The main point of contention is whether Kennedy was concerned over the domestic consequences of the Cuban missiles and his response. The traditionalist approach highlights Kennedy’s concern for the international implications of the missiles. Although the missiles had little impact on the overall U.S-Soviet military balance, they had an effect on the political balance. The successful deployment of missiles on Cuba would prove Soviet ability to act in a zone vital to American Security interests. This would damage America’s international prestige and could cause its allies in Europe to question the ability of the U.S to contain communism. The traditionalist perspective sees the use of a naval blockade as the right choice to respond to the missile threat. The blockade sufficiently communicated to Khrushchev American resolve but avoided provoking military confrontation. However the revisionist perspective sees the use of a naval blockade as the only means available for Kennedy to solve the missile crisis before the November elections. Revisionists argue that through using the blockade Kennedy was needlessly risking war. A much safer option would have been negotiations; the reason this was not tried was because of the November elections.
Through analysing Kennedy’s conversation with his brother Robert on the way to an Executive Committee (Ex Comm) meeting, “If they get this mean on one part of the world, what will they do on the next? Robert adds “and not only that, if you hadn’t acted you would have been impeached” to which the President replies “that’s what I think – I would have been impeached.” Richard Ned Lebow comes to the conclusion that both concerns over the domestic impact of not acting and the international implications were at the fore front of Kennedy’s thinking when making a decision on the correct course of action.
The seeds of the Revisionist perspective can be seen in Republican critics of the Kennedy administration at the time. The Republicans suspected that Kennedy used the Cuban Missile Crisis to win at the November elections. It is true that in the autumn of 1962 Kennedy wanted a more sympathetic congress. In 1961 only 48.4 percent of Kennedy’s legislative initiatives gained congressional approval and by 1962 only 44.6 percent were approved. Kennedy hoped that the November elections would expand his influence in congress. This was an arduous task, only once in the twentieth century had the party of the President in office improved its standings at the midterm position in the House of Representatives and not since 1934 had the party in power enhanced its strength in the Senate. Republican leaders privately projected gains of ten to twenty House seats, and advisors urged Kennedy to distance himself from the elections to avoid being personally blamed for the expected defeat. However 1962 promised to be an unusual political year the nature of the Kennedy victory in 1960 suggested that the midterm election tradition was going to be broken. Kennedy as a rule did not help democratic candidates this meant that the vulnerable candidates that would have been elected in the Presidents’ wake (the most likely to be defeated by the Republicans in the November elections) were not holding office. From this perspective it was probable the congressional elections would have little effect on the political make up of the new congress. Furthermore domestic concerns such as civil rights and medical care were becoming the centre issues. Also Kennedy’s handling of the Mississippi crisis; the violence surrounding the enrolment of James Meredith a black student at the University of Mississippi in September had swayed favour in a number of key northern industrial states.
However Kennedy’s role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco gave the Republicans the chance to heavily criticise the Kennedy administration diverting attention away from their own political vulnerabilities. In the summer of 1962 Republicans charged the administration for underestimating the Soviet military presence in Cuba and for withholding information. The Republican senator from New York Kenneth B. Keating claimed that there were missiles on Cuba although he did not distinguish between defensive missiles Surface to Air (SAMS), or offensive Surface to Surface missiles (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles MRBMS and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles IRBMS). Kennedy took the initiative over the issue by asking Congress for standby authority to call up one hundred and fifty thousand military reservists. On 29th September the Senate adopted the Cuban Resolution; it is worth noting that the Republicans succeeded in making Cuba a troublesome issue for the Democrats who were put in the position of looking like they were hiding something. Opinion polls showed that Cuba had grown into a dominant issue however Kennedy still tried to stress the domestic issues. The U2 photographs of Cuban missile bases being built in the San Cristobal area on 16th October 1962 confirmed Republican accusations and fermented the Issue as the political weakness of the Kennedy administration.
The subsequent decision to quarantine Cuba and the choice to use a television address has been considered from many angles. What is clear is the President had to act, but whether the impact on domestic issues was considered is debateable. It is evident though that on October 18th during a crisis meeting, secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon passed a hand written note to Sorensen, saying “have you considered the very real possibility, that if we allow Cuba to complete installation and operational readiness of missile bases, the next house of Representatives is likely to have a Republican Majority?” However this note should not be misinterpreted as its specific aim was to try and sway more political advisors to Dillon’s hard line approach of decisive military action against Cuba. This note did not sway Kennedy’s decision and highlights how the President was not thinking politically when considering his response. However the use of the television address to announce his response is seen by many revisionists as the deciding factor in the debate.
The television announcement of October 22nd announced the use of the naval blockade although it was called a navel quarantine as not to pose a direct threat to the Soviet Union. It is argued by the president’s advisors that they chose the use of a television address to announce the quarantine not only to surprise the Soviets and take the initiative so that Khrushchev could not issue an ultimatum but also because a secret course of action was not viable. No responsible president would have tried to mobilise he navy without informing the American people of what h was doing. However revisionists have argued that the surprise television speech was selected for its domestic political impact. A dramatic speech announcing bold action would surely rally public opinion around President Kennedy. This approach would also have the desired affect of silencing his critics and effectively take the issue of Cuba away from the Republicans, who could no longer criticise him for inaction. Although there is little evidence to sustain this argument the speech did have these affects on public opinion.
After the television statement was made Kennedy and his Ex Com advisors waited eagerly for Khrushchev’s response. Khrushchev and Kennedy exchanged letters, and American and Soviet officials met secretly. The result of which was announced on the 28th October, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba and the Americans pledged not to invade Cuba while Fidel Castro was in power. Also Kennedy made a secret agreement to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Although this effectively ended the Cuban Missile Crisis between the two powers, the issue of Cuba still remained prominent on the run up to the November elections. Republicans charged the Kennedy administration with allowing the “Red Peril” to remain in America’s sphere of influence and the presidential pledge of non invasion had taken away any possible means of ever ousting the regime. Also with Castro’s refusal to allow United Nation officials inspect the island suspicions grew as to whether the missiles had actually been dismantled.
However in the run up to the elections it was the Democrats who effectively used the missile crisis as a positive campaigning stance. A series of business funded non-profit advertisements were set up to show to the Soviets that in a time of crisis Americans value their free system of government. This advertisement campaign effectively linked the President’s successful handling of the crisis with the November elections and aroused voter interest with the November 6th elections marking the largest turnout of eligible voters in any midterm election since 1922. However the elections of 1962 barely changed the political make up of Congress. The Democrats only lost four seats and the Republicans gained 2. Neither party therefore particularly profited from using Cuba as a political platform. Traditionalists have always argued that politics were only of minor significance in decision making on Cuba, this statement calls into question the other factors that affected Kennedy’s decision making.
One of the main factors affecting Kennedy was the wider significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the Cold War as a whole. The successful resolution of the crisis reinforced European attitudes and particularly British attitudes towards security in the Cold War. The relaxation of tensions allowed the agreement of the Partial Test Ban treaty in 1963, in the negotiation of which Britain played a significant role. Also European fears over the Berlin issue were quelled with the increased diplomatic exchanges. Secretary of State Dean Rusk also noted that in addition to British advice and support to Washington, the lead that Britain had given to the rest of the European allies had undoubtedly much to do with the successful outcome of the crisis. It should be also noted that Harold Macmillan himself believed that Britain’s complete calm helped to keep the Europeans calm. However the British role should not be over exaggerated as it is evident from the exclusion of Macmillan from initial debates in Washington and Rusk’s observations that Macmillan’s letters to Kennedy suggesting courses of action “contained nothing the American’s had not already thought of” shows that Kennedy was not likely to be swayed by European opinion.
Khrushchev’s own personnel role in the Cuban Missile Crisis undoubtedly had an effect on the successful outcome. Khrushchev like Kennedy had to show restraint and maintain strict control over events; he also had to face those in his own administration who advocated actions that could only lead to war. Both leaders in their own countries were regarded with admiration after the successful resolution of the crisis. Khrushchev and the Soviet Union remained strongly linked to Cuba and Fidel Castro who six months after the crisis paid a visit to the Soviet Union where he was greeted with an enthusiastic welcome. It is evident that Khrushchev also played a significant role on the successful resolution of the crisis through striving for compromises and the concessions made on both sides nuclear war was avoided.
In conclusion it is evident that President Kennedy did not engage Cuba and the Soviet Union to attract votes to the Democrats and silence his Republican critics. As I have previously argued in the run up to the November 1962 elections there was no need for the Democrats to manufacture a war scare as they were already winning the campaign on domestic issues. What seems to be the over riding factor in Kennedy’s decisions during the missile crisis was the quick successful resolution of the crisis in a manner that did not provoke a Soviet reaction but maintained American prestige and the faith of the European allies in American security. It is apparent that the Cuban missile crisis changed the attitudes of both leaders. This is strikingly evident when analysing Kennedy’s inaugural speech of January 1961 with a 1963 American University address. In his inaugural speech he asks the American people to “bear any burden” to “pay any price” in the struggle against communism where as in his University address he says “If we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity….We labour on – not toward a strategy of annihilation, but toward a strategy of peace.” The Cuban Missile Crisis facilitated the move to détente it helped establish the Moscow Washington Hotline, the 1963 Atmosphere test ban and the trade of some $250 million of wheat to the Soviet Union. This period of Détente however was short lived with the assignation of President Kennedy and the Replacement of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union new leaders emerged and with them new policies and Cold War tensions again began to rise.
Word Count 2737
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