One reason for this lack of coherence was the inexperience of the states to conduct joint campaigns. Although alliances had existed in the past they had, more often than not been defensive alliances based on a common interest. In this case the only pressing common interest was one of ideology which even Britain, the main protagonists in setting up the Coalition, had been slow to recognise, preferring instead to be optimistic that France would be weakened by the turmoil. Only the émigrés had been determined from the outset to fight the revolution and they were of pitiful strength. There was little understanding between all the powers as to what the basis for any Coalition would be and no general agreement that the revolution was the most important concern of the European powers. There is little wonder therefore that the coalition broke down as Prussia, Spain and Russia saw there interests better served by a different policy.
This may be explained by the illusion which prevailed that the defeat of France would be a relatively speedy and trouble free event. With civil war in the Vendee and turmoil in Paris it is easy to see how European leaders came to this conclusion. As a result the uncoordinated campaigns fought by the Coalition were lacking in concentration and impetus, and when those forces met unexpectedly strong resistance from a fervent and rapidly expanding French defence the assumption that the war would be short was quickly dispelled. The Coalition did achieve significant early victories in 1793 but they proved not be decisive. By the time of the second Coalition the allies expectations had been revised but their early misplaced optimism was a considerable reason behind the weakness of the First Coalition.
As the tide turned against the allies in both the First and Second Coalitions and belligerent states became disheartened the Coalitions suffered heavily from the untimely withdrawal of crucial members. The most crucial of these was Prussia in 1795. Frederick William II withdrew his forces after military defeats which had been costly in manpower and in financial terms and turned his attention to the Polish question. This removed from the Coalition not only what was probably the most effective land army in opposition to France but also an essential strategic front-line on France's northern border.
The southern border was also made secure for France in 1795 by the desertion of Spain from the Coalition who actually joined forces with France the following year. The absence of the Prussians from the second Coalition was also a disadvantage to the alliance. British foreign secretary Lord Grenville hoped to compensate for this by involving the Russians who had resolved the Polish issue; but when they to deserted the Coalition in 1799 amidst great tension with Austria and Britain, the Coalition was left in disarray with only Austria as an effective land force left to cope with an increasingly powerful French army. Hence the absence or departure of vital members at vital times was a serious source of weakness for the First and Second Coalitions.
Behind this problem was the issue of each of the powers having different interests and objectives, which I have already discussed, but also there existed considerable distrust between some of the major powers which contributed further to the weakness of the Coalitions. The partition of Poland created an atmosphere of competition, distrust and resentment between Austria, Prussia and Russia and it was partly in this spirit that Prussia deserted the First Coalition in 1795. Division between all three main allies, Russia, Britain and Austria, however in 1799 was instrumental in ensuring that the Second Coalition collapsed and the French were left in supremacy.
Ironically the division came again in the wake of significant Coalition victories. But it was Russia who achieved the advances in Italy, a traditional zone for Austrian influence which led the Austrians to pursue their claims in Italy when the thrust of the allied assault had moved to the Swiss Alps and the French border. Without the Austrians the Russians were defeated at Zurich, and combined with a dispute with Britain over the occupation of Malta and a failed Anglo Russian expedition in the Netherlands, Tsar Paul I promptly left the coalition, disillusioned and distrustful of his allies. Division and dispute between the allies can therefore be recognised as a fundamental cause of weakness to both the First and Second Coalitions.
It is not surprising that Russia and Britain fell into dispute over the occupation of Malta in this way. For Russia, the primary concern during the war of the Second Coalition had been to ensure her strategic position in the Mediterranean in the light of French gains on the Italian Peninsula. For Britain Malta was important in order to consolidate her naval supremacy in general. Again this is an example of the differing individual state objectives hindering the community of interest, but it also touches on one of the other main sources of weakness for the two Coalitions.
Despite her earlier welcoming of the revolution in France, it was Britain who was first motivated to establish a joint campaign against the new regime when her trading interests were threatened by the reopening of the Scheldt in 1792. However Britain was chiefly a maritime power who would be unable to field a land force capable of defeating the French. Therefore the British were completely reliant on other large nations such as Austria and Russia if the revolution was to be reversed. Hence it was necessary for conflict with France to be in the interests of the other nations if British policy was to succeed. During the First Coalition subsidies were paid to smaller states and, before the death of Catherine II, plans were made for Britain to subsidise Russia's involvement in the Second Coalition. But by no means had the full system of subsidies which proved successful in the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars been established yet. As a result, with the land forces encountering fierce resistance from the French it was only Britain who was benefiting from the conflict, in terms of colonial gains. Disputes with Russia over such issues as Malta show Britain acting in her own immediate interests rather than those of the alliance. It was probably inevitable, under those circumstances that Britain would be left in solitary opposition to France, as turned out to be the case in both the First and Second Coalitions.
There were also military reasons why the Coalitions proved to be weaker than their French opponents. With the arrival of the Jacobin regime in France came radical expansion and reform of the armed forces. The levee en masse of 1793 inflated the army by August of that year to about 650,000, three times larger than the Prussian army. The new army, although not well equipped or necessarily well trained, was nonetheless fervently patriotic, enthusiastic and led for the first time by a new generation of officers such as Bonaparte who were skilful and had fresh ideas. Such massive conscription meant that the army could be assembled, and if necessary replenished, at less cost to the government than the other armies of Europe still populated with highly paid soldiers and mercenaries.
The opposing armies of the Coalitions had never before experienced fighting against a force of this kind whose tactics were also more vigorous and flexible than their own. The numbers alone rapidly transformed France from a weak military power to a match for the best in the continent. The allies expecting a demoralised, turmoil stricken, weak French force were caught wrong footed by an army ready to defend what it had achieved. For all the terror and the mob rule in Paris, the development and reform of the armed forces was one of the true successes of the French Revolution which caught the enemy by surprise. Military inadequacy was one of the more unlikely reasons behind the weakness of the First and Second Coalitions.
In conclusion we can isolate the main reasons for the weakness of the coalitions of the 1790's against France as fourfold. Firstly there is the lack of common purpose amongst the allies which continually caused the campaign to falter or breakdown. Secondly was the distrust which existed between the allies which resulted in a lack of co-ordination in their efforts. Thirdly were the false assumptions made by the Coalition powers at the outset as to the size of the task they were hoping to undertake; and finally the ancien regime style of warfare which struggled to cope with the rapidly expanding French force with their new, young, talented and ambitious officers. Many of the problems continued throughout the reign of Napoleon; some were inevitable and without solution. But without doubt in the 1790's the European powers had neither the priorities nor the commitment to ensure a successful campaign against the French. Because of this the First and Second Coalitions were always likely to fail.
