1. David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.), 343.
2. ThinkQuest.com, “The End of the War,:[article on-line], accessed 26 February 2004; available , Internet.
3. Geza Jeszenszky, “Remembering Hungary's Brave Defiance in 1956 and 1989,” [article on-line] , Insight Magazine, accessed 20 February 2004); available , Internet.
4. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “mission Statement,” accessed February 2004); available
was generally blocked through jamming in a number of countries, until the inception of glasnost (1985), but not in Hungary. The people were told that the foundation of these democratic ideals was the conviction of a well-informed electorate. These broadcasts “pulled” at the heartstrings of listeners by providing what the communists would not allow – objective news, discussion of regional issues, and the disparity in quality of life of East versus West.
Several researchers have concluded the strong, steady voice of radio programs targeting the Soviet bloc was responsible for the West's triumph in the Cold War.5 While the case can be made for the communist economic decay as the main cause for the fall of communism, there is considerable evidence that stations like RFE and RL kept the pressure on the Communist leaders and kept hope alive for millions who longed to hear political opinions from outside the media of the one-party state.6 Perhaps this effectiveness helped influence Gorbachev’s “push” for glasnost. While some East Europeans were blocked from RFE and RL, western television and radio, with rock and jazz music as well as consumer-directed advertising were continually “pulling” those living in communist countries toward democratic principles.
Nevertheless, glasnost was only the first step. The socialist-led command economies in Eastern Europe had suffered along with the Soviet Union. Hungary was actually one of the more advanced, economically, of the Warsaw Pact nations, with ONLY 25 percent of the population living in poverty.7 As Gorbachev struggled with trying to improve the slugging command economies, he determined that it could not be done without radical restructuring (perestroika). The “push” of perestroika focused on management and the inefficiency that were so common in the industrial sectors. Local factories gained more power in their decision making process as planning was decentralized. This led to modest features
5. Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens , (Syracuse University Press, 1997), summary online, available , Internet.
6. Mark G. Pomar, “RFE/RL in the Age of Glasnost,” [article online], The World & I.com, accessed 22 February 2004; available , Internet.
7. Frank E. Smitha, “End of the Soviet Union and the Cold War,” [article online], accessed 21 February 2004; available , Internet.
of free enterprise – product prices would rise as production costs rose. The reserved economic reforms in Hungary failed to overcome the command economy initially, but more-open debates were held and eventually the “pull” from the West helped shape financial policies and increase Hungary’s credit worthiness.
As early as the 1970s, Moscow had encouraged East European countries to look to Western Europe and the US for investment and technological assistance. They strategy ultimately failed, but did produce new relationships between the communist enterprise elite and western business. Worsening growth weakened the ideological appeal of old economic models and the government and entrepreneurs alike became less effective instruments of ruling class unification. Hungary moved towards marketization policies through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) backing.8 While the “push” from Moscow led to mounting debts and declining exports, intra-Bloc trade did increase. This in turn, led to a louder and louder cry from regime spokespersons promoting the virtues of “the market” (a reference to the West).
The biggest “push” for Hungary’s transformation came from within. Gorbachev’s new policies led to extreme reforms in Poland before Hungary and the “pull” from the West supplanted communist principles with democratic ideals, however it was the inevitability of the spirit of Hungarians that brought about historic changes through peaceful means. It became clear that Gorbachev would not support coercion by the geriatric leaders of the Eastern bloc countries and he would not use force to hold the bloc together as his predecessors had done in Hungary in 1956.9 Perhaps this hardest “push” came against the greatest symbol of communism; the taking down of “Wall” (electric fence) along its border with Austria. This permitted thousands of East German "vacationers" to slip across the border through for automatic citizenship to West Germany. Significant numbers of people were beginning to "vote with their feet."
8. Colin Barker & Colin Mooers, “Theories of Revolution in the Light of 1989 in Eastern Europe,” [article online], Manchester Metropolitan University, 1994); available , Internet.
9. Bruce Thompson, “Europe in the Twentieth Century,” (University of California at Santa Cruz, 1994), [syllabus online], available , Internet.
As noted before, Hungary was the most reform-minded Communist state in Eastern Europe, thus its “revolution” was much less dramatic. However, less dramatic did not mean it was any less of an achievement. Hungarians had been oppressed and suppressed for decades. The “pull” from the West had been long-standing, however Gorbachev’s “push” was the needed motivation. Many believed the move to a multi-party parliamentary democracy and open-market ideals would be too much for Hungarians or endure, and communism would displace the experiment in democracy. The “push-pull” of communism and democracy were enough to form the new political structures that would withstand a serious labor strike peacefully in 1990 and a move from the Warsaw Pact to NATO, as the first former communist country. It is obvious that Gorbachev’s brainchild and Hungary’s chief “push” had progressed well past the point where anyone thought it would go.
