In contrast, Ferenczi attempted to promote psychoanalysis on a more interpersonal and interactive level (Schatcher & Kächele, 2007). In consultations with patients, Ferenczi expressed an empathetic attunement and warmth to the patient, sharing feelings, thoughts and observations that were not only related to the therapy, but also his personal life (Meissner, 1998). This synergism between patient and therapist, wherein Ferenczi disclosed to patients, was a direct challenge to the principles of neutrality, consequently resulting in the main theoretical impetus for the movement towards a more interactive analytical process.
The Freud-Ferenczi, neutral-interpersonal, debate has continued throughout the history of analytic treatment. The patient’s autonomy, guidance towards the analytic process, and the influence on interventions are aspects of the analytic process which have been scrutinized.
According to Greenberg (1986), neutralism maximizes the patient’s autonomy in the analytical process. As the patient engages in giving an account of the illness or condition, a detailed inquest is recorded by the therapist. The patient’s role is organized by the prerequisite of the freedom to express and this is counterbalanced with the analyst’s prerequisite, which is structured to sanction, listening and understanding (Mills, 2005). There is a synergic effect from roles of both the patient’s and analysts, and this establishes a vehicle for destabilizing the neurotic equilibrium.
On the other hand, the analyst can participate more in the analytic process by self-disclosing. Schachter and Kächele (2007) argued that interactions, such as self-disclosure, are two-fold. Firstly, the patient participates less and important areas of the account may be obscured. Secondly, without open expression and interaction from the analyst, the patient may feel inhibited to further explore personal affects. Schachter and Kächele proposed that self-disclosure by the analyst can encourage the patient in ancillary examination.
However, this prompting may be problematic. The patient may be more likely conform to, rather than challenge, the ideas of the analyst and consequently providing a false account (Shill, 2004). Analytical neutrality can overcome this fault. As a result of maximum concentration, the analyst can easily identify the areas that require attention when conducting the analysis. The analyst can probe these areas by asking carefully devised questions in order to open dialogue allowing for greater self-examination by the patient. In light of this solution, analytic neutrality is advantageous to self-disclosure techniques as neutrality can “empower [the patient], rather than encourag[e] a dependency on analyst as problem solver” (McIlwain, 2007). Likewise, the code of Batman not only maximizes his autonomy in fighting crime, it also provides a medium in which he can control and channel his attention towards doing ‘good’.
Just as Batman’s code offers guidance in how to handle foes, neutrality is also acts guiding ideal that is formed and informs all of the analyst’s actions and attitudes in the analytic process (McWilliams, 2003). Contrast to the rigid constraint on human responsiveness as depicted by Meissner (1998), the neutral analytic structure establishes a vital contribution to the integrity and nature of the methodological process. Freud (1912; as cited in Schatcher & Kächele, 2007) noted the analytic process is defined by transference, which involves a distortion of reality. Neutrality and abstinence permits the transference to unfold relatively uninfluenced by direction from the analyst. This provides the analysis with the internal freedom required to observe the patient’s distortions in reality.
Alternatively, self-disclosures offer an external means to the analyst in probing transference. Whereas neutrality guides the analyst in conducting the analytic process, the interpersonal approach lacks an analogous reference point. This attenuates the analytic process as the interactions and disclosures of the therapist remain unguided. In order to establish the use of self-disclosures as an alternative analytical technique, it is necessary to delineate a protocol in which to match various analytic circumstances to appropriate self-disclosures, albeit a non verbatim procedure (Roberts, 1997). Therefore, neutrality as a principle plays a significant role in guiding the therapist in the analytical process and is advantageous to interpersonal techniques such as self-disclosures.
However, according to critics it is impossible to observe neutrality in an analytical relationship. Shill (2004) regards analytic neutralism as ill-conceived as the implicated subjectivity is irreducible and the analyst is provided with unwarranted authority. Similarly, academics (e.g., Mills, 2005) which support interpersonal approaches with patients argue that, even in a neutral context, the analyst inevitably has expectations for the patient that can influence the intervention (McWilliams, 2003).
In an attempt to provide a solution to this challenge, one can propose that neutrality may serve as the foundations upon which the analyst can gain a deeper understanding of their personal expectations and how these may impact upon the intervention. Rosenfarb (2010) suggested that whilst probing a patient, neutrality may allow for the identification of areas that require attention when formulating the intervention. This can be juxtaposed to the subjective intrusions that occur with self-disclosing techniques. Not only do self-disclosing techniques interfere with how the patient is examined, they can also result in the denial of appropriate interventions (Shill, 2004). The inevitable expectations that psychoanalysts usually have for their patients may have a significant influence on intervention. However, the use of neutrality may be essential when devising appropriate interventions for the patient.
Another criticism is that the analytical neutrality tends to disengage the patient from the analyst (Meissner, 1998). Some critics suggest that although neutrality remains equidistant from the requirements of the drives, ego, and superego, it does not preclude the existence of the intent of the therapy (Greenberg, 1986). Alternatively, proponents of neutrality assert that although neutrality may be passive in nature, there is still involvement between patient and analyst (Mills, 2007). One can suggest that as the participant-observer relationship exists, in the essence that the analyst inevitably interacts with the patient, neutrality precludes disengagement the patient.
In conclusion, the patient’s autonomy, guidance towards the analytic process, and the influence on interventions are aspects of the analytic process in which neutrality is advantageous to self-disclosing techniques. Through thorough evaluation it is evident that, similarly to Batman’s personal code which acts as a guiding force in his assignment to fighting crime, neutrality functions to guide the analysts in the analytic process. With adherence to a code which is intended to non-pejoratively help others, one can conclude that psychoanalysts are Batman.
References
Freud, S. (1912). Recommendations to physicians practicing psychoanalysis. In Schachter, J., & Kächele, H. (2007). The analyst’s role in healing: Psychoanalysis-Plus. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 24(3), 429 – 444
Greenberg, J. (1986). The problem of analytic neutrality. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 22, 76 – 86
McArtor, M., & Schneider, F. W. (2007). Complete Scoundrel: A Player’s Guide to Trickery and Ingenuity. New York: Wizards of the cost.
McIlwain, D. (2007). The Pirate’s Code of psychoanalysis: Moral rules or merely guidelines? Australian Review of Public Affairs, Digest.
McWilliams, N. (2003). The educative aspects of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 20(2), 245 – 260
Mills, J. (2005). A critique of relational psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22(2), 155 – 188
Meissner, W. W. (1998). Neutrality, Abstinence and the Therapeutic Alliance. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 46, 1089 – 1128.
Roberts, D. (1997). Differential Interventions in Psychotherapy of Borderline, Narcissistic, and Schizoid Personality Disorders: The Masterson Approach. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 4(4), 233 – 245
Rosenfarb, I. S. (2010) FAP and Psychodynamic Therapies. In Kanter, J. W., Tsai, M., & Kohlenberg, R. J. The practice of functional analytic psychotherapy. (p. 83 – 95). New York: Springer.
Schachter, J., & Kächele, H. (2007). The analyst’s role in healing: Psychoanalysis-Plus. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 24(3), 429 – 444
Shill, M. (2004). Analytic neutrality, anonymity, abstinence, and elective self-disclosure. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 52, 151 – 187.
