This essay has already proposed that humans are social beings. Humans develop attachments to other humans. Bowlby (1998) proposed an attachment theory which suggested that humans possess a psychological tendency to seek closeness to others, to feel secure when that person is present, and to experience anxiety in their absence. Harlow and Harlow (1969) conducted attachment theory experiments on monkeys. Young monkeys were given two dolls to act as surrogate mothers. The monkeys explored more when the soft-cloth doll was near, suggesting that the doll gave them a sense of security. Similarly, infant children explored more when they felt secure (Bowlby, 1998). Lifespan development theory proposed an intimate relationship between human individual development and social experiences (Wood et al, 2002). Correspondingly, Harlow and Harlow (1969) found the infant monkeys isolated from other monkeys showed deviant behaviour in social situations. They were overly aggressive or fearful when they met other monkeys and had unusual sexual responses. Female monkeys raised in isolation often mistreated or neglected their offspring. This abnormal behaviour was thought to demonstrate that a bond with the mother is necessary for further social development (Harlow and Harlow, 1969). Freud’s (1923) research on humans also indicated that there were connections between the experiences one has as a child and one has as an adult, and that a positive relationship with one’s mother is necessary for normal future development. This suggests that humans and monkeys are shaped by experiences, social interactions and the structure of society which they experience throughout their lifespan, and that both groups require a healthy relationship with their mother in order to develop normally. It also implies that both groups feel fixity, in that their early relationships correspond to their adult relationships (Wood et al, 2002). The presence of attachment in non-human primates also implies that animals communicate.
Humans feel that intricate communication skills differentiate them from other animals. However, there may not be a great deal of difference between the method by which we communicate and the manner that other animals connect. Humans think and create meaning on a constant basis while they communicate (Cooper and Kaye, 2002). Honeybees are social creatures who also communicate with their group members. They use a round dance if they have found food within 50 meters of the hive and a waggle dance if the location is more remote. They convey information about the distance and direction of the food (Kirschner and Towne 1994). Likewise, vervet monkeys perform alarm-calls when they detect a predator. They can communicate whether the predator is a leopard, eagle or snake, and the group escapes accordingly (Seyfarth et al, 1980). This suggests that there is two-way communication, as the respondents can be seen to take action, think, problem-solve and plan when they react to the dance and alarm-call (Cooper and Kaye, 2002). These abilities could be perceived as human traits but psychologists have performed empirical tests to conclude that they co-exist in other animals. However, humans communicate in a more sophisticated manner to other animals as, by contrast, they do not rely on physical movements to communicate ideas and information. Humans have the unique ability to interact using language. The next paragraph will explore whether this is a distinct human capacity, or merely a more advanced form of communication.
Psychologists speculate as to whether human’s language use is qualitatively or quantitatively different from other animal communication (Cooper and Kaye, 2002). Language use and theory of the mind are interconnected, as the interaction between these two phenomena allows humans to communicate complex ideas and communicate specific reactions to others (Sperber, 2000). However, on the basis of evidence already explored in this essay, theory of the mind co-exists in other animals, albeit at a quantitatively lower level. Apes have been taught sign-language, and have been able to respond appropriately to trainers questions (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, 1994). Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin (1994) argued that their research proved that bonobo communication was comparable to that of a 2.5 year old human. Therefore, the difference between human and non-human communication was quantitative, and did not indicate a significant difference between humans and other animals. However, it was difficult to interpret whether the apes understood the language, or if they merely responded to the sound of speech. Although the apes could react to language, their inability to produce language suggested that their cognitive-linguistic abilities could be qualitatively different to humans. Furthermore, humans have been found to have unique anatomical features necessary for speech (Cooper and Kaye, 2002).
Aitchison (1983) proposed ten design features of language. He concluded that four of these characteristics were uniquely human and that the differences were of a significant qualitative nature. Aitchison (1983) believed that semanticity was uniquely human, in that humans were the only type of animal that could appreciate that words reflected aspects of the world. However, Littleton et al (2002) argued that animals could also form internal representations like humans. Atchison (1983) also believed that displacement was a uniquely human characteristic, as humans can speak about the past, present and future. Pinker (1994) concurred that that language was a unique human ability, as animals merely communicate in the ‘here and now’ whereas humans communicate on a distinctly higher level. However, there is no proof that animals are incapable of this higher form of communication, it is merely presumed (Cooper and Kaye, 2002). Aitchison (1983) also felt that animals did not understand the human concept of syntax or creativity as regards language, and these abilities made humans qualitatively different to other animals. As it is difficult to prove that primates possess these skills, it seems that humans do indeed possess unique linguistic abilities.
Specific linguistic abilities seem to separate us from other animals. Biological features also disconnect us from other animals. Human infants depend on adults for a longer time than other adults due to their initial small brain size and socialisation requirements (Hollway et al, 2002). Furthermore, as females have a hidden oestrus, unlike other primates, humans enjoy sexual relations throughout their menstrual cycle, and this ensures that males stay with their female in order to ensure that they become the father of her offspring. This need for commitment is a unique human characteristic and it has been found in a number of cultures (Buss et al, 1992). Gender is plainly a human issue which separates us from other animals, as sexual relationships are influenced by many cultural and individual factors. Gender is maintained through discourses, so animals cannot be engendered as they do not engage in sophisticated discourses. These are significant qualitative differences which differentiate humans from other animals (Hollway et al, 2002).
Humans are comparable to other animals on many levels. Other animals possess traits that were previously presume to be distinctly human. Animals can communicate, and some bonobos are capable of complex communication as they use sign language successfully (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, 1998). Animals develop strong attachments which are comparable to human attachments (Bowlby, 1988, Harlow and Harlow, 1969). Animals can engage in complex thought processes, and their theory of the mind development is comparable to a 2.5 year old child (Whiten, 1997). However, animals do not possess the physical ability to speak, and it is presumed that they do not possess the same complex linguistic ability as humans (Pinker, 1994 and Aitchison, 1983). Furthermore, animals do not experience the same cultural gender influences as humans, as they cannot engage in the higher form of discourse that is unique to humans (Buss et al, 1992). Although animals have been shown to possess many traits that were previously thought to be exclusively human, there are significant and qualitative differences between humans and other animals.
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