R Blackford rejects the idea that embryos have a ‘right to life’. He states that unlike a human, early embryos have no interests, and if death is the misfortune for it, ‘it is certainly not in the same way as for an adult’. [5] Blackford insists that we cannot give moral weight to the interests possessed by ‘entities’, which are incapable of ‘suffering pain or frustration’. [5]
Blackford viewpoints are immoral, and pay little attention to the potentiality of the early embryo. Even though, he is right to say that early embryos have no interests, his fundamental belief that embryos have no rights overlooks the fact that they do indeed have the potentiality of becoming a human being. [1] For instance, I find it unreasonable that people can draw a moral line between the destruction of an embryo and infanticide. [5] If we condemn infanticide on the basis of potentiality, then we cannot morally deny an embryo the right to life on this same basis of potentiality.[5] It is specious and unfair to justify rights for some, but not other ‘entities’, that like newborn babies, have the potential to develop self-awareness or personhood. However, on the basis of utilitarian principle, I fully agree with the policy outlined by the Bush administration, as it condemns the creation of new lines of stem cells and only uses spare embryos that will be discarded anyway. [2] It therefore it aims to achieve a compromised solution whereby we are able to benefit from a medical point of view, especially in the potential role of stem cells treating incurable diseases such as paraplegia and Parkinson’s Disease [6]. However, according to Blackford viewpoint, the creation of new stem line would be acceptable, especially since embryos they ‘have no rights’. The implications of sharing Blackford’s opinions and carrying it forward to stem cell research may be severe, especially regarding the debate on whether it would be permissible to carry out ‘therapeutic cloning’. [7]
Rebecca Dresser, a Professor of Ethics at Washington University, addresses the issues surrounding the use of human embryos in research, and discusses whether the intention for which embryos are created for matter, and if embryos deserve ‘special respect’ due to their ‘potentiality’. [7] Much like Blackford, Dresser concludes that at the point at which stem cells are derived, the early embryos lack many characteristics, including the ability to think, feel pleasure or more importantly pain, since their nervous system hasn’t yet formed. [7] Consequently, Dresser believes that due to the facts, many people perceive early embryos as lacking a moral status. Dresser raises an important question: ‘if early embryos aren’t persons…can anything be done with them’. [7] To answer this question it is fundamental to understand the intentions for which embryos are or may be created.
To highlight the significance of these views (i.e. embryos lacking moral status), which are currently being endorsed in embryo research, Dresser raises a fundamental issue concerning the creation of an embryo via cloning a living persons cell (procedure known as ‘therapeutic cloning’) for biomedical research purposes. [7] Rebecca argues that deliberately ‘creating human life’ for research, undermines the ‘special respect’ embryos possess due to their potentiality and that we are treating embryos too much like objects. [7] She predicts that if the Bush administration is willing to give a lack of moral status to embryo, the implications may result in a slippery-slope. [7] Goldstein also agrees with the slippery-slope threat, and suggests that allowing cloning for biomedical research purposes would lead to ‘human beings being created for spare body parts’. [8] In my opinion, this slippery slope threat is severely exaggerated especially since stem cell research is carried out in a highly regulated environment. [6] As Professor John Burn concludes, the Human Fertilization Authority (HFEA) has the ability to ‘reach resonated conclusions on similarly touchy subjects’. [6]
According to Dresser’s view that embryos possess a ‘special respect’ due to their potentiality of becoming human beings, they must share the same moral status of human beings. Therefore due to the Kantian principle, if we give them the same moral status as human beings, it would be morally wrong to destroy human embryos, even though the potential benefits of conducting such research may save lives of others. [9] Creating a clone of a person simply as a source of ‘spare body parts’ is a violation of the Kantian principle. As Immanuel Kant notably quotes: ‘always treat persons as ends in themselves and not merely as means to some other end’. [4]
Dudley elaborates on Dresser’s views and raises ethical issues regarding human cloning. He is concerned with the ongoing ethical debate over human cloning, and believes appropriate limits must be placed to prevent human cloning eventually becoming common and accepted as in-vitro fertilization. [9] Dudley is primarily concerned with the safety of cloning and suggests it is ‘far from being a infallible process’. [9] He mentions the failed attempt of creating ‘Dolly the Sheep’ as a clear indication of why human cloning should be banned. It took 277 attempts to successfully create Dolly, thus Dudley realized that ‘the prospect of a similar failure/success rate involving humans is grounds enough to ban human cloning research’. [9] In addition, due to the long-term physical health problems and premature ageing of clones, as experienced by Dolly the sheep, the safety issues of current cloning experiments must warrant a moratorium on human cloning. [9]
Dudley addresses safety as the fundamental reason to halt human cloning, but in my opinion fails to consider other ethical issues that go beyond questions of safety. Firstly, he fails to mention that cloning of animals should be banned on the basis of speciesism. According to Regan, there should be a total abolition of animals in science. [10] With regards to animal rights, Regan believes that the ‘fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as our resources’. [10] I thereby conclude, that if we reject human cloning, we must remain consistent and also reject animal cloning. Furthermore, cloning in animals violates the Kantian principles outlined earlier.
In response to ethical issues concerning the use of animals in scientific research, and more specifically cloning, the Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology (GAEIB) published a report and submitted opinions to the European Commission to tackle the ethical implications of cloning techniques. [11] As outlined by the GAEIB, the use of animal cloning should only be acceptable if carried out under strict regard to animal welfare, and ‘under the supervision of licensing bodies’. [11] Although I believe it is unjust to carry out animal cloning the GAEIB believe that cloning of farm animals is likely to enhance our understanding of many biological processes, hence contribute to human wellbeing. [11] Even though I disagree with the use of animals in cloning, I believe the opinions of the GAEIB must be considered if animal cloning continues to take place. However, many researchers today have violated the fundamental ethical conditions, which allow work on animals being viewed as acceptable. For instance, Dolly the sheep was euthanized due to a progressive lung disease and severe arthritis. [9] According to the outlines set out by the GAEIB, researchers violated the condition, which states that researchers have the ‘duty to avoid animal or minimize animal suffering since unjustified or disproportionate suffering is unacceptable’. [11]
Embryonic stem cell research and cloning will continue to take place, even though many ethical and moral issues surround the biotechnologies. It is therefore essential that governing bodies place appropriate limits on the use of biotechnologies, and ensure further effort is made to improve public awareness of such technologies. [11]They must realize that as science evolves, new technologies will increase the power of people over nature. [11] Therefore researchers have a responsibility and duty to ensure research work is conducted according to a strict mandate. [11] Whether we decide that the certain areas of biotechnologies are morally wrong and unacceptable depends on what moral status we assign to early embryos as discussed in the paper. Essentially, we must ensure that the agriculture and medical benefits of using the biotechnologies outweigh the ethical controversies it is associated with.
References:
1. Beauchamp, T. Walters, L. ‘Contemporary Issues in Bioethics: Biotechnology and Bioscience’, Wadsworth 7th Edition, 2007
2. Beauchamp, T. Walters, L. ‘The Presidents Council on Bioethics: Human Cloning and Human Dignity, An Ethical Enquiry ’, Washington, 2002
3. Khan, L, ‘Ethics Analysis of the Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Debate’, Washburn University, 2008
4. Dr. Mendelsohn, H04: Ethical Controversies and Ethical Dilemmas in Science and Technology: Lecture 4: Nature, 2011
5. Blackford, R., ‘Stem cell research on other worlds, or why embryos do not have a right to life, British Medical Journal, Manash University, Australia, 2005
6. Burn, J, ‘Personal View: Can a cell have a soul?’, British Medical Journal Volme 336 pp 1132, 2008
7. Dresser, D., ‘Stem Cell Research: The Bigger Picture’, Perspective in Biology and Medicine, The John Hopkins University Press, 2005
8. Goldstein, A. ‘President presses senate to ban all human cloning. Washington Post, 2002
9. Dudley, W, ‘Ethics of Human Cloning’, Greenhaven Press, San Diego, 2004
10. Regan, T, ‘The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights’ In Defense of Animals, Oxford, 1985
11. Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology, ‘Ethical aspects of cloning techniques’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 1997.