If one had to read over all of Arendt’s works which she published before Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, one could see that it presents both continuity with her previous works, but also a change in emphasis that would continue to the end of her life. This work marks a shift in her concerns from the nature of political action, to a concern with the faculties that underpin it - the interrelated activities of thinking and judging.
She controversially uses the phrase 'the banality of evil' to characterize Eichmann's actions as a member of the Nazi regime, in particular his role as chief architect and executioner of Hitler's genocidal 'final solution' for the 'Jewish problem'. Her characterization of these actions, so obscene in their nature and consequences, as 'banal' is not meant to position them as workaday. Rather it is meant to contest the prevalent depictions of the Nazi's inexplicable atrocities as having emanated from a malevolent will to do evil, a delight in murder. As far as Arendt could discern, Eichmann came to his willing involvement with the program of genocide through a failure or absence of the faculties of sound thinking and judgement. From Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, Arendt concluded that far from exhibiting a malevolent hatred of Jews which could have accounted psychologically for his participation in the Holocaust, Eichmann was an utterly innocuous individual. He operated unthinkingly, following orders, efficiently carrying them out, with no consideration of their effects upon those he targeted. The human dimension of these activities were not entertained, so the extermination of the Jews became indistinguishable from any other bureaucratically assigned and discharged responsibility for Eichmann and his cohorts. Arendt concluded that Eichmann was constitutively incapable of exercising the kind of judgement that would have made his victims' suffering real or apparent for him. It was not the presence of hatred that enabled Eichmann to perpetrate the genocide, but the absence of the imaginative capacities that would have made the human and moral dimensions of his activities tangible for him. Eichmann failed to exercise his capacity of thinking, of having an internal dialogue with himself, which would have permitted self-awareness of the evil nature of his deeds. This amounted to a failure to use self-reflection as a basis for judgement, the faculty that would have required Eichmann to exercise his imagination so as to contemplate the nature of his deeds from the experiential standpoint of his victims.
It was very clear if not still, that Eichmann was considered an evil man throughout most of the world. The world was furious of the crimes he had committed and all believed that he was guilty. Yet, according to Arendt, “He was a cog, in a large killing machine that never contemplated his role or developed a conscious to answer questions for himself. He simply followed orders and happened to have an instrumental job in the destruction of world Jewry” This argument caused uproar, and the world had someone new to glare at. Arendt does not even fault Eichmann for completing his job, because she thought he was simply following the orders that were given to him, she would even go as far as to say he was a good soldier. This was one of the three major controversies that arose with the printing of Arendt’s book on the trial. Arendt also heavily criticized David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minster of Israel, the chief Prosecutor Gideon Hausner, and the European Jewish community. Arendt believed that the Jewish Community in Europe had meticulous organizational skills and were crucial in the destruction of European Jewry. The organizations that the Jews created were able to document and provide comprehensive statistics and complete efficiency in rounding up Jews and aiding the Nazis. Arendt believed the Jewish bureaucracy was faultless in its carrying out of these duties. This argument of Arendt's is flawed for a number of reasons. If the Jewish communal leaders assigned these tasks did not fulfil them then, other Jews may have, and if not them, then other European citizens might have, which does not completely discredit Arendt. But the fact that does expose Arendt’s theory that is often described as “blaming the victims not the criminals”, is the fact that the Russian Jews were systematically murdered and killed much the same way as much of Central and Eastern Europe’s Jews were. What stands to reason is there were no Jewish organizations to augment the efficiency of the Nazis in Russia. The Nazis were able to comprehend this task without the help of any Jewish administration. The Jewish organizations could not have been much more helpful to the Jews of Europe, Arendt simply overplays this theory. Jews were not leading their own to their deaths, or simply following orders like Eichmann and other cogs, but were probably trying to alleviate Jewish suffering.
Arendt’s criticism of Ben-Gurion’s treatment of the trial is precise. Journalists arrived from all over the world hanging on to each and every word of the trial; it was truly a "show trial." Even though Arendt would probably agree that Eichmann was a cog and an automaton, Israel’s Prime Minister was able to gain great publicity for the trial.
Therefore in conclusion, it was due to these reasons and arguments which are the major reasons Arendt’s work was poorly received in Israel and throughout the world. According to her critics, “Her criticism of European Jewry’s role in the Holocaust is rather short-sighted, but her indictment of the prosecutors and Ben-Gurion is profound.” However, it was the notion that Eichmann was merely a “good soldier” following orders that tore the hearts of the general public in Israel. Arendt’s statement could not have come at more of a worse time, a time when the Jewish people expected results from the trial and more importantly, someone to be accountable. However, the controversy that Arendt created could be seen in a different light, as it was because of Arendt that we have a deeper understanding of the Holocaust and the Nazi regime, including the thinking behind these monstrosities. Of course no excuse can be given for what Eichmann did, regardless of whether he was following orders or not, it was his incapacity to relate actions and thoughts, which according to Arendt meant that he was incapable of producing empathy for the people’s lives that he destroyed. Although no scientific or philosophical evidence can show what went through Eichmann’s mind while he was sending families, like cattle to be slaughtered, it is the very notion that he might not be guilty for his actions which shake the moral ground-works upon which we stand. If Eichmann is considered innocent, even for a brief moment one can see the devastation which may arise, one would be able to commit the most heinous of crimes, but by denying accountability or responsibility of the action, one may even be considered a good criminal who “did his job well”.
Bibliography
Books
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Arendt, Hannah (1977), Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Penguin Books
Internet
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Fieser, J Dowden, B (2003) The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [online]
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Phil Books (2003) [online]
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World Union of Jewish Students: Eichmann in Jerusalem (2002) [online] http://www.wujs.org.il/activist/features/articles/eichmanjeru.shtml
The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy - http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/
The Hannah Arendt Papers - http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/arendthtml/essayc6.html
Hannah Arendt – Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil
World Union of Jewish Students - http://www.wujs.org.il/activist/features/articles/eichmanjeru.shtml