Summary of Case Study: the Honda - Yamaha War

Authors Avatar

SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY 3: THE HONDA-YAMAHA WAR (A)

In 1970s, when Honda began focusing on the automobile market, Yamaha saw an opportunity to attack and take territory in the motorcycle market. However, instead of doing an all out direct assault on Honda’s motorcycle troops, Yamaha decided to launch its first attack, a sneak attack (quietly move).  What Yamaha did was to increase quietly it’s capacity and able to supply dealers with more products quicker than Honda. This tactic has been successful. By the end of 1981, Yamaha and Honda had nearly equal shares of the Japanese motorcycle landscape.

Throughout the period from 1970s to 1980s, Yamaha’s profit compared favorably with Honda’s i.e. Operating profits of about 7% to 10% of sales in the late 1960s and 3% of sales in the early 1980s.   Yamaha was able to push into Honda’s territory and capture market share by focusing all of its resources on motorcycles and related products.

However, bulk of Honda’s profit been on its heavy investments in R & D for its young auto business where it spends about 5% in 1983.  As for Yamaha, it only spent slightly more than 1% of sales on R & D throughout the entire period.  The second phase of Yamaha’s strategy involved a more direct, frontal attack. Throughout 1970s to 1980s, Yamaha increased its product line as compared to Honda.

Despite the attack, Honda continues to exhibit a preoccupation with autos and began investing in large scales automobile production in the United States.  Most of its production was devoted to building the Honda Accord but some capacity was also directed toward manufacturing large ‘cc’ motorcycles.

In 1981, Yamaha embarked on a breakneck production spree while totally disregarding the arrival of a low-pressure economy’. In August 1981, Yamaha announced its plan to construct a new motorcycle factory with an annual capacity of 1 million units and would be increased to 4 million units, as compared to Honda’s capacity by 200,000 units.


With the opening of the new factory, it would shift the balance of power and make Yamaha the world’s largest motorcycle manufacturer, the prestigious position that Honda had won from Tohatsu and held for almost 20 years.  In 1982, Yamaha had its sales increased to 516 million yen.  Yamaha’s management was betting its company could achieve leading market share in motorcycles.  

Since Yamaha had no other business with significant growth potential, it was prepared to invest heavily in motorcycles.  As such, Yamaha invested at a rate far higher than its internal cash generation could support.  Yamaha turned to banks for the difference and end up with its increased debt burden. Yamaha and its affiliated companies had a debt to equity ratio of almost 3:1, while Honda group’s ratio was less than 1:1.

Although Yamaha thought its overt and public challenge had gone unnoticed by Honda, they were mistaken. The innovative element of Honda’s counterattack was the use of product variety as a competitive weapon.  The effects of Honda’s two pronged attack of new model proliferation and price cutting were devastating for Yamaha. New model introductions offered greater technical and design appeal to customers, thereby increasing demand, and dealers had incentives for pushing them.  But increased volumes of new models came at the expense of older ones; therefore the life cycles for existing models were shortened and demand for them declined sharply.

Yamaha’s sales of motorcycles plummeted by more than 50 percent and the company incurred heavy losses.  By early 1983, Yamaha’s unsold stock of motorcycles in Japan were estimated to be about half of the industry total of unsold stock.  At the then-current Yamaha sales rate, its inventories were equivalent to about one year’s sales. Yamaha’s debt to equity ratio increased from less than 3 to 1 in 1981 to 7 to1 in 1983.

Join now!

1.  Problem Statement/Identification

Our group has discussed thoroughly on this case study and we are of the opinion that the problem faced by Yamaha is ‘Poor Ketsudan’ or Poor Decision Making’. The reason being why we choose ‘Poor Decision Making’ as the main problem is because of the following:

a.        Yamaha was able to push into Honda’s territory and capture market share by focusing all of its resources on motorcycles and related product. What Yamaha did was putting all its egg in one basket. There was no mentioned of diversification of product thus exposing its company to risk should the motorcycles industry failed. ...

This is a preview of the whole essay