‘Wellington’s Waterloo’.

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

‘WELLINGTON’S WATERLOO’

The French Revolution played a significant role in the history of Britain. The ideal of intellectual enlightenment and the idea of an end of a corrupt and antiquated government and monarchist rule, swept across Europe from the summer of 1789. This followed the highly symbolic storming of the Bastille, and the Declaration of the Rights of man. However, when the Revolution degenerated into ‘The terror’ of Robespierre’s government by fear and terrorism, intellectual joy turned into conservatism, and a feeling of betrayal. Politically, the social consequences were profound. As Britain staggered under the shock of Industrial Revolution, Urbanisation and the creation of a working class, the authoritarian response to the French Revolution, was a series of repressive acts of parliament and social measures, like the suspending of the writ of habeas corpus. Just as the new society cried out for help, Reform was effectively quashed for thirty years. The French Revolution also gave rise from Corsican outcast to Emperor, of Napoleon Bonaparte. This man perhaps affected Britain the most, and much as been written about this legendary figure and his wars of aggression. The object of this essay is, however, to tell the story of Bonaparte’s final fall, in terms of military history and one engagement, which saw Bonaparte meet an equally illustrious figure, his nemesis and saviour of Europe, Arthur Wellsley, The Duke of Wellington, Soldier and Statesman, and perhaps the greatest Briton of the 19th Century. He only faced Bonaparte once on the battlefield, in that small deadly space between opposing armies, at Waterloo. It is the story of that battle that this essay will examine.

It has defined us as a people whatever Britain has become, our notion of Empire and social structure, and our prejudices were formulated during those traumatic years. It was the crossroads of our being. In dealing with Wellington, this essay will look at Wellington’s background, his character, and discuss his tactics in dealing with the French. In particular the essay will examine the events of the 16th June 1815, with the battles at Quatre Bras and Ligney, which brought about the Waterloo battle. The campaign of Waterloo has been made the subject of many historians, examining in detail, every decision made by the men in the forefront of battle.

But in the midst of these men were brave soldiers battling it out, at Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte and Papelotte, to gain the advantage needed by their Commanders to win.

So who was this man who brought to an end the wars in Europe, and become one of the greatest figures in British history. Born on the 29th April 1769 in Ireland to the Earl of Mornington, christened Arthur Wesley, he later changed his name to Wellesley. He was educated at Eton College with other aristocratic children, where he enjoyed mathematics and music, the later after his father who was a Professor of Music in Dublin. He pursued a military career, most of which was spent fighting the French around the world. During a 20-year period, he fought sixteen campaigns against the French and never lost. (Roberts, 2001)(Apseyhouse [Online].

At first his career was chequered, but he learnt by experience and never repeated his mistakes. He developed a keen sense of how to conduct military operations, take control of situations personally, and more importantly how to care for his troops under very trying conditions. (Weller, 1998).

He was a superb tactician and strategist, employing some ‘revolutionary ‘principles of war’. On the battlefield “his instincts, his charisma, his judgement and composure under fire, his determination and focus, his courage and confidence made him a worthy opponent of Napoleon and his Marshals”. (Horward)[Online].

But Wellington was a strict disciplinarian, enforcing harsh punishment to offenders in front of the rest of his men as a deterrent. He once said of his men,

“They are the scum of the earth. English soldiers are fellows who have enlisted for drink and that is the plain fact; they have all enlisted for drink”. (Speed, 1969).

But he knew the individual quality of his men as well. He knew they had enlisted from differing backgrounds, because of debt, flight or had simply sought the glamour of the army.

His early career had taught him valuable lessons. In particular how to defeat the French Infantry column under certain conditions.

Firstly, the line must be protected in its flanks, for if caught by cavalry it could be rolled up, for example using the advantages of terrain, or in the field of battle, the infantry square.

Secondly, the line must be protected in front by skirmishers. Wellington in fact increased the number of light troops in order to do this.

Finally the line was not to show itself to the enemy until the last minute. His favourite technique was to position on the reverse slope of a hill, not the crest where his men could be bombarded by enemy gunners, but just a distance back, and only when the enemy column was within range would they stand and fire. (Speed, 1969)

This was important, as the French marching column was in itself an individual army, with artillery, cavalry and infantry. The French used massive artillery fire to blow holes into the enemy line, and then penetrate it with cavalry, which rolled it up, to be finished off by the infantry. This mass of power in most cases intimidated or frightened off the enemy before the battle got going.

But what brought about the battle, for which he became world famous? In 1814 Napoleon abdicated and it seemed that the Napoleonic wars were over Napoleon was banished to the island of Elba. As a result, on the 24th January 1815, Wellington was sent as the British envoy to attend the ‘Congress of Vienna’, to decide on the territorial interests of the allies. The world however, had not heard the last of the Emperor. He landed in Southern France on 26 February 1815 with a small number of troops. Wellington received a message that Napoleon had escaped from Elba and was intending to march on Paris. The Duke called a meeting of all the heads of governments seeking agreement of mutual support against Napoleon, and the treaty between the allies, known as the Treaty of Chaumont was reaffirmed. The allies realised that this would be a campaign that would finally decide the future of Europe. (Weller, 1998).

The battle of Waterloo was still several days away, and when it came it was the result of the situation following initial engagements at Quatre Bras, Ligney, and Wavre. The allies were vulnerable at this stage of the proceedings because they were stretched out in a long line, not knowing from which direction Napoleon was going to attack. The plan was that whoever was attacked first would make a token stand whilst then the others came to assist. When in fact the French crossed the border into Belgium on the 15th June, and Napoleons plan was to destroy the British and then Prussian forces, before their Austrian and Russian allies could arrive.

Napoleon was to drive a wedge between the British and Prussians so he could deal with one army, and then turn on the other, defeating them both separately.

Napoleon was to lead part of his army against the Prussians at Ligney, whilst his commander Ney was to attack the British at Quatre Bras, but from the following events things did not go to plan. (Fig 1. Map showing Quatre Bras and Ligney, with the French lines of attack).

The battle at Quatre Bras was fought around a small hamlet of four houses, at the junction between the Charleroi-Brussels Road ...

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Napoleon was to drive a wedge between the British and Prussians so he could deal with one army, and then turn on the other, defeating them both separately.

The battle at Quatre Bras was fought around a small hamlet of four houses, at the junction between the Charleroi-Brussels Road and the Nivelles-Namur Road.

(Fig 2. Map showing the stages of the battle of Quatre Bras).

On the morning of the 16th, Marshall Ney, the ‘bravest of the brave’, had deployed units of Reille’s 2nd Corps and Guard light cavalry. D’Erlon’s 1st corps would join up later. On the allied front were, Perponcher’s 2nd Dutch-Belgium infantry, belonging to the Prince of Oranges 1st Army Corps. Perponcher was a former commander under Napoleon, and he realised the strategic importance of the crossroads, and his presence on the day saved the allies. He deployed four units to the right of Quatre Bras, two on the Brussels road blocking it, and three in reserve near the crossroads. Light troops occupied the Pierrepoint farm and Orange hoped that the high rye and corn in the fields would hide the weaknesses of his force. On the following morning, around 6am, Napoleon sent out his orders to Ney and Grouchy, for Ney to engage the British at Quatre Bras and Gouchy to advance on the Prussians. The orders arrived around 11am, but Ney did nothing until 2pm when he felt he had enough strength to take the crossroads. The attack by Ney was slow and cautious with the fear of running into strong concealed allied forces. The Dutch-Belgians put up stiff resistance, but had to fall back under French pressure, they managed however to hold onto the woods. Perponcher’s line was at breaking point when reinforcements arrived, and at the same time, Wellington, who took immediate action, deployed cavalry on the left flank. Ney received further orders to take the crossroads at all costs, and renewed his attack, but with bad communications and in the confusion, d’Erlons Corps marched off northwards to give assistance to Napoleon at Ligney. Meanwhile fighting continued at the crossroads with neither side gaining any advantage, and fighting ended around 9pm. As a result of Wellington’s tactics the battle ended in stalemate, and it has been written,

“Wellington for six hours of battle at Quatre Bras, was almost continuously at the right place at the right time” (Weller, 1998).

Simultaneously the battle at Ligney was fought in a marshy valley, and the Ligney brook, although not wide had steep sides. Napoleon’s plan was to penetrate Bluchers centre whilst Ney would come and envelop the right flank, therefore destroying a half to two-thirds of the Prussian army. As the attack started Napoleon wrote to Ney telling him to advance on Blucher immediately. The first frontal attack failed, but the Prussians repelled subsequent attacks by the French on the eastern part of the village. Blucher was sending in his reserves as reinforcements, but the French gunners were destroying them. The Prussians were becoming more and more shaken, and Napoleon ordered his Guard to prepare to attack. Whilst this was being prepared he received a report of unidentified troops marching on his left flank, this was later identified as d’Erlons column. Realising this Napoleon ordered maximum destruction on the Prussians with the Guard. A thunderstorm broke and concealed the Guard’s preparation, while the French artillery opened up on Ligney. At 7pm Napoleon led his Guard into attack in two columns of double companies, backed up by cavalry and guns. By 9pm the French had held the field with the Prussians retreating in disorder. It was impossible to pursue them because of the terrain, so Napoleon contented himself to maintain some kind of contact with them. Meanwhile d’Erlons men were counter marching back to Quatre Bras.

On the 17th June 1815 Napoleon ordered Grouchy with an army of 30,000 men, to pursue the retreating Prussians, detect them and prohibit the Prussians from joining with Wellington. But Napoleon’s biggest problem was the lack of information. Napoleon ordered Ney to take the crossroads at Quatre Bras, Ney confirmed that Wellington was still in control of the crossroads. So the allies had managed to stem the advance of the French army, but for how long?

In the early hours, Wellington learned that Blucher had been defeated at Ligney, and immediately issued an order to prepare for a retreat. At 9am a Prussian Officer reported to Wellington that Blucher would concentrate on Wavre, and Wellington was to withdraw to Mont St Jean. If Blucher could be certain to send at least two Prussian Corps he would do battle there, otherwise he would retreat to Brussels.

The allied withdrawal began at about 10am, but still fearing for his right flank, Wellington posted a fifth of his force at Hal. He need not have worried because Ney did nothing to hinder the withdrawal, and when Napoleon arrived at Quatre Bras he was furious at the mischance. As Napoleons vanguard approached Mont St Jean at around 6.30pm, they saw considerable allied troops on the plateau, not knowing if it was a rear guard, he sent forward some horse artillery and cuirassier, who received fire from at least sixty allied guns. During this period a wild thunderstorm raged over the area, saturating the soil, and it persistently rained throughout the night.

The weather never respects nationality, rank, recruit or veteran man or animal. Most soldiers in all three armies the following day started to fight cold, felt hunger and in sodden uniforms, caked in mud after a sleepless night. Depicted in Thomas Hardy’s poem,

“The Dynasts’s puts it well:

The young sleep sound; but the weather awakes

In the veterans, pains from the past that numb;

Old stabs of Ind, old peninsular aches,

Old Friedland chills, haunt their moist mud bed,

Cramps from Austerlitz; till their slumber breaks”. (Adkin, 1998)

On the morning of the 18th June 1815 Wellington was occupying the ridge at Mont St Jean, just south of Waterloo. Napoleon was across the valley at La Belle Alliance. The majority of Wellington’s troops were positioned behind the ridge whilst he garrisoned three strategic locations along his line, Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte and Papelotte, the later being lightly guarded pending the arrival of the Prussians. (Hofschröer, 1998/99)[Online]. (Fig 3. Map of the battle of Waterloo, showing the position of both armies, and Appendix 1. The battle strengths of both armies).

This position had been marked by Wellington on one of his earlier rides across the region, for a good defensive battle. The battlefield itself only measured 3 miles by 1mile. (Fig 4. Plan drawing of Hougoumont, showing the French attacks).

To the right of his position was Hougoumont, the most important strategic position within the allied lines. Wellington must have thought the same, as he assigned his elite troops, the Guards to defend it. The night before the battle they spent their time reinforcing the battlements and barricading, making it into a fortress. Hougoumont consisted in 1815 of a compact group of buildings round two courtyards and largely enclosed walls. The château was in the centre and higher than the other buildings. To the east was the farmers house extending up to the garden wall. To the south was the chapel. To the west side of the property was a ‘Great Barn’, which contained a carriageway linking the two courtyards. In the northern courtyard was a ‘Draw Well’. The south side, or enemy side of Hougoumont was the Gardener House, with stables and store on either side. There are four entrances to Hougoumont, which were clearly of great importance to its defence; otherwise walls surrounded the property. The area surrounding Hougoumont in the direction of the French attack was a wood, which ran down the valley, running east to west. On the north edge of the wood was a gap of 30 yards of open ground to the walls of Hougoumont. Along the north edge of Hougoumont was a sunken track, known as ‘Hollow Way’, which was to play an important part in the defence of Hougoumont in that it was the supply link to the allied position. Wellington realised that once well garrisoned, it would compel an attack to take it before the right could be threatened and his position on the ridge jeopardised.

Conveniently placed 250 metres in front of Wellingtons position was La Haye Sainte, coupled with a sandpit 50-metres north, and on the other side of the road, it provided the defender of the ridge with an outpost to disrupt and delay any assault up the main road. (Adkin, 2001). La Haye Sainte was an awkward place to defend but Wellington realised its importance being close to his line, he could not afford the French to have the position, so he posted a detachment of 360 men of the Kings German Legion, who were well known for their reliability. (Howarth, 2000). (Fig.5. Plan of La Haye Sainte).

So the scene is set likened to a giant chessboard, ready for the game to begin. The water-saturated soil would make the effective use of artillery impossible, Napoleon set the hour of attack for 9am in order to let the ground dry. At 9am when Napoleon wanted to attack, some of his units were not in place, and the ground was still too soft for artillery. At about 10am Napoleon received a message from Grouchy that he was marching on Wavre, and that most of the Prussians were attempting to join Wellington via Brussels.

At about 11.30am on that morning, both armies are in position. (Fig. 6. Map showing the position of both armies, and strategic positions of Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte).

Napoleon opened the hostilities. Wellington must have thought his concerns were now justified, as the initial attack came to his right on the allied stronghold, Hougoumont. Prince Jerome, Napoleons brother was determined to capture Hougoumont at whatever cost, and it was not as Napoleon wanted, a diversionary attack. Jerome sent his skirmishers into the woods south of Hougoumont, but they were faced by the Nassauers and Hanoverians who defended well, although they were pushed back to the orchard to the east of the farm. Jerome must have thought this was easy, but now faced the formidable 30-yard gap between the wood and walls of Hougoumont. As soon as they broke cover they were gunned down by the allied defenders protecting the walls, and despite their efforts the attack failed. The French followed the Nassauers and Hanoverians through the orchard, but Wellington had sent the Light Companies of the First Guards to support them, and together they drove the French back into the wood. The first French attack had been rebuffed. (Paget & Saunders, 2001).

Jerome being a Bonaparte should have stopped there, but instead he continued the attack from the wood, together with an attack from the west by his 1st Light regiment, and some light cavalry were sent to circle round and attack from the north. The 1st Light Regiment was opposed by about one hundred men of the Light Company (3rd Guards), driving them back along the west wall of the farm, towards the northwest corner. The British troops saw that the North gate was still open and rushed inside, closely followed by the French. Approximately thirty French troops succeeded in getting in, before officers and men of the Coldstream and 3rd Guards, forced the gates shut and barred them. The French inside were trapped and outnumbered, and they were all killed except a drummer boy. Wellington sent three companies of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards who were in reserve behind Hougoumont, to repulse the French who had reached the north side of the farm. This they did forcing them to retreat back into the wood. Wellington said later, “The success of the Battle of Waterloo turned on the closing of the gates.” (Paget & Saunders, 2001, p 54).

Jerome mounted a further attack around midday, this time to try and flank the farm on the eastern side, through the orchard, but as they emerged from the wood and into the orchard, they came under fire from the Coldstream Guards who were positioned along the wall of the Formal Garden. Once again they were beaten off back into the woods.

Napoleon’s usual practice was to bombard the enemy with his artillery before attempting an infantry attack, so Jerome brought forward a howitzer to the edge of the wood, which began dropping shells onto the roofs of the buildings and into the courtyards. The Grenadier Company of the 3rd Guards rushed the wood to put the gun out of action, but the French drove them back through the orchard. To combat this action the 2nd Battalion of 3rd Guards was sent into the orchard, retaking it and driving the French back into the wood. This back and forth action was draining Napoleon of men, vitally needed for the main battle.

The French tried again by sending in even more troops, this time from their centre. They marched from near La Belle Alliance towards the southeast of the farm, crossing the field of battle. They were torn to pieces by allied artillery, and they never reached the orchard. More French guns were brought up and began dropping incendiary shells onto the roofs of the buildings. The chateau and chapel in the centre of the complex and the Great Barn of the west were soon on fire. Wounded men who had been taken to these buildings for shelter had to be rescued from the flames. Wellington on seeing the fire, sent a message to the men inside to avoid loosing men to the flames and falling timbers, but he said Hougoumont must still be held. He was assured that it would be! And despite all the dangers from fire, floors collapsing, and exploding shells, the Guards remained at their posts and continued to repulse the French who dared to breach the walls. “It was said that the courtyard was as hot as a oven”. (Howarth, 2000, p. 25).

There now followed a lull in fighting around Hougoumont, and Wellington managed to adjust his line by moving his troops back into cover of the ridge, avoiding French artillery bombardment. Marshal Ney believed he saw the allies retreating, led a long series of cavalry charges unsupported by infantry, against the steady infantry squares of the allied troops. By this time it was early evening and the French made another determined attack on the southeast corner of the orchard. This time the allied line engaged by Neys cavalry attacks, were unable to repulse the French, who crossed the field forcing the defenders out of the orchard, but they came under devastating fire from the Coldstream Guards posted along the formal garden wall. Hougoumont still remained in Wellington’s control. (Paget & Saunders, 2001).

The second sequence of the battle started around 1pm with the French Grand Battery opening fire. After about 30 minutes of heavy artillery fire, the French main attack commenced. The allied infantry had hardly suffered any casualties from this bombardment, because of Wellington’s strategic move of placing them on the reverse slope some distance behind the ridge, and the softness of the ground prevented ricochet fire. The French divisions of d’Erlon corps advanced, deploying a battalion frontage, with 200 men in the front rank and between 24 and 27 ranks deep, making an easy target for the allies. Only one cavalry brigade supported them, when it was usual for the cavalry attack to precede the infantry. Decimated by allied artillery fire, they continued forward, capturing the ‘sandpit’, Papelotte and the enclosures around La Haye Sainte, but could not break into the buildings. This farm was located just to the west of the Genappe Road, approximately 250 yards South of Wellington’s position. It was similar in many respects to Hougoumont but smaller, and not so well suited for defence. Consisting of masonry and brick buildings with the necessary connecting walls a long relatively narrow rectangle of pasture and orchard inside a stout hedge. The men assigned to defend this garrison were of excellent quality, veterans armed with the British Baker rifle. (Weller, 1998).

Simultaneously Picton’s Division counterattacked, the French wavered under the British volleys, short-range artillery fire and devastating bayonet charges. During the furious fighting General Picton was killed.

This time they attacked from the east of the orchard, again the French drove the defenders out and again they came under fire from the Coldstream Guards, and again the counter attack forced the French back. Lord Uxbridge took this moment to order the British cavalry to advance. The cavalry brigades charged down the hill on the French, routing out the French cuirassiers, and then plunged into the mass of French Infantry. The charge of the brigades of dragoons, and Scots Greys smashed into the French, completely taking them by surprise. Sergeant Ewart of the Scots Greys took the eagle of the 45th French Regiment, and Captain A. K. Clark of the Royals captured the 105th regimental eagle. The French panicked and ran after a fierce struggle. (Weller, 1998, p 103).

Over excited by their success, Ponsonby’s brigade continued to charge the Grand Battery in the valley. Although they reached the guns and killed many gunners their charge was doomed. Napoleon had sent brigades of cuirassiers and lancers to counterattack. Ponsonby was killed and his brigade cut to pieces.

Wellington used the time won by the heavy cavalry charge to reinforce La Haye Sainte, re-occupy the sandpit and bring up a brigade into the line. On his left flank Prince Bernhardt retook Papelotte.

At 4pm, as the artillery duel reached a climax, the French pounded the allied centre, but Wellington had ordered the line to retreat behind the crest of the plateau, at the same time he summoned his unit from both his left and right to rebuild his battered centre. Ney seeing this movement through the thick curtain of smoke that hung over the battle, thought Wellington was retreating from the battlefield, and ordered his cavalry to charge against the allied strongest part of line, the right centre, without infantry or artillery support. His charge forced the Grand Battery to cease their supporting fire. (Adkin, 2001).

Fired upon by the British artillery until the last possible moment, hindered by the soft, wet ground, about 5,000 sabres charged up the plateau to find that the allied infantry had formed 20 squares, in a chequered pattern before them. Without enough room to manoeuvre, the momentum of the charge was broken. The horsemen swept round the squares trying to penetrate them, but Uxbridge's cavalry counterattacked and forced them back down the slope. The French rallied and renewed their charge several times, and by 5pm the whole French cavalry was committed, some 10,000 sabres. The British squares held out, although they were severely cut up. Holding off as many as twelve unsuccessful charges, the remainder of the French cavalry retired, badly shaken up.

The British Colonel Frazer said the following about the charge of the French cavalry,

“Never did cavalry behave so nobly, or was received by infantry so firmly.” (Collins, 1964).

At 5.30pm Napoleon decided that the allied centre must be smashed, and ordered Ney to take La Haye Sainte, no matter at what cost. The French after furious fighting managed to capture the buildings, as the King’s German Legion had expanded all their ammunition, and had to run for their lives, leaving the position to the French. The Rifles at the crossroads were then involved in heavy fighting as the French took hold of the farmhouse. The loss of La Haye Sainte afforded the French an established position within the allied line. (Kessler, [Online].

Ney then brought up artillery against the crumbling allied centre and sent for reinforcements, Napoleon replied, “Troops, were do you want me to find them, do you want me to make some?” (Hofschröer, 1998/99).

Napoleon had good reason not to send any troops, as the Prussians had reached Plancenoit, and he had ordered a counterattack. With only two Guard battalions pitted against fourteen Prussian battalions, in only 20 minutes of fighting the Guards had retaken Plancenoit, leaving 3,000 Prussian casualties. It was a great demonstration of their skill and élan.

Meanwhile Ney had pressed his attack on Wellington’s left and centre, but Wellington saw his chance diminish, as the presence of some cuirassiers had forced the allied troops to stay in squares, and they took a heavy beating from French skirmishers and French guns at close range. In the midst of this inferno, in a supreme moment of courage and leadership Wellington rode along his line, urging his troops to fight back. Reinforcements were coming from the Prussians.

Napoleon had one card left to play, he still had his Old and Middle Guard in reserve, and at 7pm he ordered them forward. Napoleon marched in front of the Guard before handing over command to Ney, some 600 yards from the enemy lines. By this time troops were appearing in the northeast, of course these were the Prussians but Napoleon told his troops that it was Grouchy returning.

Now all hope was on the Guard as they march forward to the sounds of the “Pas de charge.” But Wellington was ready, his centre had been reinforced, and his troops were waiting, concealed from the French. Ney marched them northwest along the same track as his cavalry had taken, and the allied troops at Hougoumont were able to fire at them on their advance. Ney left two battalions to fight and carried on with the other battalions in single column towards the allies. (Hofschröer, 1998/99).

The French grenadiers to the left advanced over the crest, within 40 yards of the allied line, when Wellington said, “Now Maitland! Now is your time!” A pause then, “Up Guards! Make ready! Fire!” (Holmes, 2002, p 249). After tremendous volley’s the grenadiers hesitated, then turned and retreated. A British Light Brigade, which had concealed itself in a high standing cornfield, attacked the chasseur column. Wellington ordered the troops in the vicinity to charge with bayonets, the French unable to form, also retreated after a bloody fight.

At 8.10pm as the defeat of the Imperial Guard caused a general French retreat, Wellington rose in the stirrups and waved his hat, thereby ordering the whole line forward. The French formed squares to the south of La Haye Sainte, and at La Belle Alliance as a refuge from the relentless allied pressure. After a bloody exchange the remaining two squares at La Belle Alliance assisted Napoleon to retreat from the battlefield towards Genappe. (Weller, 1998).

At 9pm Wellington and Blucher met at La Belle Alliance. The pursuit of the French was left to the ‘fresh’ Prussian cavalry, while the allied troops remained on the battlefield for the night.

The Battle of Waterloo was over; Napoleon had fought his last battle. A member of the Rifle Brigade summed up the end of the battle, John Kincaid said,

“I have never yet heard of a battle in which everybody was killed, but this seemed likely as an exception as all were going by turns.” He goes on to describe the end of the battle, “As thick smoke everywhere that it seemed he had not seen anything for hours, it was a fine summers evening, just before sunset. The French were flying in one confused mass. British lines were seen in close pursuit, and in admirable order…after pursuing them until dark, we halted about two miles beyond the field of battle, leaving the Prussians to follow up the Victory.” (Speed, 1969).

As Wellington rode past La Haye Sainte, in the quiet of the evening, in the fields on either side, and in the farms and cottages, 40,000 men; 10,000 horses lay dead or dying, or too badly injured to move. He was silent and a few officers with him saw a tear running down his face “A Victory”, said Wellington afterwards, “Is the greatest tragedy in the world, except a defeat”. (Howarth, 2000, p 27). (Appendix 2. Casualty list of Officers killed in the battle).

In conclusion, much as been written and speculated about the battle, and about the possible scenarios that could have taken place. The simple facts are, Napoleon with 112,000 men set out to fight a combined force, Wellington and Blucher with 250,000. Wellington and Blucher had dispersed their armies over a very wide front and Napoleon hoped by striking quickly and dividing them, he could beat them in detail before they could unite, or indeed before either army could be fully concentrated in itself. It is true to say that Napoleon sent part of his army to look for the Prussians, and indeed at the end of the battle had to guard his flanks from them. But significantly, Wellington had fought a defensive battle, with skilful strategy and tactics, using all of the forces at his disposal. Acts of bravery by his troops and by himself, saved the day for the allies. The evidence suggests that the battle had been won before the Prussian army made any impact on the field of battle, fighting continuously from 11.30am until 9pm. The overwhelming evidence of the battle supports the fact that the battle should have been called, ‘The Battle of Hougoumont’, because without the stubborn resistance of the troops defending this allied position, the battle would have been lost within hours, instead it drew in the French into a battle within a Battle, and remained in British – Allies hands, all through the day. The French had lost everything when the Prussians entered the field of battle, Jerome had squandered infantry in an attempt to take Hougoumont as a prize for his brother, Ney had wasted his cavalry in a charge against the allied squares, and Napoleon himself wasted his Imperial Guard against allied artillery, and rapid firing infantry. So in every sense of the words it was ‘Wellingtons Waterloo’.