Kant may argue that this moral difference is necessary and correctly placed. Kant believes that only rational and autonomous agents should be bearers of ‘moral worth’. In his view, animals are not self governing, self-conscious creatures. They are not ‘ends in themselves’, but are there only as a ‘means to an end’, to benefit human beings. Therefore, other animals, which do not have the ability to reason and be aware of their own consciousness, have no moral claim upon human beings. According to Kant, morality is based upon rationality and the ability to reason; therefore an irrational creature is consequently amoral. The two-year-old boy was aware of his surroundings and conscious of his consciousness; however, the pet dog was not. Therefore Kant may argue that this displays an ‘important moral difference’ between the way in which we treat humans and other animals. Kant’s argument being that it is morally wrong to keep a rational human being locked up in a kennel, (as to deny another rational being of respect is in turn denying yourself of your own rationality); however it is morally acceptable to keep an irrational dog in the same conditions, as amoral beings claim no moral worth upon us.
However, critics of Kant may question his concept of morality, claiming that just because animals are not rational, autonomous agents does not mean that we should deny them of respect and moral worth. Is rationality a significant basis for defining morality? Surely a human being suffering from a mental disorder could be deemed ‘irrational’, does this mean that we should deny them of ‘moral worth’ also? Jeremy Bentham claims “a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversible animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month old” (P. Singer, “All Animals are Equal” pg 4), therefore in Kant’s terms, does this imply that they should hold a larger ‘moral claim’ upon us?
Tom Regan introduced the ‘Rights view’, a theory which, in principle, claims that “all who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not” (T. Regan and P. Singer (eds), Animal rights and Human Obligations pg.111). Regan places equal value on both human beings and other animals, suggesting that there is not a moral difference between the two. Similarly to Bentham, Regan feels that it is unjustifiable to claim that humans have greater moral worth than animals. Also resisting Kant's view, Regan believes that to judge an animal on its inability to reason, or lack of intellect or autonomy is not valid. Human beings do not place less moral worth upon “the retarded child” or the “mentally deranged”, therefore why penalise other animals? As quoted by Singer, “If it is unfair to take advantage of an isolated defect, why is it fair to take advantage of a more general limitation?” (P. Singer, “All Animals are Equal” pg. 8) Animals do lack many of the abilities that human beings possess; however, certain human beings have fewer abilities than others do, but we do not suggest that they then have less inherent value or moral claim upon us.
It could be argued that these apparent double standards are a result of ‘speciesism’. The speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. A clear example of this, as presented by Singer, is the fact that we eat other animals but would not eat our own species; “we treat them purely as a means to our ends. We regard their life and well-being as subordinate to our taste for a particular kind of dish.” Therefore, we allow our personal interests to override the greater interests of animals, and in doing so, we are speciesists. It is the similarities between human beings as a species which distributes ‘equal’ moral worth amongst our species only, and therefore the dissimilarities between humans and animals which causes us to discriminate against them.
However, Frey in his ‘Case Against animal Rights’ may disagree with the notion that all human beings, even though they are of the same species, have equal moral worth. Frey claims, “I do not regard all human life as of equal value; I do not accept that a very severely mentally-enfeebled human or an elderly human fully in the grip of senile dementia or an infant born with only half a brain has a life whose value is equal to that of normal, adult humans” (T. Regan and P. Singer (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations pg 116). Therefore it is fair to say that there is an ‘important moral difference’ between human beings and other animals, determined by rationality, self-consciousness and intellect; just as it is fair to say that there is an important moral difference between certain humans, also characterised by this notion. Similarly, it could be argued that people living in Third World countries, who are uneducated and surrounded by disease, death and famine, may feel that their lives have less moral ‘worth’ compared to that of another, living in a well established democracy.
Despite the claim that there are moral differences between not only humans and other animals, but also between humans and other humans; Singer may argue that this is not relevant. Singer argues that the only relevant method of distinguishing between the species is sentience, in particular the capacity to feel pleasure and pain. Therefore, because both humans and animals are sentient creatures, there should not be an ‘important moral difference’ between the way we treat the two. According to Singer, it would not be acceptable to perform an experiment on a human being, because they would be able to feel the pain being inflicted upon them. However, to use a non-human instead shows “simple discrimination”, as “adult apes, cats, mice and other mammals are more aware of what is happening to them, more self-directing and, so far as we can tell, at least as sensitive to pain, as any human infant” (P. Singer, “All Animals are Equal” pg.5). Therefore, both human beings and other animals would feel the pain, which is why there should not be an ‘important moral difference’ between the two, and animal testing should, in this sense, be banned.
Similarly, the practise of rearing and killing animals for food is highly criticised by Singer. However, what if no pain were caused to either humans or animals, and the notion of ‘pain’ did not exist? Would it then be considered acceptable to rear and kill humans, and also animals? This helps to put this argument in to perspective. As it could be argued that sentience, and the ability to feel pleasure and pain, is not the most important moral concept. Even if humans could not feel pain, it would still not be accepted with in society to rear and kill them for our own means; therefore this suggests that despite Singer’s theory, an ‘important moral difference’ is still placed between the two. Of course Kant would argue that pleasure and pain were totally irrelevant, and ‘rationality’ was the key distinguisher.
The concept of ‘indirect duty’ also puts constraint on what is considered to be ‘acceptable behaviour’ towards other animals. It could be argued that duties towards animals are indirect duties towards mankind. An example of this is given in Cottingham, The Status of Non-Human Animals, where it is suggested that duties to humanity are reinforced as a result of obliging duties which are necessary to animals. Therefore, when a dog serves its master faithfully, the dog is rewarded and looked after, and kind and serving duties towards humanity are reinforced as a result. Similarly, if the master were to have the dog shot, he is hence damaging the kindness and humanity in himself, and therefore also destroying his sense of duty to mankind. It is suggested that there is a direct link between the two, and that feelings and actions towards animals will be reflected in dealings towards mankind. This suggests, then, that there should not be an ‘important moral difference’ between the two, as then to hurt an animal e.g. live animal testing, would mean that the notion of pain and cruelty would be reflected in ones actions towards mankind also.
In this sense, for the ‘good of mankind’, there should not be an ‘important moral difference’ between both humans and other animals; as a man who acts with cruelty towards animals will become ‘hardened’ in his dealings with humans also. However, this is a very selfish perspective, purely to benefit humanity, therefore could it be argued that this act of selfishness is in fact immoral in itself?
In conclusion, this argument has presented many interesting and yet conflicting points of view. As I stated previously, ‘morality’ is a highly subjective issue, as there is never a right or a wrong answer. The question, “Is there an important moral difference between human beings and (other) animals?” has posed many questions, yet also provided many answers. Views change from one person to the next and over time. Bentham may believe that just as practises in the past, (such as black slavery in the British dominions), were once considered natural and inevitable, have now come to be seen as a result of unjustifiable prejudice; so too may practises and prejudices towards animals. “It may one day come to be recognised that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate” (P. Singer, “All Animals are Equal” pg 4). However, of course, philosophers such as Kant or Frey may strongly disagree, which is why the question posed provides many possible conclusions.
Bibliography~
P. Singer, “All Animals are Equal”, 1989
Cottingham, “The Status of Non-Human Animals”, pg 441-3
T. Regan and P. Singer (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations
