Virtue of Character
Introduced through habit
“Virtue, then being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and growth to teaching” (1103aI)
Adds further support with
“And by doing these acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or courageous or coward, and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly” (1103b15)
Concludes with emphasis on its importance
“Thus, states of character arise out of like activities, those activities have to be of a certain kind, it makes no small difference, or rather all the difference then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth”(1103b25)
After we have acquired this disposition we must then be ready to know why they are dispositions to virtuous actions. This can only be achieved through practice of action through reason, the constant practice of virtuous activity.
We must now learn how, when presented with many situations, all with their particular circumstances and factors, how to correctly perceive those factors and see what the correct action (or amount of action) is called for in that instance. But how do we know what the correct action is. In Ethics we are helped by the doctrine of the mean, and through this we are introduced to how closely Aristotle’s connects virtue is to reason.
REASON CONNECTED TO VIRTUE
To know the right thing to do we must employ a theory called the doctrine of the mean. Ethics tells us that virtue “is concerned with passions and actions”(1106b13) and we must use practical knowledge and reason to respond to them and moderate them correctly. It is because we are exposed to courage and cowardice, pleasures and pains that we can reason the proper amount of courage the situation at hand calls for. In light of this, it is easy to see, that to each passion, appetite or action in each situation there is an excess, defect, and an appropriate mean. “Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, relative to us” (1106b36). By stating “relative to us” Aristotle is saying that the “mean state” is determined by other properties which we perceive in particular situations and then with proper perception of these properties we can rationally arrive at the right amount or right thing to do in relation to the general principal. You must use practical reason in order to know and recognize the properties of a situation. For example let’s look at courage. If we walk into a situation that calls for
some degree of courage the virtuous person must be able to rationally reason, which means he must be able to see the situation, perceive in a correct way all the relevant factors and then moderate his traits to the right amount and perform the correct action. In book six Ethics discusses how intellectual virtue involves practical reason. This virtue is not purely theoretical (which can be totally be separated from action), but practical. Practical wisdom as we know is all about action, the correct action. Since only reasoning with a view to some desired end motivates us to act, practical reasoning is distinguished from theoretical reasoning. The desired end (an solid already existing end) is the goal of our reasoning which motivates us to act. “We deliberate not about ends but about means” (1112b12). Aristotle believes that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational and he connects these with rational and irrational principals, theoretical and practical knowledge. “And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principal-one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things,”(1139a8). Theoretical and practical reason is another central issue in Ethics. In contrast to practical reason which involves action, theoretical reason involves the big picture, the validity of a claim, idea or end... It is because of all this deliberation, reason and moderation, aimed that uncovering the right “mean”, that it is so difficult to live the virtuous life. In conclusion intellectual virtue is excellence in deliberation or reason.
PRIMACY OF THE PARTICULAR
The primacy of the Particular over General basically says that you first must know or understand all parts (particulars) before you can know or understand the whole (general/ principal). McDowell contends Aristotle’s view of the particular and expands on it by stating that using any kind of general principal will “generate unacceptable prescriptions in particular situations”. It is because of the complex and infinite nature of ethical situations we will be faced with in life that no one general principal will ever cover everything.
His ideas are shown by the following statements;
“People do not act by applying universal principals”…pg62
Then addresses why it would be unreasonable to disagree
““If one attempted to reduce one’s conception of what virtue requires as a set of rules, then, however sublet and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would eventually turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong, not necessarily because one has changed one’s mind: rather, one’s mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula” (67)
Principals, general in nature leave way to error because, in life, there are always exceptions.
An easy way to explain why the practical is epistemically prior to the general is to say without the virtuous man and all his choices of actions in particular situations there would be no general notion of virtue.
WHY THE PRIMACY OF THE PARTICULAR IS ESSENTIAL FOR ARISTOTLES ACCOUNT OF VIRTUE
I will begin by noting Aristotle’s account of the knowledgeable man. Very early in Ethics it is discussed that different disciplines/know ledges (physics, psychology, and ethics) hold different amounts of concrete certainty. The educated person, (one, who has explored many different sciences with some intensity,) knows what degree of certainty and demonstration (ability to show that this is certain) is appropriate to each one. This difference in certainty is connected to Aristotle’s particularistic view. For our debate let’s look at the certainty in relation to what to do in particular situations surrounding ethics or virtue. Ethics makes it clear that there is no general formula that instructs a person on how courageous to be (that is the same amount of courage is appropriate in every situation.) Instead we have to find the mean of two extremes in order to display that virtue. But that mean is particular to the situation at hand. We have to use our knowledge and reason to be able to detect the amount of courage appropriate for that situation. Aristotle displays this view in the following passages:
“...to what degree and how seriously a man must err to be blamed is not easy to define on principle. For in fact no object of perception is easy to define; and such questions of degree depend on particular circumstances, and the decision lies with perception”
Adds support with:
...to experience these emotions [fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure] at the right times and on the right occasions and toward the right persons and for the right causes and in the right manner is the mean or the supreme good, which is characteristic of virtue.
And with a third passage:
By the mean considered relatively to ourselves I understand that which is neither too much nor too little; but this is not one thing, nor is it the same for everybody. Thus if 10 be too much and 2 too little we take 6 as a mean in respect of the thing itself; for 6 is as much greater than 2 as it is less than 10, and this is a mean in arithmetical proportion. But the mean considered relatively to ourselves must not be ascertained in this way.”
The primitive concept is the concept that comes first, before all else. This concept ties into to Aristotle’s teachings right from the beginning. One of the first points he makes is that the virtuous thing to do, is that which the virtuous man would do. That concept requires that what we have a handle on first is the idea of the virtuous man or virtuous character. ”we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good” (1103b24) the focus is on the individual, the particular. If we had some theoretical account of virtue that would allow us to tell in advance what virtue is (general principal), the virtuous man would no longer be conceptually primary, therefore reinforcing the view that the particular is prior to the general. It is through the practice of correct perception and action over many particular situations that we can then qualify that that is a virtuous life (principal).
Primacy of the particular is necessary because a person must know the situational properties, circumstances and all other situational specific qualities and further perceive them in the right way, then use reason to arrive at the act and only then after the particular is determined can we apply it to the general theory/principal. It is because the virtuous man is primary, that we can have no general account of virtue.
PHL277
ARISTOTLE’S VIRTUE
HANA OTTA
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