Considering the political climate of the times, are there changes in attitudes or procedures that could have averted the disasters of the airship R101 and the Vasa?' Both the R101 and The Vasa were intended to be major advancements

University Degree Architecture, Building and Planning

‘Considering the political climate of the times, are there changes in attitudes or procedures that could have averted the disasters of the airship R101 and the Vasa?’

Both the R101 and The Vasa were intended to be major advancements in either means of travel or means of superior warfare, both were developed at a time where prestige and national pride were important. Sweden’s King was intent on protecting his claim to the throne and was engaged in conflict with Poland, Britain was not at War but the production of the R101 came between the two major World Wars and during a time of economic depression. The methods of development and production, however varied, were different; in the case of the Vasa the death of the original shipwright and the adoption of the project by his less qualified assistant led to design faults that resulted in a predictable disaster. In the case of the R101 individual safety issues were fully in place but the safety of the airship as a whole was never fully explored and tested.

Airships had made more technical advancements than aeroplanes, between 1910 and 1914 five German airships had carried 42,000 passengers in 2,000 flights; this role however was reversed at the end of the war when the ‘heavier than air’ machine had many more uses. Of the airships built in the early part of the 20th century the American and the German designs were seen to be the best; but there were many disasters and crashes that were to create such apprehension that two committees were formed to study and analyse the statistics of airships. The Aeronautical Research committee appointed each body; the first was the “Airship stressing panel” their main objective, obvious from the title, was to measure and calculate the stresses and strains that an airship would and could undergo in adverse weather conditions. The second panel was also aptly named “The Airworthiness of Airships panel”. These teams investigated previous crashes and recommended safety factors that should be put in place to avert any future disasters.

The design and building of the airships R100 and the R101 were the largest ever undertaken, the largest ship so far being the German airship the Graf Zeppelin. It was proposed that two ships would be built for commercial and military transport each with a capacity of 5 million cubic feet and plans started in 1924 to build them. The ship R101 was to have many pioneering design features and to achieve this the completion date had to be pushed back several times. It was found that the overall disposable lift was not as much as was anticipated and so was taken back into the hanger for more work. After extensive tests and trials it was decided that radical action would be necessary to increase the overall lift and so engineers of the ship cut it in half! This was needed to add another bay so that another gas bag could be fitted to give more lift; this extra gas bag added another half a million cubic feet.

Hugo Eckener a fellow engineer from Germany came to inspect the R101 and found it to be of great design and said that it was, ‘a new breed of exceptional ship’. This confidence was to spark plans for more airships, the R102 and the R103. Many commented that the airship R101 flew particularly low compared to the earlier Zeppelins seen during the war, but it was advised that when flying long distances it was economical to fly at the height of 1500 feet plus the views were outstanding as it was just below the cloud cover. The interior of the R101 was considered, ‘a lavish floating hotel’, it boasted a dining area that could seat 60 and a smoking room that could seat 20, this was all spread over two decks. The R101 was a vast improvement from the German predecessor the German Zeppelin ZL127 – Graf Zeppelin that could only accommodate 20 passengers.

The reduction in expenditure in the early twenties called for the Royal air force to close down operations to build any more airships, in 1921 and 1923 much contemplation was given to a scheme of airship development. In 1924 a committee appointed by the former government of Ramsay MacDonald decided that if airship development were to continue with sound technical support then the government would have to fund a scheme that would allow this to happen. The scheme was designed to test the capacity of airships as modern commercial long distance flights and the government to aid this scheme put up £1,350,000. It was proposed that after the two ships had been built it would pave the way for more ships to be built.

The memorandum prepared by Samuel Hoare as Secretary of state for air, and put to the Imperial conference in 1926 went as follows,

“It was held that once this programme had been successfully carried out the further developments of airships would be assured, and it was recognised that that the practical progress of the experimental programme might well prove to be of decisive importance in the history of airship development. It was therefore, decided to develop the programme in a spirit of scientific caution, holding considerations of prudence and safety to be of paramount importance.”

Much experimentation ...

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The memorandum prepared by Samuel Hoare as Secretary of state for air, and put to the Imperial conference in 1926 went as follows,

Much experimentation and testing took place to ensure the safety and maximum capability of the airships, the National physics Laboratory became involved; to determine the best shape of the airship, experiments were carried out in the wind tunnels which led to, eventually, a change in the shape of the hull previously seen in the original and older airships. In addition to this R33 was reconditioned and was used to carry out a number of trial flights to accumulate data plus a full scale section of the R101 was constructed to test the strength and durability before the ship was even built. Many more trials, experimentation and research was carried out before the building commenced; this however did not help the forty-eight people who died on the edge of a wood near Beauvais. The R101 left for India on its maiden voyage, the weather was not ideal, the deteriorating weather conditions threw the ship into downward sprawls eventually crashing to the ground and bursting into flames seven hours into her first flight. It would appear that the aeronautical industry took due care and consideration when designing and building both Airships but on delving deeper into the tragedy and the end of the British airship, it becomes apparent that Airship R101 was no where near ready to fly.

After the First World War Britain was unstable and in debt, millions of pounds were owed to the Americans and unemployment was on the rapid increase. The Government was changing and weakening and The British Empire was looking pretty bleak. Britain needed a moral booster and the rise of the British airship industry was to do this. Although Britain had little money it was thought best by those who controlled it to give the industry an amount to start up what was going to be a great British establishment. The R101 was going to be the Pride of British engineering and was advertised as such.

The originality in design should not be blamed here, with any new invention many trials and tests must be carried out at every stage of change in engineering to ensure that all parts and structures will work in harmony with one another. In the early stages of the building of R101 every precaution was taken and all elements were tested to there capabilities but as it became more important to avoid further postponement and the trip to India became more urgent certain trials that would have been checked and checked again may have been overlooked. This is not to say that work on the R101 was not done properly; not only did the insertion of the new bay for the gas bag postpone the flight but further delays were to follow. The R101 was originally to have five engines, four of which would work ahead and one of which would only work astern. These plans were modified so that all engines would work ahead and two of these engines could also be worked in reverse and so working ahead and astern. There was a delay in supplying these backwards-working engines and it was thought that even if they worked day and night they would not be ready in time. The last fitting of the engine was completed four days later than anticipated. Another indication of the urgency in which to complete the project was the way in which the two independent consultants, Professor Bairstow and Professor Pippard acted. They were asked to write a formal report after examining plans and calculations of the R101, these calculations were called design memoranda, for the purpose of making a report as to the airworthiness of the ship. There report sustained a permit to fly for the purpose of trial flights. The two distinguished scientists were not involved until a year later when they were asked to make another report after the new bay had been fitted, the two men commissioned to inspect the memoranda raised many queries into the new bay which were dealt with accordingly. It was imperative that there was a certificate of airworthiness for the ship to gain another permit to fly, the final report however, never materialised. The professors wrote a letter to the Secretary air minister informing him that they had not yet written a final report it stated that, “A good deal of general thinking and comparison on limited information has been required on reaching our conclusion”. The permit to fly was issued on the basis that the report would later be received. After the crash the actual report was heard in an inquiry, the report contained alarming concerns about the new weight of the ship and the lack of sufficient information to make a formal and calculated assessment. It also contained trepidation about the testing of the new design; it was raised that the new weight of the ship did not correspond to the overall structure and shape and that if it was to be successful at this weight it would have had to of been completely redesigned with the weight as a basis for the structure.

Both The Vasa and the R101 were going to be the pride of a nation; they were the creations that would lift their countries in terms of power and admiration. In Britain in the 1920’s unemployment was increasing and the leadership of the country was unstable and weak, after the gung ho attitude of the First World War Britain was unstoppable or so the people thought. The present government were behind the airship scheme even though the rest of the country was in need of funding. In 1925 Prime minister Baldwin declared that there would be hard times ahead with poor housing, education and healthcare, not to mention the low wages. Baldwin also asked the British public to accept low wages until industry was on its feet, so England needed something that would boost moral and set up the industry. Imperial airways Ltd started in on 31st of March 1924 after the British government appointed the Hambling committee to look into air travel in aeroplanes rather than air ships. Britain was the first country to form an airline by merging four separate companies but these flights were mainly for airmail and it was only a few planes that carried passengers like the De Havilland DH.66 Hercules who boasted a luxury flight seating 7 people. It is questionable why the Government set up the Airship scheme when they were on the brink of having one of the biggest airlines in the world, why would the British government put money into a failing aircraft when they could have been feeding the growth Imperial airlines. One reason for this maybe because the Airship could carry far more numbers and if successful could be used in warfare to transport large numbers of soldiers. With this in mind the Government never the less pushed for the R101 to be completed as soon as possible if anything to show the world that England could make something magnificent and successful.

The story of the Vasa is a similar one to that of the R101 in that both ships were going to be the biggest and the best. The Vasa set sail on her maiden voyage in 1628 and sank some 1500 yards later in front of a huge crowed of Swedish onlookers. The Vasa was to be King Gustavus II Adolphus’ warship but it was poorly designed and top heavy. The 1620’s were a disastrous time for the Swedish Navy who had lost twelve ships prior to The Vasa; ten were lost in a violent storm and during a confrontation with the Polish fleet two were captured. King Gustavus II was a brutal King who was famed for his strict discipline and his stricter punishments. He became King when he was only 17 and lead a successful counter attack on the Danes at Kalmar, although Kalmar was later recaptured The Danish King, Christian IV had enormous respect for Gustavus. In the early sixteen hundreds The Baltic sea was home to many vicious commercial rivalries; Sweden was up against Denmark and Russia, Gustavus threatened both with war and eventually came to a peace agreement with Christian IV of Denmark in 1613. The thirty years war broke out in 1618 but Gustavus was reluctant to join, he was more concerned with conquering Poland; in 1621 Sweden launched her first attack taking the trading city of Riga, the outlet for one third of Poland’s exports. Five years later Gustavus secured the province of Wallhof and was now preparing to take Poland’s Prussian possessions to the South. In 1625 whilst still in Poland, King Gustavus ordered four ships to be made one of which was to be the Vasa. The plan was to build four ships, two large warships and two smaller ships also for battle. These ships were to be built in the Naval shipyard in Stockholm and a Dutch master shipwright by the name of Henrik Hybertson, an experienced ship builder, was to eventually be responsible for the design and building of the Vasa. The Vasa was built with constant interruptions from the King who wanted the ship to be the greatest warship yet. Gustavus knew that to have a great army would make him more powerful than his rivals and to aid a good war, military protection and supply lines were necessary as the Baltic Sea lay between Sweden and the continent. A strong Navy was, “Second to God” as Gustavus put it.

The Naval shipyard saw the building of some eight ships all under the command of King Gustavus for his Navy. During this era most of the design requirements were kept in the head of the Master and it was up to him and his judgement as to how the ships were built. There were no formal testing procedures and no scientific theory on ship stability was available at the time, there were no mathematical calculations to determine centre of gravity, centre of displacement volume, form stability or weight stability. There were no schematics, blueprints or even drawings of the design. Instead of all this, ‘reckoning’ was to be the only tangible plan for the Ship which consisted of the Master shipbuilder drawing a simple diagram with some simple, basic measurements, everything else was up to the skill and experience of the builders. January 1625 Henrick Hibertson and his Brother Arendt de Groot signed a contract to build the four ships ordered by the admiralty. The shipyard already had four ships under construction that were to be finished before the present four were to be started. The contracts only stated the length and width of the ship there were no written specifications or guidelines to follow so the Master Shipwright was the one responsible for determining proportions and calculating dimensions; Hybertson became the manger for overseeing the interior. The Vasa was not only going to be a great war ships it was also going to boast a lavish interior with sculptures and ornaments in abundance.

As work in the shipyard increased the Äpplet, a ship already built, had to come back to the shipyard because the hull and stern required strengthening. In September that year whilst the King was fighting in Poland ten ships were lost in the Bay of Riga, the King immediately ordered the two smaller ships to be delivered before the completion date, in order to secure this the King wrote to the Council of the state and ordered that the Council and Nobility contribute money towards the construction of two new ships. The King was in desperate need of more ships and was counting on the early completion of the two smaller ships. The King made constant interruptions and changes to the building of the ships, he ordered that one of the original larger ships be made into two more smaller ships but by this time the timber had already been cut for the larger one; also he ordered that the Vasa have another gun deck installed which was uncommon but not unheard of, the rival Danish ship had two gun decks and Gustavus wanted his to match. In the National registry it is noted that on November 30 three sets of specs were entered: The Kings own, Hybertson and a third by an independent ship builder. Hybertson finally admitted to the King that his specifications could not be met with the amount of timber that was available and so the King replied that he go ahead with the original plan.

Three hundred years later, when the Vasa was recovered in the twentieth century it was found that the actual measurements of the ship were nowhere near any of the original specifications. One of the most noteworthy tests that was done on the Vasa was the Lurch test, which involves twenty or so men running from side to side to see how much it will roll on its underside; when Lurch tests were carried out on the Vasa they had to be stopped after the third run because the ship was rolling so violently it was feared that it may capsize altogether; tests were abandoned and seemingly forgotten about or ignored. This kind of incompetence was prevalent throughout the construction of the great warship. In spring 1627 Henrik Hybertson was to die, his assistant Hein Jacobsson took over with very little experience, as the main details of the ship were in Hybertson’s head it was now impossible to carry on building the Vasa in the way that Hybertson intended. However building did continue and got worse. Plans for the Vasa’s armament were under way and there was in excess of seventy tonnes of heavy artillery which was far too much for one closed deck and one open deck to carry so with the wishes of Gustavus another gun deck was added making it the first Swedish ship ever to have two gun decks. In 1627 the hull is completed and the Vasa is launched, work now begun on fitting the ship out. Changes were constantly being made to the design of the ship and in 1628 Gustavus insisted that the Vasa be ready for battle by July 25th, he stated that if it were not complete then the people responsible would be subject to His Majesty’s disgrace! It was rumoured that none of the shipbuilders or the Master shipwright were present at the stability tests and even when the Admiral was told that the ship was too narrow at the bottom he replied, “The ship builder has built ships for years, do not worry”. It was also unlikely that any of the armament were on board at the time of the tests.

On July 31st the king ordered that the Vasa be ready for battle with full attendance of all marines that were to man the ship. On August 10th the Vasa set sail on her maiden voyage and sunk less than 2000 yards from port. It was noted that a large gust of wind made the Vasa lean heavily to one side it was only when the gun decks started to fill with water that it sank thirty metres into the Baltic sea. Some 50 men women and children died as a result of this disaster. Fortunately the King was not present as the Vasa set sail but insisted that, “negligence and imprudence” must have been the cause. After two inquiries no one was found to blame and no one was punished. In the years leading up to the sinking of the Vasa, Sweden was almost constantly at war with Russia, Poland or Denmark or all three at once, in 1613 Sweden made peace with Denmark, in 1614 there was an armistice with Poland and at last peace was made with Russia in 1617. The war against Poland started again when the Swedes tried to stop Poland trading with Western Europe. King Gustavus had reformed the Swedish army by changing the formations of troops in battle; he created smaller more effective units. The King of Sweden was innovative and intelligent and built Sweden up to be one of the leading armies in Europe, to keep on growing however he needed something that could beat all the other contenders. The Vasa was the answer and Gustavus wanted it to be the biggest and the most intimidating ship.

If Hybertson had lived to complete the ship then he may have been able to advise the king that his requests were simply not viable; or if the King had insisted still on the second gun deck then Hybertson could have redesigned the ship to accommodate the new modifications. The main issue was time, the King needed the ship as quickly as possible and this meant that safety features and simple design specifications were overlooked or just ignored; if the King was not at war and there was sufficient time for the ship to be built then it may not have met the end that it did.

Although both disasters were very different they were both the result of bad planning and insufficient testing. The political and cultural climate of the times fuelled the necessity for quick completion, the war with Poland in the case of the Vasa and Gustavus needing the ship as soon as possible before the completion date, which meant that it was not fully finished on its maiden voyage; not to mention the appalling preparation and development. The R101 is less clear and there is not one party that can be held responsible; the Government were the ones who were anxious for completion so that England could launch a new and exciting type of commercial air travel but on the other hand was it the fault of the engineers who didn’t test and test again as they had done early on in construction. No one was really held responsible for either catastrophe but they are certainly good examples to look at when planning is of importance.

R101 The airship disaster 1930, uncovered editions