Preference (desire-satisfaction) fails to be a reliable measure of well-being.

        Preference can also be related to a choice. However, the preference between two options may not ultimately be the most rewarding for the well-being of an individual. For example, say an individual has to make a choice between $9 an hour or $8 an hour, but would like to make $25 an hour. The individual would prefer to make $9 over $8, but that choice does not contribute to his or her overall well-being and happiness. In this case, the individual would like to make $25 an hour which would contribute to their overall happiness and contentment. You could say that this is what they are striving for; though, the attainment to receive $25 an hour is unachievable and therefore could cause stress to the individual. You may desire to make $25, which would satisfy the individual’s needs, but making that $25 is out of the question. Consequently, looking at this example, preference over some over thing does not relate to an individuals overall well-being.  

         According to Arrow, our preferences become the measure of utility (Tiffany, 2004). If everyone is guaranteed their own choices and preferences, then everyone should remain happy. Happiness contributes to well-being. Who am I to say that people shouldn’t have choices that satisfy their desires. Some may argue that if they are happy at the moment they choose to do something, than that’s all that matters; therefore implying that preference is a reliable measure of well-being. For example, if an individual chooses to read a book and reading a book is what satisfies his or hers desires, then that individual’s well-being is being met. In contrast, look at another example where a heroin junkie chooses to shoot up. Shooting up satisfies the heroin junkie’s desires. In the moment, that junkie will feel so ultimately fulfilled, but does this preference to do heroin contribute to that individual’s well-being? In the long run, no; however, according to Arrow, preferences are the measure of utility (Tiffany, 2004).  

        Going to back to utilitarianism, if an act promotes the greatest good for the greatest number of people, then the act should be pursued (Tiffany, 2004). However, preference (desire-satisfaction) promotes the greatest good for an individual and not for the greatest number of people. Preference is implying that everyone is free to make their own choices whereby their choices satisfy their desires. People do what they choose and choose what they do. Therefore, preference is a good thing. If people are happy doing what they choose, then that is a reliable measure of well-being. Nevertheless, there is a counterargument that goes against this implication. An individual may choose something that goes against the majority’s interest, thereby not maximizing utility. Take students grades for example. All students want to do well in school. Say there was this unkind teacher’s assistant (TA) who chose to fail all of his or hers students. The TA’s desires are satisfied when he or she fails their students. Since all students want to well in school, this TA is going against the majority’s interest of doing well in school. A consequence of failing all of his or hers students will result in the majority of the students disliking them. Not being liked is an unpleasant feeling and therefore the TA would have no choice but to be unhappy. Now is being unhappy a good measure of well-being? When making choices whereby the decision is going to affect those other then you, it is important to take the other people’s interest into account. This example describes once again that preference is not a reliable measure of well-being.    

        To conclude, Freed’s characters, Benji and Mike, simply reveal that preference does not equal well-being. Although they prefer to remain in this cult, clearly that decision does not contribute to their overall well-being. By applying the money example above, preference between two options also may not be the most rewarding for the well-being of an individual. Then by looking at choices that satisfy an individual’s desire in the moment, is also undeniably an unreliable measure of well-being. Lastly, making decisions that go against everyone else’s interest does not maximize utility; thereby, once again stating that preference is not a dependable estimate of overall well-being. In summary, by going over the four arguments presented, I come to conclude that preference (desire-satisfaction) is an unreliable measure of well-being.

Total word count: 1,188

References

Freed, Josh. (1980). Chapters 1-2. In J. Freeds, Moonwebs (p. 1-27). CA: Virgo.

Tiffany, Evan. (2004). Slides for the unit of utilitarianism. Retrieved March 5th, 2004,         from .