Detrimental reliance
The person asserting the claim must show that he has done something to his detriment (per Lord Bridge)
Gissing V Gissing
Eves V Eves = the man told the woman that the only reason the house was being put only in his name was that she was under 21. In reliance of that she had two children, redecorated parts of the house and did heavy works (she demolished a garden shed). She was awarded a quarter shares in the proceeds for sale.
Grant v Edwards = the man bought the property in his name and that of his brother and told the woman that he did so just because she was divorcing from her husband and it could have affected it if she had her name on a property with another man. The man paid the deposit and the mortgage and the woman paid to keep the home. The court entitled her to half of the share.
- Inferred common intention
In Gissing lord Diplock said that common intention is what a reasonable man would infer from conduct.
No beneficial interest
In absence of an agreement, expressed or implied, indirect contribution will not avail the woman claim for a share in the property. The following types of conduct will not infer an acquisition of an interest:
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Improvements to the home.
Pettitt V Pettitt = the hose was in the sole name of the wife, the husband claimed a share in the proceed for sale when they divorced. The wife paid for it but the husband claimed beneficial interest for helping with redecoration of the house and the garden. The court held that:
- There was no presumption of advancement
- There was agreement that he should acquire a beneficial interest, it was a gift to his wife.
Hussey V Palmer = the wife paid for an extension to the house and the court decided she had a beneficial interest, although they could not agree whether it was a resulting of a constructive trust.
Thomas V Fuller-Brown = a woman carried out substantial works to the man’s house , she had no beneficial interest.
- General works around the home
Lloyds Bank Plc V Rosset= the man bought the house with his money in his own name. Unknown to his wife he borrowed money from the bank to pay for improvements. The wife supervised the works. The man became insolvent and the bank wanted to sell the house, the wife wanted a share. The court said no, it is normal for a wife to supervise the works in her husband house.
- Contributing with her income to other expenses in the household.
Gissing V Gissing = home was in husband sole name, he also paid the mortgage with his money. She paid for herself, their son and some furniture. When he left she claimed a beneficial interest, but she failed because there was no common intention at the time of the acquisition of the house that she should have had a beneficial interest.
Burns V Burns = Fox LJ Made an obiter comment that if the woman makes a substantial contribution even indirectly it could make her acquire a beneficial interest. In the case Mrs Burns had done no contribution so she did not have a beneficial interest.
Shares in the proceeds of sale
Resulting trust= proportion to the contribution made before the purchase price, later instalments don’t count.
Constructive trust=it is inferred by conduct.
Cowcher V Cowcher = the share of her interest was unaffected by the later instalments is just the intention at the time when the property is purchased that counts.
Abstract: Rights of property between husband and wife are in principle the same as between strangers; they do not alter on the break-up of a marriage. Per curiam: It is desirable that solicitors dealing with the purchase of a matrimonial home should invariably enquire of the spouses as to their intentions regarding beneficial ownership. H and W bought a house for GBP 12,000 in 1963. The house was conveyed to H alone. It was agreed that W should be treated as having provided the GBP 4,000 which was paid in cash. The remaining GBP 8,000 was borrowed by a loan secured by a mortgage of the house and of a with-profits endowment policy for GBP 8,000 on H's life, which was written for the benefit of W under the Married Women's Property 1882 subject to the charge for GBP 8,000. W paid some instalments when H was unable to do so. The marriage was dissolved in 1971 and W claimed a half share in the house; H contended that she was entitled only to one-third.
Summary: Held, (1) that the effect of the payment of instalments by W was not to alter the beneficial interests but to make H liable to account for those payments to W when the proceeds of sale were divided; (2) that no unequivocal evidence could be found of an intention that the beneficial interests should be different from the proportions in which the purchase money had been advanced: accordingly W was entitled to one-third only of the proceeds.
Springette V Defoe = when the property was bought in joint names and no mention was made about the beneficial interest the court inferred that the share corresponded to the proportion in which they contributed.
Drake V Whipp = an initial resulting trust can be displaced by an express common intention of a constructive trust. An unmarried couple bought a ban for conversion, the woman overall contributed with 19%. The court of Appeal emphasized that assessing the share is very different in resulting trusts from constructive trusts. In resulting trust it is the proportion of the contribution in constructive trust it is inferred by conduct.
Clough V Killey = if there is an express agreement as to the size of the share then the contribution does not matter.
Gissing V Gissing = if there is nothing expressed the court should try also to infer from conduct.
Midland Bank plc V Cooke = the size of the share can be inferred from conduct. Mrs. Cooke contributed 6.47% to the purchase of the family home; the rest was put by the husband. The trial judge gave the wife the proportion she paid, but the court of Appeal took the view that they were a couple who wanted to share everything and they divided the beneficial interest evenly.
Pettitt v Pettitt
Abstract: The is purely procedural; it does not confer on the court an unfettered discretion to override existing rights in property, or to apply any notion of family assets not to be found in English law in determining disputes as to title or possession after a marriage has broken down. Such issues involve questions of social policy which should be dealt with by Parliament. The legal title to H and W's former matrimonial home was in W alone. H had not paid any money towards its purchase but he had redecorated and improved the home, thus enhancing its value. Following a divorce H issued proceedings under s. 17 claiming an interest in the proceeds of sale of the home.
Summary: Held, allowing W's appeal, (1) that s. 17 was merely procedural, and (2) that in the absence of any agreement or estoppel to the contrary W was absolutely entitled to the home or the proceeds of its sale.
Gissing v Gissing
Abstract: Where the matrimonial home was conveyed into the name of one spouse only and there was no agreement or understanding or expression of intention that the other spouse, though she had contributed, should have a beneficial interest therein, the law of trust would apply to resolve the entitlement of each spouse. The respondent made no direct contribution towards the purchase of the matrimonial home. She, however, spent her own money on furniture, improvement of the lawn and the family's clothes. The parties got married in 1935, purchased the house in 1951 and the respondent obtained a decree absolute in 1966.
Summary: Held, that it was not possible to draw an inference that there was any common intention that the respondent should have any beneficial interest in the matrimonial home.
Eves v Eves
Abstract: Where a man leads a woman, to whom he is not married, to believe that she is to have an interest in a house which he has purchased, and the parties maintain and use it for their joint benefit, the court will find a constructive trust in favour of the woman that the house is held partly for her benefit. P, a woman under 21, and D started living together in 1968, and in 1969 they had a child. D bought a house for them to live in, telling P that he would have had it transferred into their joint names, had she been over twenty- one. At the trial he admitted that her age was merely an excuse. The house was dilapidated and P did a great deal of heavy work improving it. They had another child, but in 1972, D married another woman. In 1973 P was compelled to leave the house with the children because of threats of violence. She applied for a share in the house.
Summary: Held, P had been led to believe that she was to have a share in the house, part of the bargain being the work she had done in improving it, and the court made a declaration that D held the house on trust as to one- quarter in her favour.
Tinsley v Milligan
Abstract: Even where title to property has been acquired in a course of illegal conduct, a claimant to an interest in it may still seek to assert his claim, so long as he does not plead, or rely on, an illegality. Two parties purchased a house in the sole name of one, but on the understanding that they were both joint beneficial owners of the property. The purpose of the purchase was to perpetrate a social security fraud. When the parties fell out, P, in whose name the house was registered, asserted her right to sole ownership of the property. The other counterclaimed that she had an equitable right in it. This was allowed by the court, and P appealed.
Summary: Held, dismissing the appeal, that despite the fact that the property had been acquired for fraudulent purposes, the equitable right of the claimant would stand.
Reform
Law commission discussion paper “Sharing Homes” says that the share will be based both on direct and indirect contribution, so the money given at the beginning and the contribution to the household expenses, without looking at inferred intention. This obviously creates certainty. So in cases like Burns V Burns where one person pays the bills and the other the mortgage the court can infer that the person paying the bills intended to acquire a share in the property. In the recent case of Le Foe V Le Foe the judge said that the fact that one paid the mortgage and the other for the day-to-day expenses was just an arbitrary way of allocating expenses.
Constructive trust and proprietary estoppel ??