Because it was anticipated that rising traffic volume would surpass the inventive guess in the plan, the number of jet fans was increased from 7 to 11 (1 of them as a spare). For the north approach road, the original site was changed due to the complications in acquiring the assent of tribal people to their offering sites; however, the road length has been secured nearly as planned.
As for the south approach road, it was shuffle to evade the prefectural government’s office and an arsenal, and the road span was extended by about 4.7km. As a result of the relocation of approach road, TOR for re-examination of detailed design was added to consulting services.
Table 1. Comparison of Outputs Between the Plan at the Time of Appraisal and the Actual Performance
Project Period
The entire construction phase of the project had been originally deliberate as from November 1994 to November 2000 (73 months) it was in fact from November 1994 to April 2003 (102 months), 1.4 times longer than the plan. There was a delay of three years before the beginning of civil engineering works because of the re-examination of detailed design resulting from the rearrangement of the approach road; prolonged assortment of consultants resulting from the addition of TOR and the reassessment of the proposal assessment; and delay in land acquisition for the north approach road. There was also delay of six and a half months in total during the construction works because the contractor had not obtained a working license and because Japanese consultants temporarily fled the site due to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001.
Because the two-shift system was subsequently adopted for making up for delay, the original period of civil engineering works—December 1996 to November 2000 (48 months)—was actually from August 1999 to April 2003 (45 months) and it was shortened by three months.
Project Cost
The project cost had been originally intended as 10,462 million yen, but it in fact became 15,623 million yen (the cost overrun of 5,161 million yen) (149% compared to plan). The aspect of the cost enlarge were the amplify of construction volume escort by design change, the rearrangement of the approach road and the increase of cost resulting from the superior price growth than approximate due to the delay before civil engineering works (for about three years) (the CPI increasing rate during the 1994-98 period averages 10.8% a year).
Traffic volume
The average traffic volume inside the tunnel and on the approach road was 5,463 vehicles/day in 2004, 65% of the planned value. The factors responsible for the situation seem that the standard value of 1996 was set in excess of the performance value, through adjustment of actually-measured traffic volume in consideration of daily and seasonal variation,3 and that the construction of the main highway were not completed, such as Indus Highway, the section between Quetta and D.I. Khan of Highway 50 which link to the Indus Highway, and the section between Malana Junction and Sarai4. After the opening of the tunnel, traffic volume inside the tunnel and on the approach road has been increased by 49% during the 2003-2004 period and 13% during the 2004-2005 period; the traffic volume has been increasing by exceeding the expected growth rate (at a 5% annual rate).
Shortening of transit time and reduction of travel cost
Transit time was shortened in all the types of vehicles compared to the old road. According to a beneficiary (driver) survey (total samples: 105), all the persons answered that transit time was shortened by use of the new route in comparison with the old road and 67 persons (64%) answered that transit time was cut more than 40 minutes off.
Although travel costs of each type of vehicles were calculated5, they have not been re-examined after the completion of the tunnel. According to the driver survey, 82 persons (78%) answered that travel costs (fuel costs) were reduced using the tunnel/approach road in comparison with the old road.
Improvement of safety
It is impossible to judge whether the number of traffic accidents and failure decreases by virtue of the construction of the tunnel and approach road in the section consisting of the Kohat Tunnel and approach road because there are no data (before the project and at the time of ex-post evaluation) about the number of traffic accidents and failures on the old road. However, there is no substantial change in the accident rates between 2003 and 2004 in the light of the number of traffic accidents and failure inside the tunnel and on the approach road. According to the driver survey, all the sampled persons (105) answered that the tunnel and approach road was safer than the old road and the results of an inspection visit to the old road bear out such an opinion. Therefore, it is judged that safety of the relevant section has been improved.
Comfort of travel
There are no traffic jams at the Kohat Tunnel and approach road at present. Because the users of the old road have decreased to a little over 10 % of the total traffic volume in the section concerned, no traffic jam have occurred on the old road unless an accident happens. On an inspection visit to the old road, no traffic jam was seen there. According to the driver survey, all the sampled persons (105) answered that the tunnel/approach road brought out smoother traffic flow than the old road. In addition, in the survey, 35 persons (33%) answered that it was more comfortable to travel on the new route than the old road and 69 (66%) answered that it was comfortable to travel on the new route; thus, it is acknowledged that the project contributed to improvement of comfort of travel in the section.
Project period and project cost both exceeded the plan, at 140% and 149% compared with the plan, therefore, the evaluation for efficiency is moderate. The main reason for the delay was that it became necessary to re-examine the detailed designs before the start of the civil engineering works, etc. However, a two-shift system was adopted for construction to keep delays to a minimum. The factor behind the cost increase was the increase in construction work volume due to design changes.
Project Risk
Every human endeavor involves risk; the success or failure of any venture depends crucially on how we deal with it. Science and engineering increasingly progresses by major projects, many of them are high risk. However, the need to identify a project’s uncertainties, estimate their impact, analyze their interactions, and control them within a risk management structure has only in recent years been realized, mainly within the defense, construction and oil industries. For years the engineering and construction industry has had a very poor reputation for coping with risk, with many major projects failing to meet deadlines, cost targets, and specifications. New product development demands shorter project duration owing to a tremendous amount of competition and fluctuation of customers’ demand (Vega and Vokurka, 2000).
The major risk factors in this project were the instability of the local government during this period. According to Ashely (1987) It is really important to find out as much as possible about the political stability of a region before taking over the initial stages of a project. The government had changed 3 times during the past 5 years and every government brought about some major changes which would directly or indirectly effect a project of such extant especially in this case, where it had foreign involvement. Furthermore, the stability in the near areas was also point of a concern.
This was in fact noticed when after 9/11 when the project was delayed for a whole 6 months because the work was stopped as the foreign engineers had to leave for security purposes. Terrorism has been a recent treat to big projects recently. During this period of 6 months, the only loss was not time- it was the unnecessary loss of capital and other resources.
In this case another example of knowledge management failure was notice. The contractor did not have an approved license from the government to commence any construction work. It was only realized a few days before the work was being commenced. A major part of the project could not be executed due to the lack of such a license, again leading to a huge amount of delay. The major failure on the organization part was their wrong assumption. Being from a different country, they assumed that obtaining such a license should not be a difficult and/or time consuming process, but it was, especially in this specific region of the country where projects of such a high scale are quite rare.
Conclusion:
Project management is of growing importance as bureaucratic organisations pass through transition to be more flexible “network organisations. Work is increasingly undertaken by groups and teams, and the focus of assessment shifts from input to output. In certain sectors, companies are coming to resemble portfolios of projects. Akintoye(1998).
The above project had a great scope of error and mismanagement; therefore, a error free project management was required from the time the project was started until the end product was handed over. In this case, there was a lack of some of the aspect of successful project management especially in the case of initial time frame described and the lack of knowledge about the licensing and legal requirement for executing such a major project. Furthermore, this project was very high profile and continuously under discussion as the successful completion of this project would lead to a greater development of the region.
The major project risks that should have been identified were political situation of the region, that delayed the project for almost six months, also, the legal requirements that lead to a huge delay in the project.
As a whole, the project would be classed as success, because in such conditions it is not easy to complete a project of such a scope. It was delayed but as far as the project is concerned, it was competed and is providing all the benefits that it was intended to deliver.
Bibliography & References:
Akintoye, A.S., MacLeod (1997), "Risk analysis and management in construction", International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 15 No.1, pp.31-8.
Lock, Dennis, (2003), “Project Management”, 8th Ed. Gower Publishing Ltd.
Ashley, D.B., Bonner, J.J. (1987), "Political risks in international construction", Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 113 No.3, pp.447-67.
Vega, RR. and Vokurka, RJ. (2000) New product introduction delays in the computer industry, Journal of Industrial Management and Data Systems, Vol. 100, No 4, pp 157163.
