One of the most striking visual examples of the destruction that the earthquake brought was the complete collapse of Memorial Arch, which once faced Palm Drive in front of Memorial Church. Before April 18th, the arch stood out majestically against the outer quadrangle and could be seen from nearly every point on campus, but after the tremor, the entire arch was ruined, leaving only the base of what it once was, which is still present to this day. This of course was an extreme shock to the students who had come to identify the Arch as a symbol of pride and prestige with their university. In one student’s words,
We walked over to the Arch, the once beautiful Memorial Arch, which stood as a gateway to the outer quadrangle. Around the upper part of the frieze had been carved that which represented ‘The Progress of Man.’ Most of the frieze had crumbled away and the Great Arch was split almost to its base, it was a sight to behold (Beymer 3).
Another startling example of the power of nature was the state that Memorial Church was left in. The bell-tower that once rose up and above the church was now destroyed. The consequential falling of the steeple created a vacuum of air which blew out most of the mosaic that had previously adorned the façade of the building (Jordan 3rd President’s Report 5). Passers by could only gape, astonished at what had become of their most distinctive monument. The other buildings, such as the museum and new library, suffered similar fates. Most of these buildings, it was considered, would have to be repaired basically from the ground up (Wing 510). The entire university was, for the most part, left in shambles. David Starr Jordan, initially optimistic, said that classes would resume in a few days, but upon further consideration, classes, as well as that years commencement ceremony, were postponed until the following academic year.
In the aftermath of Stanford’s first natural disaster the statistics were grim: 2 deaths (one student and one fireman); $3 million dollars in damages (adjusted for inflation approx. $39 million); and the prospect of major repair work on the great majority of campus buildings. Even though most of the university faculty and staff were optimistic, some students did not hold those same positive views. Student Payson Treat writes in a letter to his father following the earthquake:
So as we think it over, and our minds are hardly able to think at all, we realize that the University will all be rebuilt, but during the process there will be dark days again. The dreams of salaries and equipment will have to wait longer for realization. The Stone Age will begin again (5).
Since this of course was the first major crisis for the university, most of the students and others affiliated with the school would have good reason to hold such dire opinions, but fortunately for them, the situation was not as dismal as it appeared to be or could have been.
Fast-forward 83 years to arrive at October 17, 1989. At 5:04 p.m. Stanford University was unfortunately once again treated to another encounter with Mother Nature’s rumblings. Cole Campbell, a Knight Fellow, was able to describe his experience in class that day,
Steve Stublarec, a San Francisco lawyer who lectures at Stanford Law School, was the first in our classroom to notice the vibrations at 5:04 p.m. Tuesday. ‘That’s an earthquake!’ he said as the tremors increased. The building itself began to heave, and Stublarec bolted from his chair, flipping it over on its back, and sprinted from the room. The words I had always associated with earthquakes don’t describe the experience. The building didn’t shake or quake: It undulated (A7).
Even though more than four decades had passed, the reaction is an understandably common one: panic and fear. Yet it can be argued that those who experienced the earthquake in 1989 were in a much better position in the aftermath of the disaster. The Stanford News reported that,
Stanford survived its second major earthquake with far less destruction than was wrought in 1906, when two persons died and press reports implied that the campus was in total ruin […]. In 1989, there were no deaths or major injuries on campus, despite a student population more than eight times what it was in 1906 and the fact that the temblor hit at the end of a busy workday. Certainly the ’06 quake was far more powerful. Now estimated at 8.3 on the Richter scale—a means not available at the time—it released at least 30 times more energy and generated at least 10 times more ground motion than the quake of ’89 (24 Oct. 1989 1).
Not only the fact that no lives were lost in the Loma Prieta earthquake come as welcome news, but the business of the university also resumed almost immediately afterwards. The earthquake took place on Tuesday evening, but by Thursday, classes were already being held, albeit in makeshift classrooms and at different times. Compare that to the previously stated fact that classes as well as graduation had been postponed outright in the 1906 earthquake to be held in August of the same year. Even though the latter class, at least superficially, walked away with much less bruising physically, the economic situation that the disaster put the university in was anything but secure. The value of property lost was described by the Stanford News:
If all goes according to plan, the University eventually may spend $171.5 million to recover from the Oct. 17 earthquake. Plans reported to the Administrative Council and the Board of Trustees in early February call for a basic program of “must” repairs and legally required seismic strengthening totaling $134 million. Another $37.5 million may be spent for repairs and building improvements that are considered optional (13 Feb. 1990 2).
The amount of $171.5 million is of course much more than the $39 million dollars (adjusted for inflation) that was lost on the original earthquake of 1906. Of course this can be attributed to the fact that in those 83 years, the university had expanded quite considerably and invested much more funds into its infrastructure and buildings, but both time frames were still faced with the question of “How do we pay for this?”
Money Matters
Jane Stanford was once quoted as saying, “Our institution and my work here must never be disgraced by becoming a begging institution” (Stanford Annual Financial Report 1989), and to a lesser extent, in the earthquake of 1906, the university did not have to go out and “beg” for money. Even though Jane Stanford had died a year before the earthquake, on Feb. 28 1905, the university was still in a very good financial situation; they had very little bureaucracy and red tape, and no debt. Even though funds would have to be used to repair most of the major buildings, the idea of going into debt was an uncommon one at the time:
The University will not have money available at once even to begin some of this work. Its endowment cannot be impaired. Its income of $800,000 a year must suffice for current expenses as well as for rebuilding (Keatinge 4).
Not only was the university unable, or unwilling to enter into any type of long term debt, it was also very hesitant to look to outside sources for assistance. This is understandable given the current state of the government; programs such as FEMA were still concepts not even conceived of. However, the university did receive moderate contributions from some of its burgeoning alumni to help defray some of the repair costs. This is one of the primary contributors as to why some many of the construction projects after the 1906 earthquake took so long to complete, the main example being Memorial Church, in which major construction did not even begin until 1911 (Jordan 8th President Report 6). Even though the university had a comparatively smaller amount of monetary damage than that of the ’89 earthquake, the physical damage was much more comprehensible since most buildings were used on a daily basis with little emergency space. This is one of the main causes of the ’06 closing of the university two months ahead of schedule, whereas the ’89 class could continue instruction in other locations, such as portable units and other empty or unused buildings.
Although the 1989 earthquake left Stanford with no loss of life and few serious injuries, one could say that it left the University in a much more precarious position financially. The university had already been moving towards preventative measures just in case another similar disaster ever hit; one of which was the implementation of self-insurance against earthquakes in 1985:
‘Stanford has been self-insured for earthquake damage since 1985,’ according to Robert Beth, director of risk management, ‘Stanford had earthquake insurance from 1980 to 1985,’ Beth said, ‘but then the insuring companies cancelled the policy.’ After considering its options, Stanford decided to become self-insured. Beginning in 1985, it began setting aside an earthquake reserve. As of August 31, 1989, the University had $3.4 million in an earthquake reserve and another $3.6 million in a property reserve, to respond to such events as fires or floods (Stanford News 19 Oct. 1989 1).
This moderate amount of insurance, however, was not enough to defray the costs of reconstruction after the catastrophe. The university was already in the midst of a major fundraising endeavor; “The Centennial Campaign” was entering into its fourth year, begun in 1985. This project was one that planned to raise nearly a billion dollars towards programs and research in the university. At the time the earthquake hit, the university had already raised some $400 million dollars towards its objectives (Rosse 28-29). A press release from a meeting of the trustees reveals the situation the university was in at the time:
All academic buildings closed by the quake and Memorial Church will be repaired as part of the basic or “minimum” program. This includes the Language Corner (Building 260) and Geology Corner (Building 320), projected to cost $15.5 million and $13.5 million, respectively; the Museum at a cost of $15 million; Memorial Church, $12.5 million; the old Main Library, $13.5 million; and other empty buildings (most of them on the quad), $8.5 million. Some $6.5 million is set aside to repair all seven Row houses for students, and about $3.5 million to repair Anatomy and provide temporary space for the Medical School. Another component of the minimum program is the required strengthening of the un-reinforced masonry buildings—even if they were not damaged Oct. 17—at a cost of $31.5 million. This includes the whole Inner quad, Outer quad buildings that have not been remodeled and reinforced in recent years, the engineering labs behind the quad, Encina gym, and the art gallery. The optional category labeled “choices” and projected to cost $37.5 million includes life-safety strengthening that is not mandatory but recommended by seismic engineers. To pay the huge repair and bracing bill, the university plans to use $28 million in plant reserves, including $14 million originally intended for the Near West Campus redevelopment. Another $23 million will be allocated from facilities reserves over the next seven years and $4 million may be diverted for arcade repairs from General Plant Improvement funds that would have paid for roads and landscaping. Officials estimate that FEMA will approve $58 million for damage survey reports submitted by the university. So far, FEMA has approved a little over $1 million, but the university is still waiting to hear on the major buildings. The University has reordered its Centennial Campaign objectives, and will seek $40 million in quake repair donations from alumni and friends of the university, The University will also take on as much as another $18.5 million in long-term debt. ‘If we fall short of our fundraising targets, the only alternatives are either not to fix some buildings or to incur additional long-term debt,’ Hughes said. But such debt is not a good idea, he added. Each $10 million of debt adds about $1 million in debt service to the operating budget, he said. Provost James Rosse on Feb. 8 announced plans to cut $22 million from the operating budget during the next 18 months (Stanford News 13 Feb. 1990 2-3).
When one hears the university administration talking in these terms one wonders, “If the University has just raised almost $400 million dollars in only 3 years, why don’t we just use that money to pay for the repairs?”, but that lacks a fundamental understanding of how the university budget is allocated. James N. Rosse was the Vice-President and Provost of the university at the time when the earthquake took place. Due to the fact that most laymen did not understand how the Stanford University budget operated, he took it upon himself to outline the entire budget structure in his report on the Operating Budget Guidelines 1990-1991. Rosse explains how the University budget is divided into two main subdivisions: the restricted and the unrestricted budget. The restricted budget is what is usually used for grants, fellowships, research, and general instruction. The unrestricted budget is the portion of the budget that pays for capital improvements and plant maintenance. Those two components, along with other miscellaneous operating expenses, make up the Stanford Consolidated Operating Budget. The focus of the “Centennial Campaign” was primarily on expanding funding for research and endowment fellowships. Consequently, most of the contributing money had been earmarked for that purpose, leaving it unavailable for general use (11). The operating budgets of the University in 1906 were, by comparison, much more simplified in that they did not have major distinctions between restricted and unrestricted funds and the subsequent repairs merely came out of the general yearly income. Also, the prospect of taking on any type of debt for the university did not appeal at all to the members of the board of trustees at that time. So the recipients of the 1989 earthquake had to modify their current fundraising plans to cope with this new crisis by moving funds originally earmarked for the Near West Campus redevelopment to earthquake relief efforts.
Lessons Learned
Almost immediately following the destruction of the 1906 earthquake, engineers and architects began to examine how some buildings were completely destroyed, while others survived with little or no damage. A report published in Engineering News sums up the findings:
The principal structural lessons that can thus far be drawn from the earthquake is that any type of building construction--steel, brick, stone, concrete, or wood--which was well designed and thoroughly and honestly constructed stood the shock with very little damage resulting to it. This was well exemplified in the buildings of Stanford University. They were carefully examined after the earthquake by a committee of engineering professors and I have also personally gone over most of them since then. Nearly all the damage is due to a combination of three causes: (1) Absence of trussing in roofs, allowing a settling of rafters and a consequent shoving out of side walls; (2) poor masonry, having voids imperfectly filled with mortar, entire absence of bond between facing-stones and the brick backing, and showing convincing evidence that neither bricks nor stones were wet before laying. The buildings at Stanford are divided into two general classes—the working buildings, mainly built some years ago by day labor, and the ornamental buildings (chapel, gymnasium, library, museum, etc.), built lately by contract, with no engineering and very little architectural supervision. With rather unimportant exceptions, the damage was confined to the latter class. The line was so sharply drawn that the main body of the museum, carefully built of reinforced concrete some 13 years ago, was almost uninjured, while both its wings (lately built of poorly built brick and stone masonry) were practically ruined. The only example of steel construction is the dome of the new library building, which is supported directly from the ground by steel columns. This dome, with its stone facing, is uninjured—while the buildings surrounding it are a mass of ruins, its failure being perhaps aided by the vibrations of the dome-tower” (Duryea 510).
By coming to the realization that those buildings that were built of steel could better withstand an earthquake, the university began to more widely use steel in the reinforcing of its structures; David Starr Jordan said, “All stone and brick chimneys will be banished from the campus” (Palo Alto Times 24), illuminating the fact that nearly all the damage caused to the campus was due to falling chimneys. But one wonders, why did the founders of the university not take precautions in building given the geologic conditions in California? The California of 1906, understandably, was not as synonymous with earthquakes as it is today. A quote from Jordan reveals his own naïveté, “I suppose it was a mistake not to consider the possibility of an earthquake in drawing the plans for the construction of university buildings, but we all supposed that this section of the country was immune from temblors” (S.F. Examiner 7). Of course the lessons learned in 1906 directly related to the good fortune that the 1989 class experienced, as well as all future classes with regards to safety. By taking added precautions of higher quality building materials and a restriction on the height of certain buildings, the damages that occurred to the campus in the latter year were much less severe than they could have been. After the earthquake, however, the campus was also faced with the task of reinforcing all of the structures that had not been previously reinforced. This was due to a California law passed that required buildings to be in conformity with earthquake safety guidelines (Stanford News 13 Feb. 1990 3).
Drawing Conclusions
A disaster, by its very definition causes disruption in ones way of living. This is true of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, as well as the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake; so the reactions of those who were present, those of initial fear and panic, are understandable. The way in which the university reacted financially, however, is startling. In 1906, still hearing the echo of Jane Stanford’s pride in not wanting to disgrace her institution, the university to a very internal approach in how it repaired the damage that was done. Very little attention was given to massive fundraising efforts and the idea of getting major amounts of assistance from the government was, at this time, a novel one. Contrast that with the fact that in 1989, the university was already considering running a $2 million dollar deficit (Rosse 3) and the prospect of incurring more debt, although shunned upon, was still nonetheless considered a valid option, which it might not have been 83 years ago.
Works Cited
Beymer, Jeanette. Letter. Stanford Review Apr. 1931: 3.
Britannica Encyclopedia Ready Reference. CD-ROM. 1 disc. Britannica Interactive.
2002.
Campbell, Cole C. “We Were Like Tiny Sand Crabs Flipped Out of a Beach Blanket.”
Greensboro News & Record. 19 Oct. 1989: A7.
Duryea Jr., Edwin. “A Report on earthquake damages at San Francisco and Palo Alto.”
Engineering News. New York: NY 10 May 1906: 510.
Elwell, C.F. “A novel Seismograph.” Letter. Nov. 1950.
James, Mrs. William. Letter. Apr. 1906.
Jordan, David Starr. Untitled. San Francisco Examiner 1 May 1906: 7.
---. “Stanford University and the Earthquake of April 18, 1906.” Pacific Monthly. San Francisco
June 1906: 636-645.
---. “No Backwards step for the University.” Daily Palo Alto Times 16 May 1906: 24.
---. 3rd Annual Report of the President. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1906.
---. 8th Annual Report of the President. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1906.
Keatinge, Richard. Stanford Alumnus. Vol VII No.8 May 1906.
Mosher, Celia Duel. What the earthquake did and afterwards. June 1906.
Rosse, James N. Operating Budget Guidelines 1990-91. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
1991.
Stanford News. Press Release 19 Oct. 1989.
Stanford News. Press Release 24 Oct. 1989.
Stanford News. Press Release 13 Feb. 1990.
Stanford University Annual Financial Report 1989.
Treat, Payson J. Letter to father. 18 Apr. 1906.
Wing, Charles B., “Report of the Stanford University Engineers.” Engineering News.
New York: NY 10 May 1906: 509-511.
Willis, Bailey. “Date of Next Earthquake Not Certain.” Daily Palo Alto Times. 18 Apr. 1907: 31.
