Unless we assume that everyone is free to make moral choices, we have no right to punish criminals. Discuss
'Unless we assume that everyone is free to make moral choices, we have no right to punish criminals'. Discuss
According to the Hard Determinist view, freedom is an illusion. Humans cannot be punished because just punishment presupposes blame. We cannot be blamed for the actions we take because the choices we make are predetermined by factors beyond our control. As science advances, there is increasing evidence that human nature is the product of genetic inheritance and up bringing. According to this view, humans are not 'autonomous', as was once believed. Historically, the human race has set itself apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Along with Aristotle, we regarded ourselves to be at the top of the hierarchy, as we possess the unique ability to make moral decisions. On the hard determinist view, we do not exist independently of the rest of nature, and are indeed subject to the same physical laws which govern the behaviour of other animals. Human beings in their present form are the products of the same evolutionary processes which have created every other creature in the world. Man is not independent of the rest of nature. Hard determinists maintain that everything in the universe, including human action, has a cause which precedes it. This is the Theory of Universal Causation. That the cause of events is not known does not matter. A doctor who cannot find the cause of a particular disease will not conclude that it is uncaused, merely that the cause is unknown.
Humans are not 'free' agents, but beings which are fully governed by the psychological and physiological factors which form the self. The 'self' which makes decisions acts under the influence of the factors which created it. The factors which form the self are the also the causes of the decisions we make. In the same way as a computer acts according to how it has been programmed, so the human brain acts according to the factors which created it. We may think that we are free when we make decisions, but our decisions are in fact causally determined.
However, the defining feature of a moral act is that it is a free act; an act without a sufficient set of causes. A choice cannot be made if there is only one option. Herein lies the difficulty. If human nature is the result of certain external factors, behaviour is, at least in theory, predictable. We can only make one choice-that which is compatible with our nature, having been determined by factors beyond our control.
Within determinism, there are varying opinions as to exactly what predetermines our lives and our choices. On the theological view, God predetermines our lives, by creating us and endowing us with the genetic inheritance which determines action. Psalm139:13...16:
'You created every part of me; you put me together in my mother's womb....The days allotted to me had already been recorded in your book, before any of them ever began.'
We are his sheep, following the path which he laid down for us. Calvin held that every human's destiny was determined by God as his foreknowledge of our character enables him to know what will happen. Psalm 139:4:
'....you know all my actions. Even before I speak, you already know what I will say'
The scientific approach is similar, (that genetic inheritance determines character and therefore action), but may not agree that God is the source of this inheritance. Behaviourists such as John B. Watson asserted that our selves and actions are 'conditioned' by external factors which are beyond our control. These factors determine our actions. They are the causes of action-therefore a free choice is impossible. Bio-behaviourists place greater importance on genetics as the ultimate determinant of action. It has been suggested that homosexuality is the result of genetic inheritance. Feminist and violent tendancies, for example can be attributed to certain combinations of X and Y chromosomes in the sex-cells. This is why we cannot be held responsible for our actions, because what we do is beyond our control. Just punishment presupposes moral blame. We cannot choose, so cannot be held morally blameworthy. Any perception of freedom is an illusion. Any decisions we make are the effect of previous causes, not our own volition. We are merely puppets of factors beyond our control. We are victims of circumstance.
Determinists may argue that theirs is also a very healthy view. The reassessment of our position in the natural world and recognition that humans are subject to the same physical laws as the rest of nature, leads us to reject the idea that we are superior: the belief which has led us to abuse animals and the rest of nature. Accepting ourselves to be merely another component part of nature would surely encourage us to live more harmoniously with the rest of nature, not to abuse and destroy it for our own ends.
To retain the idea ...
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Determinists may argue that theirs is also a very healthy view. The reassessment of our position in the natural world and recognition that humans are subject to the same physical laws as the rest of nature, leads us to reject the idea that we are superior: the belief which has led us to abuse animals and the rest of nature. Accepting ourselves to be merely another component part of nature would surely encourage us to live more harmoniously with the rest of nature, not to abuse and destroy it for our own ends.
To retain the idea of moral responsibility, determinism must be rejected. Free acts must be possible, a person must be able to choose between right and wrong; this is libertarianism. Libertarianism accepts that events in the inanimate world are caused and predictable. Libertarians distinguish between the personality and the moral self. The personality is governed by causal laws, as it is an empirical concept. The personality is the product of physiological and psychological conditions and as such can be scientifically explained and predicted. Our formed personality predisposes us to certain actions-such as a child who has grown up in a Christian environment, perhaps with a parent who is a priest, is more likely to commit to the faith himself in later life. However, this is a probability, not an inevitability.
The moral self is autonomous, and as such can counteract the tendencies of the personality. The moral self differs from the personality in that it is an ethical, not an empirical concept. It is not contingent on heredity and environment and is capable of subduing the inclinations of the personality which is conditioned in this way. The libertarian approach contains within it a Platonian influence-the idea of the body (inferior, motivated by inclinations) in conflict with the mind, which is somehow independent of the empirical world, and the true source of wisdom. Joseph Butler (1692-1752) wrote that humans are unique amongst animates in that the moral self enables us to make real choices, to decide between self-interest and duty:
There is a principle of reflection in men by which they distinguish between approval and disapproval of their own actions...'
Whist our genetic inheritance and social environment may predispose us to do certain things, we can never be certain of people's decisions. We can choose to do other than what we might theoretically be expected to do. In a situation of moral significance, the moral self enables us to choose duty over self-interest; a causally undetermined choice which produces the opposite result to what might otherwise have been predicted on reflection of perceived causes. In the making of this choice, we exhibit freedom. A principal feature of the libertarian argument is that we all experience making decisions. The act of decision-making is proof that we are free agents. We perceive the only limits on our freedom to be external factors. For example, we may choose to go on holiday to Wales instead of to Australia, because our freedom to choose between destinations is limited by our financial budget. However, in making the choice between going to Wales or France, we find ourselves making a real decision and do not already know what we are going to do. We feel equally at liberty to choose either destination.
A determinist would point out that just because we feel that we are free to make a decision does not mean that we are actually free. There is no evidence for this claim. One cannot move from a subjective 'feeling' to an objective fact- that free will actually exists. This is to commit G.E.Moore's 'Naturalistic Fallacy', a movement of logic which cannot be made. The determinist counter- argument is similar to that made against Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God- just because we have a concept of something in our brain does not mean that the concept exists in reality. We all know and recognise the concept of a unicorn, but just because we have such a concept does not mean that a unicorn actually exists The universal concept of freedom is like our concept of a unicorn in that it exists in our head only. Our concept does not relate to an objective fact. An internal belief cannot create an external reality. Again, Plato warned us against such 'presumptuousness', in his famous 'Allegory of the Cave'. The prisoners think that what they perceive to be the truth is actually reality, because they are too credulous and take things at face value. Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) wrote:
'....the timid man thinks it is by free will that he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid, whilst, in truth, thy have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak, so that experience itself, no less than reason, teaches that men believe themselves to be free simply because the are conscience of their actions, knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined.... Consequently those who believe that they speak, or are silent, or do anything else from a free decree of the mind, dream with their eyes open.'
Determinism therefore holds that the experience of deliberation is admissible for evidence for the belief in the existence of free will, but not admissible as evidence for the actual existence of free will, as experience can be deceiving. On the determinist view, any evidence based on experience, including scientific conclusions based on experiment, must be rejected on grounds of possible deception.
A libertarian does not dispute that experiences can be deceiving, but asserts that the possibility of deception does not mean that experience cannot be accepted as sufficient evidence for the truth of belief in free will. Contrary to Platonian thought (that truth cannot be found in the contingent world), libertarians do not reject sense experience as a basis for knowledge. Although sense experience is insufficient when matched against the requirements for necessary truths which exclude error (Moore's closed questions), it is sufficient to provide evidence for contingent truths- those which are reached on the basis of corrigible evidence. According to Swinburne's Principle of Credulity, experience is normally reliable, and our sense experience can normally be relied upon as a source of evidence (in contrast with Plato). Swinburne is not saying that experience is infallible, just that it is more likely to be true than not and that we should go with the balance of probability, which is that we can trust what our senses tell us:
'Initial scepticism about perceptual claims... will give you no knowledge at all.'
If we always reject of sense experience as grounds for knowledge, we shall find ourselves, according to Swinburne, in an 'Epistemological queer street'.
The majority view lies somewhere in between the determinist and libertarian view. Soft Determinism accepts that freedom is incompatible with fatalism, the view that humans are powerless to change the course of their lives, but it is compatible with determinism if we accept that our own choices and desires are among the causes which determine our actions. To return to our example, if one was deported to Australia, than the act of going to Australia is determined by external forces-the police. If one decided to take a holiday in Australia, the determining factor of the same action is one's own desires. This desire, in turn, was the result of other causes, such as a persuasive advertising campaign, or relatives living there. The soft determinist therefore accepts that an explanation for the action, even if difficult to establish, is theoretically possible. The act of going to Australia by deportment is no less determined than going of one's own choice. All human actions are governed by causes, the distinction is between internal and external causes. When one acts voluntarily in going to Australia, the cause is internal (desires, wishes). This action, although caused, is regarded as being a free choice because its causes are internal to us. When deported, the cause is external - an involuntary act.
This view therefore accords with determinism in that it agrees that all human actions are caused. When we say we act freely it is because the causes of action are internal to us, we feel under no kind of external pressure. Thus, freedom has causes which stem from personal desires and beliefs. Freedom is the ability of humans to act in accordance with such wishes. The more we know about a person's wishes, the more able we are to predict action. For example, where there are many chocolate bars, I am able to predict which one my friend will choose, as I know her preferences.
This view is also compatible with moral responsibility, claim soft determinists, because if, for example, someone commits a crime, they do so because of certain wishes and desires on their part, which is compatible with responsibility. The action is freely undertaken, and the result of the character which caused, and is responsible for the action.
Both determinist approaches carry implications about the nature of God for those who believe that God determines character and maps out the life of each individual : Psalm 139:16- 'days allotted to me' It is therefore God who is responsible when a serial killer murders 50 people. On this view, how can a loving God plan for such awful things to happen? It may be argued that God knowing what will happen is not the same as him determining what will happen. God did not 'map' out our lives, but his omniscience gives him foreknowledge of what we will do. Here again, we may cite a weakness-can we ever break free of God's foreknowledge? Is this alone a constraint on our freedom? If God is omniscient, what is the purpose of religious practice? Why pray to God to try to draw his attention to misfortune if the latter is either something which he planned (an evil God?),something of which he is already aware yet chooses to do nothing about, or cannot, because this would be contrary to his gift of free will. Even if God did not plan evil events to take place, his omnipotence surely allows him to intervene at any time to change the course of events. A loving God would want to step in to prevent evil. An omnipotent God is able to. God is both, so why then does he not do so? A popular religious counter argument is that God cannot step in because this would be contrary to free will. Yet if we believe Christian doctrine, that God is our creator (Gen.1:16:'So God created human life'), we have none.
Even if we reject religious determinism, that God plans the course of each life by intervention as an external force in each that he creates, he could still be held morally responsible for our actions, on the soft determinist view. The God that 'puts us together in our mothers womb' (Psalm 139) must therefore give us our genetic inheritance which predisposes us to certain character traits and subsequent action. This makes God responsible for our internal causes. On the soft determinist view it is these internal causes which are responsible for our 'free' actions. God must therefore take responsibility for the actions which result from the character which he predetermined.
I have already mentioned John B. Watson's assertions that internal causes are the product of social environment. We are 'conditioned' by our experiences of society. Free action is not possible because whatever we do is always caused by our conditioning. However, are we not also conditioned by the sense of right and wrong asserted by society, upheld by its law courts and affirmed by punishment of those who do not conform? Criminals can be punished if they have been exposed to these influences, which social citizens are. Law is supposed to be sufficiently well enforced that each member of society internalises its predicates so that the law becomes part of our decision making process. In deciding to break the law, the criminal is aware of those laws. Deciding whether or not to commit a crime involves consideration of the likely punishment which will ensue. The consequences are recognised. Punishment is a 'zero tolerance' measure used to suppress those actions which are not conducive to social harmony. Aristotle held that the ultimate aim of human endeavour is happiness, and that the best form of happiness is to live well alongside others, as part of a community. Our judicial systems reflect what society deems to be socially destructive and undesirable. It is the framework within which we live, and is internalised to form part of the framework within which we make our decisions. To commit a crime with full knowledge of the law is to undermine the good of the rest of society. Punishment has a dual function. It punishes those who have broken the law, making them less likely to do so again and also acts as a deterrent. The punishment of criminals is an assertion of the law and deters others from doing the same thing. It is a threat. Experience tells us that where there is no enforced law, socially destructive behaviour proliferates, for example in war-torn countries. Punishment is therefore socially desirable because it protects the masses, it is utilitarian. It is a form of control, an accepted restraint on our freedom because it is conducive to what we desire.
Where the law has been insufficiently internalised and has failed to condition a criminal, punishment reconditions the offender, becoming a greater conditioning force than were the anti-social conditioning influences which caused them to offend. Punishment is therefore conditioning which aims to affect the cognitive processes so that in future, the law will be respected as it has been internalised. This is the functionalist approach to punishment. For Marx, religion is a form of control whose messages are internalised to keep people from behaving in a way which those who enforce the religion do not want. Similarly, Emile Durkheim held that what we perceive to be 'conscience' governing our actions is actually the internalised voice of society, not, as Kant and St. Augustine believed, the internalised voice of God.
Is this contrary to human rights? Should our perceptions of right and wrong simply be moulded to conform to those of society? Could making people conform to social requirements lead to the destruction of people with genes known to produce anti-social behaviour? Perhaps had the technology been available years ago, homosexuals would have been aborted at the moment that their sexuality was known, in the same way that 'undesirable' female foeti are aborted in China. Over time, society has grown to accept and even to respect homosexuals. This genetic difference has had a positive influence on social morality, making society more tolerant -could not other genetics currently deemed to be 'undesirable' have the same effect, if only we would let them?
If right and wrong are only relative to culture, as opposed to being absolute, is punishment according to a moral code which we do not accept an infringement of our human rights? Ultimately, if we choose to live in a particular community, we are subject to its laws; we enter into a mutual contract, which includes the respect of laws. It is a price to pay for the enjoyment of communal living. When western women go on holiday to Saudi Arabia, they must conform to the modest dress code, although they are at liberty to dress more freely in their own society. They want to experience an Arab country and society, but in order to do this, the Islamic laws of that society and must be respected, even if you do not share the faith. If a holidaymaker chooses to break these laws, the 'contract' has been broken and the person must be deported-removed from the society. In Britain those who do not agree to respect the laws of society are also removed from society to exist in another environment in which they can continue to live by their own moral standards without affecting others or social stability. This is why criminals must be punished, for the good of the majority. Their actions may well be caused by conditioning influences over which they have no control, but society cannot judge them 'innocent' on these grounds. Society must say 'maybe you did not know better then, but when we have finished with you, you will'. Claiming 'diminished responsibility' on the grounds of pre-determined action and absence of free will is a recipe for social chaos which is entirely undesirable and impractical.