On top of there being a nationalistic fervour, the nationalistic movements themselves were disunited with several ideological differences and personal rivalries. Attempts therefore at amalgamation of all the different groups to create a united force met with limited success. So the nationalism took the Japanese people deeper into the war but once in it did not prove to be a very stable force for holding the people together. Whilst these parties fought out their differences over the period within the Diet, the many cabinets that came in and out were also not very stable and were almost always militarily dominated. So this all contributed to a weakening of the Japanese position.
The Role of the Army is very significant in understanding the failure of the Japanese challenge to the West as it can almost be said that they were at the heart of the challenge, putting into action their own policies, often bypassing the government and dictating most foreign affairs. They had the upper hand in the cabinet in the early 1930’s having a favourable ratio of military to civilian ministers and also control over most political and economic matters in conquered territories, particularly Manchuria which it conquered in 1932. The political parties at the same time as stated before were in a lot of disarray and suffered “a loss of importance”. They were often consumed by their own internal squabbling and therefore the army often found little resistance to carrying out its programs abroad. It instead often got opposition from the other armed services, particularly the Imperial Navy. Both fought for increases in funding from the treasury and often liased together, bypassing the government, as to what action they would take. And even though the army was dominant in Japanese affairs it still had its own factional struggles within as different generals struggled for control. All this insecurity did not help when conducting the war later on. The military's constant undermining of the government’s decisions proved to be fatal later on as it took decisions that committed Japan to a path of conflict the government did not want and one which it would ultimately lose.
Different cabinets had different policies towards the army. Some tried to rebuff the army whilst others embraced it, approving the hard-line they often took. Some cabinets such as that of Saito in 1932 tried to control the army whilst others such as the Hayashi cabinet of 1934 authorised the army’s already expansionist ideas. Other cabinets such as the one led by Konoe tried policies of compromise between the different factions, trying to please everyone. However the army generally acted as an independent force. It was largely responsible for the settling up of the Anti-Comintern pact in 19? and also the National Defence Plan of 1936 which then justified increased spending. The Army also pushed a policy of domestic reform through the Prime Minister and if it was not happy with the status quo then it had the power to bring down a cabinet or prevent the formation of one which it objected to. Often those belonging to the army who lived abroad would act in a manner they saw as fit, confident that the government would endorse their actions. Beasley an historian puts it well in saying that “army commanders had shown that they would disregard the cabinet with impunity”. The climax of all this military dominance was seen in the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937 when fire was exchanged between Chinese and Japanese troops following an attempted seizure of that area by a Japanese general. The whole incident escalated from then on into a full scale war with China, a war in which Japan had no sympathy because of its previous exploits in Manchuria. Both the incidents in Manchuria and in 1937 were as a result of the army acting independently and getting itself into a mess that the Japanese government could not back out of. Even after that the army was not kept in check but was left free to undertake further expansion in China in the next two years. So the army started off the spiral that led Japan into war when it didn’t really want to and certainly was not equipped for economically.
The army’s decisions isolated Japan diplomatically, forcing the other allies to come closer together and to protest at Japan’s actions. In a world where imperialism was being seen more in an unfavourable light and the principals of self determination were prominent, the expansion into China was seen with suspicion and mistrust. Furthermore when the army entered into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany that started to worry the allies even more and they began to unite in order to meet this new threat. Japan, as well as having to deal with this opposition from the allies, did not find expanding into China completely free from trials either. There was no “speedy collapse of Chinese resistance” but rather Japan had to commit 700,000 troops to the campaign which were scattered in north, south and central China. The Chinese nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek began to receive funding from the Americans whilst their temporary partners, the Chinese communists led by Mao, were given Soviet money to conduct their guerrilla warfare in the north. Japan also suffered a setback when Germany signed the Non-Aggression Pact with the USSR as it meant Germany in their minds was no longer a trustworthy ally. The US, although not in the war until 1941, also started to impose trade restrictions and embargos on oil and iron, which would mean that Japan would be militarily incompetent in two years time. This led to another fatal Japanese mistake, the bombing of Pearl Harbour. War with the US was initially seen as inevitable by Japan. The Americans it was assumed would come into the war sooner or later and had cut off Japanese supplies. On top of that they were constructing a two front navy, which would be more powerful than that of Japan. So they advocated making the first strike and gaining the advantage over them. However all they did as one general put it was to “wake a sleeping giant”. The force of the US, combined with the might of the USSR and other allies then became too much for Japan, culminating in several defeats, the most famous being when the US retook the Solomon Islands in 19?. So the Japanese approach contributed to their failed attempt to challenge the West.
Also on top of the defeats in battle and the Chinese resistance the Japanese economy was under a lot of pressure from the war as was every other war economy at the time. Despite Japanese expansion into East Asia there was still a lack of raw materials for the war machine and also government expenditure was very high resulting in heavy taxes, government borrowing and price controls. Heavy industry had to be expanded at the expense of other things and there was a tightening of import restrictions to help the balance of payments as the country wasn’t exporting much. The government passed the National General Mobilisation Law in March 1938 which gave the government powers over labour, industry and banking. All these measures were not very popular with the general public and the military defeats after 1942 meant that a mood of discontent swept through the country. The government had to use propaganda to try to keep the war effort going but despite this there was still unrest. So another reason why Japan failed to challenge the West was that its economy was in a bad state and even before the war was fragile due to the Wall Street crash of 1929 and collapse in world trade/increase in protectionism. And as it was part of a less powerful alliance it could not stand up to the allies, who continually helped each other with finance and investment.
The Japanese Challenge to the West not only failed on the battle field but in government and society. By the end of the war the population was not in favour of the continued aggression, the economy was in a bad way and the government politically was in a mess, acknowledging near the end that it was going to lose but that it would still fight to the death. The Japanese challenge mainly failed because the military got so carried away with its policies of expansion that they ended up alienating foreign powers, undermining their own governments and committing themselves to more than they could cope with. In acting independently they sought their own interests rather than the national interests and did not consider the consequences of their actions. The nationalistic ideas were sown into their minds earlier on in the inter war era and this formed a lot of their thinking. In believing that they were superior they blindly went forward and ended up on a path which they couldn’t turn back from. The surrender in 1945 simply formally ended a challenge that had been destined to fail since the start because of its unrealistic aims and radical nature.
Bibliography
M. Barnhart, Japan and the World since 1868 (1995)
W.G Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (1987)
A. Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (1987)
R. Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation 1868-2000 (1987)
Other resources
Article from Encarta Encyclopaedia entitled “Japan”
