Mombauer’s use of such context and development of broader questions surrounding the blame attributed for the First World War is one of the key reasons that her book is far more than just a simple outlining of the debate. Particularly throughout the second half of the book, her broad and often subtle observations and understanding of why certain interpretations were offered enables the reader to gain a perspective of why the issue was such a crucial debate and, for example, allows one to appreciate why a similar course of denial was not followed in the aftermath of the Second World War. As is discussed in her chapter on the Fischer debate, the idea of a continuity of German aggression from the Kaiser to Hitler which, although not explicitly forwarded by Fischer is an obvious leap, was an unbearable thought for both the West German public and the government who were now desperate to achieve acceptance within the new European system. If it became widely accepted National Socialism was not just an anomaly and that Germany was an inherently aggressive, West Germany would not be able to integrate effectively with the new Europe and there would be no future potential for reunification with East Germany. Mombauer observes that it is therefore unsurprising that the origins of the First World War remained such a relevant concern, that such a strong official line was adopted over the matter, and that any attack upon this interpretation, such as Fischer’s, would be unequivocally rejected. Mombauer also places great emphasis on the importance of the lessons which Fischer’s analysis suggests, namely that by categorising National Socialism as an anomaly there was potential for a third attempt at Weltpolitik to be unleashed, this time in a nuclear world. If Germany was incapable of accepting responsibility and learning these lessons then the potential for future catastrophe remained a real threat.
Again Mombauer moves past a mere analysis of the historiography with her appreciation that political needs have often superseded an attempt for genuine and accurate historical understanding. As with the case during and immediately following the First World it was in the national interest to defend against any claims of guilt and so throughout the entire course of the debate there had often been a motive for pushing a certain thesis. She also notes that German historical study took a backwards step in the 1980s from the increasing objectivity shown in the 1960s with the desire of the new Conservative leadership and eminent historians to normalise Germany’s past and create a new national identity. Germany’s future following the Second World War was seen to depend on proving that the First World War did not occur as a result of German aggression, and with the development of the Cold War, historians were keen to place the debate within a context that would allow them to gain an understanding of how conflict resolution could be better utilised in the future. Equally, Mombauer touches upon another interesting point regarding wider historical investigation through her analysis of the role played by hindsight. Germany’s post-Second World War belief that they desperately needed to prove their innocence due to fears of their future position in Europe was misguided, as the fight against Communism ensured that the rest of Europe would happily overlook such issues in their quest to repel the Communist threat. Observing issues such as this, and equally why it was so important during and following the war to prove one’s innocence, can easily lead to a criticism of poor historical integrity on behalf of those who willingly endorsed it at the time. The First World War is now a genuine event in history, whereas throughout the debate it had played a pivotal role in the lives of those discussing it and still played an important diplomatic role within many of the countries concerned. As well as observing these tendencies in the past, Mombauer makes the excellent point in her conclusion that history is not an objective, factual account of events as they occurred, and historical accounts have to be read with a clear understanding of their provenance, and so it is therefore unlikely that anybody will be able to produce an entirely accurate account of what really brought about the First World War.
This idea that completely objectivity is not only relevant to those offering new interpretations, but also those providing a historiographical overview of a debate, and Mombauer herself demonstrates this in the chapter regarding Fischer. Despite the expertly researched and effective if uninspiring nature of the presentation in the first two chapters of the book, Mombauer moves into the debate surrounding Fischer’s publications and the responses to his work and this is where the book both comes into its own and should be treated with caution. The Fischer controversy can arguably be seen as the real starting point for the debate that still rages today, and so it is unsurprising that Mombauer’s work takes a more argumentative tone and perhaps less distanced analysis. Mombauer is clearly a strong supporter of both the way in which Fischer attacked the subject and to a large extent his findings. Fischer’s arguments are presented with a enthusiasm that had not been seen in the first half of the book and the criticisms of his work, although presented, are often attacked by Mombauer herself. Having published a book on the role played by von Moltke just a year earlier it is unsurprising that this is particularly true when examining one of Fischer’s most controversial assertions and pieces of evidence, the meeting of the War Council in 1912. This was Fischer’s most important document when coming to the conclusion that Germany had been planning war for eighteen months prior to its outbreak, and led him to a redefining of the meaning of preventative war. In his mind, Germany had sought war in the knowledge that within a few years they would not be strong enough to defeat the Entente, not a preventative war in the sense of preventing an imminent attack. Riezler’s diary had then become a crucial weapon for those who fought against Fischer, but Mombauer discredits this source due to issues over authenticity and omissions of details that did not support the counter-argument, whilst giving little weight to any question raised about Fischer’s sources.
Although by no means fully endorsing Fischer’s view that Germany was solely to blame through her acceptance that the actions of other countries also contributed to the situation that resulted in the First World War, Mombauer clearly strongly endorses the view that Germany must accept much of the responsibility. A feature that develops throughout her book is that although in support of Fischer’s views it is in fact the approach he took in challenging the now long accepted orthodoxy, not being afraid to break taboo and present what many would consider unacceptable view, his striving for an objective historical understanding that does not merely serve a political purpose and his scrupulous use of vast quantities of evidence to build his arguments that so impresses Mombauer. The Fischer controversy irreversibly changed the debate surrounding the origins of the first world war for the better, and Mombauer does little to hide her appreciation for the work he did in opening up and advancing the debate, and perhaps quite rightly.
In her final chapter, Mombauer largely dismisses the role played by Britain, for whom Foreign Secretary Grey has been discussed as having a potentially pivotal role, by the conclusion that regardless of whether Britain made misjudgements and was indecisive in her attempts to deal with the crisis, such as declaring her backing of France and Russia, their aim had been to avoid rather than provoke a war, a sentiment which cannot be shared with their German and Austrian counterparts. Equally, the role played by France is not deemed to have been aggressive and in any real way responsible for the war that broke out. Arguments about Poincare’s desire for revenge are established by Mombauer to be largely unfounded, and as with England, there were certainly diplomatic mistakes made but the nature of the efforts were not meant to being a war. France’s location meant that they would inevitably feel the full brunt of German aggression and so their actions to ensure they were militarily prepared for hostility and had strong support from Russia were natural actions to take in their situation. Along with France and Britain, Russia’s actions are also seen to be defensive and non-aggressive. Finally Serbia’s role is not underestimated. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand and their limited acceptance of Austrian demands in the knowledge that they would be deemed unacceptable, coupled with their new found confidence in the Balkans and desire to challenge the dying Austrian-Hungarian empire shows that they played a significant role in triggering the war. Nonetheless, it is concluded that as much as they were the trigger, they were merely offsetting a chain of events that Germany had anticipated and hoped for and so although accepting that others played important roles in allowing the crisis to progress, it was Germany that unquestionably holds most of the responsibility for the First World War.
On balance, it is clear that Mombauer has provided an invaluable addition to the wealth of publications of the origins of the First World War. Particularly since the completion of the Second World War, a phenomenal wealth of documents have been uncovered from all participant nations, which have fuelled and expanded the debate rather than clarify it. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of this issue is that there is ample evidence to support any desired argument as to who was to blame, and it has even been possible for vastly different interpretations to be generated from the same pieces of evidence. Mombauer manages to effectively synthesise these arguments into a concise and accessible publication that should prove to be a key resource for any student attempting to tackle such a broad topic. Although at first it is difficult to understand the interest for the general reader in such a book, Mombauer’s method of tackling the Fischer controversy ensures that anybody with an interest in this area of history would garner interest from the diversity and comprehensiveness of the views and sources examined. As much as Mombauer’s sometimes forceful pushing of Fischer’s ideas would occasionally seem inappropriate in a book purely examining the development of the debate, it her utilisation of a her own wealth of knowledge, insightful raising of important questions about why the debate has relevance even to this day and discussion of broader historical issues that transform the book into more than just a historiography of the origins of the First World War. Mombauer’s expertise in this field is evident throughout the book and she has unquestionably gone a long way to providing an excellent overview of a notoriously challenging topic.
Bibliography
Berghahn, V.R., Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, (Macmillan, 1993)
Fischer, Fritz, Germany's aims in the First World War, (Chatto and Windus, 1967)
Joll, James, The Origins of the First World War, (Longman, 1984)
Kaiser, David, ‘Germany and the Origins of the First World War’, The Journal of Modern History, 55 (1983), pp. 442-474
Mombauer, Annika, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus, (Longman, 2002)
Mombauer, Annika, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, (Cambridge University Press, 2001)