An In-depth comparison of two major Confederate Commanders: Robert. E. Lee and Braxton Bragg, during four major battles of the American Civil War.

So why did lee fail here, when he had so spectacularly won at Chancellorsville? The major factors in Lee's loss arguably can be attributed to: (1) Lee's overconfidence in the invincibility of his men; (2) the performance of his subordinates, and his management thereof; (3) health issues, and; (4) the performance of his opponent, George G. Meade, and the Army of the Potomac. Many historians and writers offer a complete range of different reasons as to why he failed, some even agreeing with those mentioned above. In an article published again in The Harper Weekly on July 25 1863, the Harper brothers again discuss Lee’s tactics this time at Gettysburg. In the report on Gettysburg they offer the reason that General Meade was not as naïve as General Hooker when it came to falling for General Lee’s Tactics: ‘On Friday morning General Lee did not desire to make the attack. He saw the superiority of the federal position, and wished to entice them out of it, and down into the valley. With this design he withdrew all of his sharpshooters.’ They then go on to say that: ‘General Lee’s evacuation had no effect. Meade was neither to be enticed into the town nor into the valley. Enough dead bodies lay In the fields and streets to give him warning of what had happened to poor Reynolds two days before, and he wisely determined to stay where he was and let events shape themselves.’ Therefore it can be seen that The Harper Brothers believe that Meade was a lot clever then the Union’s commander at Chancellorsville, and could see through General Lee’s tactics.

In an essay written by William Coventry, he discusses critically Lee’s use of tactics at Gettysburg. His assessment is very critical of the circumstances surrounding Gettysburg and General Lee himself. In his Introduction he states: ‘A combination of circumstances separated Gettysburg from Lee’s previous battles. But he did not appear capable of adapting his modus operandi. Lee’s reliance on aggressive tactics where simply not appropriate for the situation he stumbled into at Gettysburg. This is especially true when contrasted with the view of his corps commanders.’ In his closing statement Coventry states this:

‘Lee’s confidence in his own ability, and that of his army, had become unrealistic or at least idealistic. Using the best case scenario, with the federals broken and routed, how long could Lee’s battered force, with little supplies, capture and hold such a city as Washington or Philadelphia? Lee continually expected the federals to break and run, even as they flagrantly demonstrated courage, strength and stubbornness. He knew his men could match these federal qualities, but, due to terrain and numbers, would have to surpass this. With proper general ship, intelligence and coordination, it was possible. But he did not have this and realised it from July 1st onwards.’

        Summing up Coventry’s view, he seems he believes that Lee’s aggressive tactics he used at Chancellorsville where out-dated and completely useless at Gettysburg. He overlooked advice given to him by his officers and attempted to push through an impossible victory at Gettysburg. His blind vision of bringing a quick end to the war, and glory for his state of Virginia was another reason for his loss at Gettysburg.

        A final historian’s view of Gettysburg is one by Ethan Rafuse. In his article he also discussed Lee’s tactics at Gettysburg. He also agrees that Lee had finally met his match in Meade.

 ‘Lee drew on previous experience as he weighed his options. He was not fighting blue chess pieces, but fallible human beings. History suggests it would have been the height of folly not to count on federal mistakes in making his plans. Perhaps in yesterday’s confusion Meade shifted his forces around, leaving party of his line vulnerable. Maybe the strain of waiting for the Confederates to make a move would prompt one of Meade’s subordinates to lose his head and do something rash. To be sure, absent of this sort of luck, the odds against assaulting the Federal position were long. But lee had no choice. He could neither induce the Federals to make a major mistake nor put his army in a position to exploit one unless he went on the offensive. Meade however recognised that the Federal army could win simply by not losing. His lack of boldness and dash would make him, like McClellan, the target of scorn from shallow and superficial military analysts. But Meade’s stolid qualities were poison for Lee.’

        Rafuse clearly believes that the union army, under the direction of Meade, had learned its lesson from Chancellorsville. He was not about to lose the battle by falling for Lee’s tactics to draw him out. This in turn is a fatal reason as to why Lee lost at Gettysburg.

        Braxton Bragg is the second Commander this in depth comparison will look at. He was born in North Carolina on March 22nd 1817. He too, just like Robert. E .Lee was educated at West Point Military academy and also began to make a name for himself during the Mexican-American wars. On April 12 1862, Bragg was appointed a General in the Confederate army, one of only seven men in Confederate history to do so.

        Bragg’s most famous battle was the battle of Chickamauga. The battle was the most significant Union defeat in the  of the  and involved the second highest number of casualties in the war following the . Here, Bragg would face William Rosecrans.  On the 19th September the battle began. Bragg had planned to attack the Union’s left win in a flank attack. This did not really take in to effect as Bragg has misjudged the enemy’s position. A clash between Brannan and Forrest’s forces lead to an all-day battle between the two forces. Both sides continued to fight to gain the advantage but none succeeded. Bragg continued to fight on into the night to try to push the union south but yet again this plan failed to. Army of Tennessee historian Thomas Connelly criticized Bragg's conduct of the battle on September 19; He wrote that Bragg bypassed two opportunities to win the battle on September 19:

‘Bragg's inability to readjust his plans had cost him heavily. He had never admitted that he was wrong about the location of Rosecrans' left wing and that as a result he bypassed two splendid opportunities. During the day Bragg might have sent heavy reinforcements to Walker and attempted to roll up the Union left; or he could have attacked the Union centre where he knew troops were passing from to the left. Unable to decide on either, Bragg tried to do both, wasting his men in sporadic assaults. Now his Army was crippled and in no better position than that morning. Walker had, in the day's fighting, lost over 20 per cent of his strength, while Stuart and Cleburne had lost 30 per cent. Gone, too, was any hope for the advantage of a surprise blow against Rosecrans.’

        Here it is already clear that there is heavy criticism of Bragg’s tactics on the first day of Chickamauga. Connelly believed that Bragg had over stretched himself and missed out on two perfectly good opportunities to push the union forces back. However day two would fare better for the Confederate forces. Bragg divided his forces and gave half to Longstreet to command and half to Polk. The battle progressed without error until Rosecrans made a fatal one. Rosecrans was trying to strengthen his defences on his right while he sent Thomas to his left. Thinking that Wood was on Reynolds right flank he ordered wood to close up and support him. However Brannan was on Wood’s left. Wood the pulled out of line, around Brannan, to support Reynolds’ leaving a hole in their defensive line. This is when Longstreet attacked tacking full advantage of the gap. The union forces of Sheridan and Davis’s where scattered. The right flank was the driven back on its left. However Bragg had failed to provide for Longstreet so his success could not be exploited further. Rosecrans unable to rally his forces began to retreat. The aftermath of this battle was that Rosecrans was sacked and replaced by General Thomas. Also a confederate described the scene at Chickamauga as ghastly, with hundreds of dead on the field, their faces upward and some with their arms sticking up as if reaching for something. In their book Randall and Donald described Chickamauga as this: ‘Costly as it was Chickamauga was a barren victory for the confederates”

        However looking more closely at Bragg’s role, was this victory down to his use of strategy or down to the sheer luck and skill of his men. Before he had arrived on the battlefield on the 18th September, none of his men had carried out the duties he had ordered. He was left livid. Some of Bragg's subordinate generals were frustrated at what they perceived to be his lack of willingness to exploit the victory by pursuing the Union army toward Chattanooga and destroying it. In his article, David Eicher discusses Bragg’s lack of ability and respect as a commanding officer at Chickamauga: ‘Despite the victory the gruff, argumentative and demanding Bragg found himself with few friends. Ridiculed by many subordinate commanders for not aggressively pursuing the fleeing Yankees – especially by Longstreet and Polk- Bragg found that as he moved his forces into position around Chattanooga, few soldiers or officers held any confidence in him’ Bragg’s officers clearly felt he was unable to do his job. He continued to miss opportunity after opportunity to push back the union forces and destroy them. It is therefore clear to see that, Bragg’s victory at Chickamauga was not down to tactical and strategic genius but more down to being in the right place at the right time and in the incompetence of the union commander. Even though victory was achieved the victory had taken its toll: ‘Bragg’s “victory has crippled him”.’ 

In his book Foote describes how Longstreet was feeling during  the  battle of Chickamauga, going as far to compare him with General Lee at Gettysburg: ‘ An hour he had waited, the another and another. And still there was no crash of guns from the north or word from headquarters of a postponement or cancellation of the attack. Like Lee at Gettysburg, where the shoe had been on the other foot, the burly Georgian scarcely knew what to make of this, expect as an indication that such things were not ordered well in the western army.’ Again this shows that the commanding officer lacked respect with his officers and even intelligence to keep his forces well communicated and Longstreet was left sitting wondering what was going to happen.

The Battle of Stones River is the second battle that this in-depth comparison will look at. It took place in December/January 1963 and here yet again Bragg would face Rosecrans. Bragg struck first by launching a strong, surprise attack against Rosecrans on December 31st. This proved to be successful and drove the Union back to a small defensive position but could not break it or their supply line. Bragg soon got over his head assuming this was the battle over and Rosecrans would withdraw. However by January 2nd the Union troops still remained at Stones River. The battle resumed when Bragg launched an unsuccessful attack of the Union defences utilising Maj. Gen Breckinridge to do this. But the Union line proved too well defended. Here the battle situation completely changed. Bragg recognising his lack of progress, the change in weather conditions and the arrival of supplies and reinforcements for Rosecrans began to withdraw his army, ceding victory to the Union and Rosecrans. In his article McWhiney stated that Bragg had ‘lost his nerve’ or so the Union would make out: ‘Just as at Perryville, Bragg seemed to change under stress from a bold and aggressive attacker to a hesitant and cautious retreat-er. He had, of course, sound reasons for withdrawing from Murfreesboro. His principal subordinates advised him to retreat. He had lost nearly 30% of his men in the recent battles; if forced to fight again without some rest, his army might disintegrate. But his decision to retreat allowed his enemies to charge that once again Bragg had lost his nerve.'

McWhiney here suggests that Bragg was tepid with his tactics and in warfare. That one minute he was on the offensive all guns blazing pushing the union back, the next running away ceding defeat, giving Rosecrans an easy victory. Stones River is amongst the top ten bloodiest battles in the Civil War but has none of heroic lore the other battles carry. Casualties amounted to almost 30,000 men and this was substantial considering there were only 76,000 men on both sides. Bragg received almost universal scorn from his Confederate military colleagues; only the support of Joseph E. Johnston and President Jefferson Davis's inability to find a suitable replacement saved his command. But a case can also be made that Stones River was in fact a strategic Union victory.

Assessing Bragg’s tactics it is clear to see that his tactics on the first day of the Battle of Stones River where impressive. He struck out against the Union dealing them a harsh enough blow to push them back. However it all began to fall apart when he fell for Rosecrans tactics of faking a set of false reinforcements and supplies. Bragg believing this soon gave up the fight and cowardly began to retreat. When looking at both Chickamauga and Stones River in turn, it is hard to see which battle was Bragg’s greatest. Although the Confederacy won at Chickamauga it was down to Union blunders and the effort of Bragg’s subordinates that victory was achieved.

After assessing both Commanders in turn and looking at all four battles in depth too, it is clear to see that neither of the two Generals had a long line of successive victories. Although both enjoyed success at Chickamauga/Chancellorsville, both Generals also suffered major defeats. General Lee clashed with Hooker at Chancellorsville and due to his perfectly timed used of tactics, lead his army to victory. He cleverly split his army into two to deter the forces at Fredericksburg and the used his officer Stonewall to pursue Hooker. Although Stonewall later died after this battle, his efforts were gallant.

        However General Lee sought to use the same aggressive tactics at Gettysburg, but the whole scheme of the battle, including terrain and weather, was different than at Chancellorsville. He faced a more impressive leader and General Meade saw right through Lee’s Strategy. Instead of taking the bait and leaping into Lee’s trap, he sat out, waiting for Lee to inevitably make his move leading to a Confederacy defeat. Had Lee alternated his strategy and played a more defensive role the outcome may have been different.

General Bragg on the other hand had a not so impressive victory and an even more humiliating defeat. At Chickamauga, Bragg attempted to strategize the battle. However he greatly misjudged the enemies position and only by a stroke of luck, due to the enemy’s lack of communication, did an opening for Longstreet occur to take advantage of a gap in the enemy line. But due to Bragg’s lack of backing Longstreet up, this could not be fully exploited. Also due to the enemy’s negligence, Bragg managed to push Rosecrans back and achieve a futile victory.

However preceding this battle was Bragg’s clash with Rosecrans at Stones River. Here Bragg began what would seem like an impressive start to any people. He went on the offensive and managed to push Rosecrans back. However his approach changed on the second day and after learning of reinforcements, cowardly began to retreat, ceding an easy victory to the Union. His actions at both battles where highly condemned by his subordinates. But due to a lack of a replacement Bragg kept his position.

So after an in-depth comparison of both Commanders, who was the better General? Going by who achieved the most status and fame out of the war, then General Lee would clearly be the better General. However after assessing each battle more closely it becomes clear that both Generals had a degree of skill which they both clearly implemented in each battle. But it seems that in the majority of the four battles the Generals both somehow got lucky and due to other factors, such as Union blunders, strength of their officers and terrain differences, they both managed to pull a victory off. And in the case of their defeats, the Union also showed they too could implement strategy. However this is the role of the commanding general, to lead and guide his army into the fray of the battle, simply trying to secure their goal by any means possible. Going by this statement then both General Lee and Bragg came out on top.

Bibliography

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