As well as the coming together of left wing parties and organisations, a common feature of French history in this period is the striking of the French workforce. It can as a result be argued that mass popular movements played a massive role in the rise of the Popular Front. Highly significant here is the aforementioned fusion of the CGT and the CGTU, and how quickly the new union was to pay dividends to the left. For example from March to May 1936 250,000 workers joined a unified CGT, which was able to create such great successes as those on May Day 1936 when despite threats from bosses 120,000 engineering workers in the Paris region struck for the day, even including Renault who closed their doors for the first time in twenty years as 25,000 struck. Furthermore Levy claims that in June 1936 alone there were 12,142 strikes involving 1.8 million workers. Also significant is the fact that many such strikes involved the occupation of factories. As for instance at Le Brèguet aircraft factory in Le Havre on 11 May, where the 600 strong workforce remained in the plant overnight in response to the managements decision to sack two know union members for taking a day off on May Day as tradition dictated. The sheer number of strikes taking place as well as the vast numbers of workers taking part in them, emphasises the huge importance of the popular movement in the rise of the Popular Front, because it would have given the left the support and legitimacy to bring the warring elements of the left together, which eventually led to its election; furthermore that the nature of many of the strikes was the protection of workers liberties as at Le Brèguet, corroborates Saucy’s claim that Blum and the Popular Front were carried to power by the workers, so as such were sympathetic to them and aimed to bring forward measures in their interests. As such it seems clear that the mass popular movement present during this period was key to the rise of the Popular Front.
A great deal of historical commentary regarding the rise of the Popular Front has also been directed towards the effects of domestic issues in France, such as the effects of the world economic depression that took place in this period. Jackson for example attributes the riots of February 1934 to an institutional crisis and a crisis of regime, which resulted from the depression.If this is the case then the depression would be a hugely important factor in the rise of the Popular front because it would have created an atmosphere in which the popular mass movement was able to grow and thrive; and as elaborated upon earlier this movement was pivotal to the joining of the left parties and thus rise of the popular front. Evidence for this notion can be taken from the social categories which suffered most as a result of the depression; apart from the unemployed the most affected were the Classes Moyennes: the peasantry whose real income fell by some 30% between 1930-35, small business owners and shopkeepers. It is these very groups who arguably made up the bulk of the mass popular movement for the Popular Front. The PCF was able to mobilise these groups through emphasis of limited demands (Revendications partielles), where the party would translate concrete material demands into political action; this can be seen in Bagneux, a suburb of Paris where in 1935 communist activists took over and reinvigorated the Tenants Association, in response to the grievances of residents of the new cheap housing developments who had been neglected by the municipal council; allowing the residents to express their views politically. Given the importance of the mass political movement of the people to the rise of the popular front, the fact that the depression was able to create an atmosphere in which the PCF was able to mobilise the ordinary people through Revendications partielles, suggests that the depression was a precursor to the success of the movement and as such itself an important factor in the rise of the Popular Front. Without it the mass popular movement of the people may never have got off the ground, and the Popular Front may never have been elected.
Having discussed factors which may have led to the rise of the Popular Front, the next step in this study is to attempt to account for its downfall. With regards to this end, it is wise to examine issues pertaining to the foreign policy of the Popular Front, as it is an area of analysis which has received a great deal of attention from historians. A key issue in this respect is that of the Spanish conflict and non-intervention; in which the Popular Front abandoned a programme of aid to the Popular Front government in Spain, in the face of pressure from the domestic fascist press, British hostility to such aid and finally Quai D’Orsay warnings that French intervention may prompt Germany and Italy to aid Franco. A major issue resulting from this, as levy points out was that many government supporters attacked the policy as a betrayal of the anti fascist principles upon which the Popular Front had been built.This would have undoubtedly destabilised the Popular Front as rifts would have emerged within the government between those alarmed by the abandonment of such policies and those supporting it, making it harder for the Popular Front to continue in the long run. Levy shares this idea, arguing that the disagreements over Spain helped provoke the emergence of divisions within the trade unions between communist advocates of aid for Spain, and elements of the SFIO and CGT opposed to anything which may turn into an anti fascist crusade that would conflict with their entrenched pacifism. Union unity was central to the Popular Front so such divisions would have been hugely detrimental to its ability to effectively run the country. Aside from the Spanish crisis the Popular Front government was also put under huge strain by the crisis in Czechoslovakia, regarding its defence against Germany. Adamthwaite argues that as a result of the ensuing Munich agreement regarding the crisis, twenty years of diplomacy lay in ruins as France abandoned Czechoslovakia and the Eastern pacts fell into dissolution, while domestic divisions remained as deep as ever, and the left felt betrayed and broken.Bonnet further argues that after Munich, the Popular Front was ‘definitely dead’. It is clear that these two crises of foreign policy both accentuated existing splits, while creating new ones inside the Popular Front, which no doubt would have diminished support for the government and reduced its ability to effectively run the country, ultimately resulting in its downfall.
As has already been discussed a hugely important factor in the rise of the Popular Front was the mobilisation of the ordinary people through strikes, creating a mass political movement. Such mobilisations are also relevant when discussing the fall of the Popular Front, especially considering the deep divisions that lay within the government and public as a result of various crises, because such divisions could cause different groups to mobilise against the government, and exert a tremendous amount of pressure upon them. Levy argues that the PCF campaign against non-intervention in Spain, combined with new employer militancy resulting from the humiliating concessions employers had to make to workers earlier in the year, combined to spark a new wave of strikes in September 1936. These strikes clearly exerted significant pressure on the government, because throughout August they conceded to the employers through the institution of a system of compulsory arbitration in labour disputes, designed to resolve at least some of the problems employers had. A further example of a mass popular movement against the Popular Front is the Paris metal strike of 1938, which involved 167,000 workers at its peak and lasted twenty-four days. In response to calls from the Paris metal union for a new contract, the government responded with a series of sentences; such as the Jacomet Sentence in which the government exacted a concession from employers but compromised labours biggest conquest, the forty hour week; culminating in the Giraud Sentence which conceded none of the unions demands, lacked a wage adjustment and failed to maintain many of the previous gains, ultimately ending in a massive loss of union credibility and many workers tearing up there union cards. 30% of the union’s total membership for example, is estimated to have quite in the period immediately following the strike. Because of the importance of union unity in the rise of the Popular Front, it is likely that this loss of union credibility caused the government to lose a great deal of popular support, which when combined with the rifts within the government itself ultimately resulted in the breaking up of the Popular Front.
It is clear that many different factors would have contributed to both the rise and fall of the Popular Front in France, not all of which have been touched upon in this essay. Concerning the rise of the Popular Front it would seem clear that a series of factors including; fear of fascism as a result of the current European situation and the events of 6 February 1934; and the effects the economic depression was having on the classes moyennes created a political climate in France in which the different elements of the left were able to unite. This is significant because once the left became united they became able to mobilise the classes moyennes through various strikes and factory occupations, creating a mass popular movement which carried them into power. The fall of the Popular Front can largely be attributed to the government’s handling of several issues such as the crises in Spain and Czechoslovakia. With regards to such issues Haslem argues that ‘popular front policies... tended to accentuate the splits in the left rather than heal the divisions’. This lack of unity would have made it nearly impossible for the Popular Front to fight the mass movement against it, instigated by employers seeking to regain concessions they had been forced to make earlier. The result of this movement, chiefly the loss of union credibility decimated support for the Popular Front rendering it in reality unable to continue in power. The mobilisation of the classes moyennes resulting in a mass popular movement can be seen in both the rise and fall of the popular front; carrying the government to power on a wave of popular support before bringing it down by accentuating existing divides between the different elements of the left. It is a theme central to the history of the Popular Front in France and as such is arguably the most important factor when accounting for its rise and subsequent fall.
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