped the Germans to win against the Russians. From this essay, it becomes clear that Italy played quite a significant role in the war as the support given to the Germans was matched only by the Finnish who defeated the Russians in some occasions and it’s arguable that the Italian failure in the Balkans slowed down Hitler’s plan to attack Stalingrad because it was proved that the German army was not ready to fight against the U.S.S.R. Yet the Italian Army was a great support and Germany had a valuable ally by her side which made the difference in several occasions.
⁶ ‘This source is valuable to a certain extent as it contains precious information about the campaign that Italy was carrying out in Russia, however it is limited due to the lack of different interpretations discussed’.
⁷ ‘Claims that the Balkans campaign delayed Barbarossa seem to have steamed from the British government's justifications of their disastrous intervention in Greece. In reality, it made no difference’.
