Monash University Philosophy: Caulfield

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SURNAME: Hobbs

GIVEN NAMES: Michael

ID no: 19930623

SUBJECT CODE: PHL1070

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Plagiarism – Student’s Statement: Michael Hobbs

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4. Replaceability and persons

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4. Replaceability and persons

Classical Utilitarianism takes a ‘total’ view of morality, meaning that what ultimately matters is the total amount of happiness and suffering in the world. Many utilitarians accept that this commits them to a principle of replaceability. That is, it is sometimes justifiable to kill an individual, if that individual is then replaced by a new individual who will contribute just as much, or ideally more happiness, to the overall total. But, in ‘Killing Humans and Killing Animals’, Peter Singer suggests that this consequence can be evaded in the special case of persons: persons are not replaceable and this gives a reason for not killing persons that we do not have for non-personal beings.

Is the idea of replaceability defensible? Is Singer right in thinking that replaceability marks an important point of difference between humans and other animals?

The question has been asked whether the idea of replaceability is defensible? The idea of replaceability is largely connected with the Classical Utilitarian view that is concerned with the total amount of happiness in the world by way of maximising happiness or pleasure and minimising pain or suffering. From this total view one can then derive the concept of replaceability where for example the killing of one happy, mature individual is permissible so long as another can replace them and thus equalise or increase the amount of happiness in the world, resulting in no less happiness than before anyone was killed. Although Peter Singer is widely seen as utilitarian he is able to make an important distinction between the rights of humans and animals by suggesting that humans have the ability to be persons and therefore have preferences regarding their “plans, intentions, desires and hopes”(Townsend 2004:16). This idea of personhood that Singer proposes is one that can only be ascribed to humans and therefore gives an important weight of interest to humans over other animals who will obviously never be able to obtain preferences of this quality. Through the additional and more flexible thoughts that Singer provides regarding utilitarianism we are able to move from the rigidity of the Classical Utilitarian view, illustrating that replaceability is in many cases not defensible.

Under the views of a Classical Utilitarian we are faced with many limitations and it is a philosophy often thought of as harsh and insensitive to the rights of individuals. By advocating this line of thought one is accepting the idea that people are simply numbers in a pool of happiness and that if some of these numbers are to decline there will only be a problem until the numbers are brought back up or replaced to the original amount of happiness in the pool. Once the pool is refilled and the numbers replaced, we can see according to the classical view that no harm is done. Such views leave little or no room in the discussion for not defending replaceability, and seem highly implausible if we are to apply such ethics practically to the real world.

Those holding a general utilitarian stance will have difficulty arguing against replaceability, however if we are like Singer, able to attach significance to the preferences associated with a person, there is hope for the utilitarian in the fight against replaceability. Due to the overwhelming desire amongst humans to live out their lives and fulfil many preferences throughout the course of life, it is obvious why the killing of such a person would be of the highest moral injustice, frustrating their preferences altogether. By highlighting the importance of these preferences connected to persons, we simultaneously emphasise the less important roles of merely sentient creatures that are unable to attain such personhood. In accordance with my comments on less evolved beings as differing from persons are the famous words of John Locke who claims a person is ‘A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places’ (Singer 1993:87). Through these influential claims, it is found that for a being to qualify as a person they must be fully conscious and aware of their existence over time. It is now clear that we can regard persons as deserving special interests and that they are not beings that can be insensitively traded off for a replacement, having preferences that outweigh the perhaps shallow view of total happiness in the world.

Although Singer has through this preference strand of utilitarianism, distinguished between non-personal beings and those of developed persons, he is unconvincing in the grey area that falls between these two beings, leaving us with an area of instability in our moral thought. This area covers those beings who are sentient and that although may not be persons, could have some preferences of consideration. Such beings would include a mature chimpanzee and perhaps infants embarking on childhood, both of which could certainly exhibit preferences for pleasure and pain and possibly have an understanding of themselves through time. Beings of this kind shed new light on the defending of replaceability and also on Singers line of thinking. As these types of beings are not viewed as persons by a philosophical definition, yet still have the capacities it would seem to surpass mere sentient creatures such as fish, moral thought can become inconsistent. A utilitarian based Singer would, having possibly exhausted his tolerance with personhood in this discussion, find it difficult to distinguish between the killing of a chimpanzee and that of an infant. To add to this, Singer may even now technically adopt the saving of a well-developed chimpanzee rather than that of a newborn baby, as a greater level of preference would be filled. Although, Singer may also decide intuitively that a baby’s life is perhaps worth saving over the chimp, he would certainly not be doing so under the grounds of ‘speciesism’ or ‘human priority’, which draws me to my next point of furthering the separation between humans and animals.

At this point having supported Singer’s earlier ideas regarding personhood, I would continue further to draw the line between that of humans and animals in a similar vein to that of Rosalind Hursthouse. She proposes we can regard any member of a species, for example the species of homo sapiens, as being a person so long as some or all of its members have attributes that make them persons (Townsend, 2004:87). Through this line I feel we can include all humans including infants and the mentally disabled as retaining rights of personhood by virtue of them being a part of a species that generally are persons. It may not be that in every possible case we can defend the lives of humans for example some terminally ill patients and that of dangerous pregnancies, but we can most importantly defend them in regards to replaceability amongst animals. Such a distinction can be drawn between animals and humans, not by way of ‘speciesism’ that Singer refers to (Townsend, 2004:69), but through the recognition of beings with the potential for personhood and the membership of a group that has within it characteristics of persons. Such characteristics that I speak of in persons simply can’t be found in animals, thus leaving them unprotected and below the line which I have drawn between humans and animals.

In conclusion, Singer is justified in his adoption of preference utilitarian views in the argument for personal beings and therefore is in accordance with my view that replaceability is not defensible on any real level. So it is in this practical notion of ethics I am able to break through the utilitarian barriers restricting Singers argument and further propose that a clear difference can be made regarding the replaceability of not just persons and animals, but of all humans and other animals.

Bibliography

Singer, P (1993), ‘Practical Ethics, 2nd Edition’, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press.
Townsend, A, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’, ‘Study Guide and Readings Part A’, The School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics, Monash University, 2004:66-68.
Townsend, A, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’, ‘Study Guide and Readings Part A’, The School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics, Monash University, 2004:87-88.
Townsend, A, ‘What’s Wrong With Killing’, ‘Study Guide and Readings Part A’, The School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics, Monash University, 2004:16.