In October 1931, religious clauses in the new Constitution were still being debated in the Spanish Parliament- the Cortes. Articles 26 and 48 caused significant divides to worsen. The former stated that ecclesiastical budget must end within two years, the Society of Jesus would be dissolved and its property would be confiscated In addition, a state system of secular education was proposed and all members of religious congregations were prohibited from teaching. Prime Minister Azaña stated his feelings towards the church: “all the convents in Madrid are not worth the life of a single Republican”. This was a clear attack on the Church and caused tension to arise. Pildáiin, a Basque deputy priest, threatened the Republic with armed resistance if the Constitution was passed. Furthermore, armed bands of traditionalists began training in the Catholic region of Navarre and, as a result, by 1935 had 6000 people ready to fight. In addition, the Republican government granted Catalan autonomy, much to the disgust of the Right and the army. The army was also told by Azaña that they had no right to challenge the authority of the government. Subsequently, half of the officer corps were pressed into early retirement at full pay. As a result of this, General José Sanjurjo led a military coup d’état in 1932 in Seville and in Madrid. Sanjurjo argued that he was not against the Republic but was against Azaña’s government. Finally, the Agrarian Reform Law was passed in 1932 angering landowners. This complicated bill provided expropriation of several categories of land. Under its terms, the great majority of the approximately 80,000 landowners, of medium holdings, had their property confiscated. Moreover, all confiscations had to be paid for, and the government had almost no money left; expenditures on agrarian reform were limited to 1% of the budget. In the meantime a full survey of land on the basis of taxation had to be completed and initial operations supervised by an agrarian reform institute representing all the major parties, so that little was accomplished during 1933. Therefore, the government found it difficult to compensate the landowners and, as a result, it was never implemented on a large scale angering the peasants and the landowners causing divisions to strengthen.
Therefore, tensions were beginning to intensify throughout Spain. Firstly, in Casas Viejas, thirteen anarchists barricaded themselves in a café and fired upon the police. As a result, Maura ordered: “we want neither prisoners nor wounded” ; none of the anarchists survived. The government was widely condemned throughout Spain and, as a result, municipal elections were held in several small towns in northern Spain whose pro-monarchist local governments had been ousted by the Republican regime in Madrid two years earlier. Thus, two-thirds of the new municipal officials elected represented parties in opposition to the government. Therefore, it is clear that the Left were causing huge amounts of anxiety to arise within Spain that the Right would later exploit. In addition, in August 1933, Spain’s first elections for the Supreme Court were held and the Right won a majority. This is because many of Azaña’s supporters had lost confidence in his government and believed he had been too radical- causing the Left to disintegrate and, therefore, a coalition government was no longer feasible. Additionally, it has to be made clear that whilst the government’s measures led to the foundation of the right-wing Catholic CEDA party led by José Maria Gil Robles and, in addition, the Falange party was founded by the son of former dictator Primo de Rivera- José Antonio de Rivera.
CEDA won the November 1933 election with the Socialists coming third and the Republicans nearly being wiped out in the Cortes. The government was made up of liberals and conservatives and should have led to a CEDA led coalition. However, President Alcalá Zamora was antagonistic towards CEDA and, consequently, the leader of the Radical Party, Alejandro Lerroux y García, formed a minority-coalition government. However, CEDA only accepted this arrangement temporarily and demanded participation in government in October 1934; a constitutional right since they were the largest parliamentary group. Thus, Zamora appointed another coalition government, led by Lerroux, including three CEDA ministers sparking revolutionary insurrections in Catalonia and Asturias. It is clear here that CEDA were causing tension to arise. However, CEDA are working within their constitutional right; they were the largest party in the Cortes so they should play a major role in government.
In Catalonia, the Esquerra, a left-wing party, had retained control of the regional government and then won the municipal elections of January 1934 and had introduced a series of legislation- most importantly the Law of Cultivation Contracts that would allow long-term renters (for fifteen years or more) to buy their property at affordable rates. However, this law was fought by the landowners and it was, subsequently, referred to the Spanish Supreme Court. The Court ruled that central revision of rental contracts were determined by legislation pending in the Cortes- ruling the law unconstitutional causing huge amounts of social unrest and individuals calling for an armed revolt to establish absolute Catalan autonomy. As a result of this, the Catalan Autonomy Statute was suspended, angering the Esquerra and the Left increasing antagonistic feelings throughout Spain.
Secondly, the revolutionary insurrection of October 1934 in Asturias was a revolt of socialist workers, supported by the CNT- an anarchist trade union- and the Communists, who occupied the entire mining and industrial district making up the central portion of the province of Asturias. Elite troops had to be called in from Spanish Morocco to quell the revolt, which lasted for two weeks. More than 1000 were killed- the majority revolutionaries. The revolutionaries shot nearly 100 people, most of them policemen and priests, and an almost equal number of rebels were executed out of hand by the troops that suppressed the revolt. This revolt pushed the Left, especially the UGT of Largo Caballero, towards a more revolutionary position and pushed the Right into the belief that the Fascism promoted by Rivera’s Falange was the only effective method of controlling the workers. In the aftermath of the repression, however, there were cases of police brutality and torture in Asturias. The argument of horrific tyranny gave rise to a powerful leftist propaganda equal to that of the Right, which exaggerated the extent of the "red terror" in Asturias. The whole impact of the insurrection and the repression was to polarize political opinion toward the extremes of Left and Right. However, it has to be made clear that the international context strongly influenced the polarizing opinion. Thus, fascism and communism was growing in power throughout Europe and many in Spain believed taking a moderate stance would lead to takeover from one side intensifying the situation.
However, it can be stated that Gil Robles’ did not want to adopt a fascist stance; he wanted to revitalize the Spanish army. Nevertheless, the coalition government reversed the processes of reform and cancelled the measures taken by the Azaña administration against the Church. Thus, the Left classed 1934-1936 as the “Black Biennium” causing greats amount of tension to arise because, in actuality, the Right had blocked the reformist trend the Republic was following and alteration of the balance of power.
Polarization of opinion continued in 1935. Firstly, a ‘Popular Front’ of Communists, Socialists, Republicans and Separatists was formed to oppose the government. The Right formed the ‘National Front’ and elections were held in February 1936 after the government was dissolved in December 1935. It has been said that the election of 1936 was in a way a referendum on the 1934 insurrection; the main rightist slogan was "Against the revolution and its accomplices". The Popular Front won the election, however their support was not an expression of enthusiasm for revolutionary insurrection; it was a positive response to Popular Front propaganda, which stressed the tyranny in Asturias and the need for Republican reform. Therefore, the Left had control of Spain with an even stronger majority than in 1931- the Popular Front had 271 seats with the Right having 137. Accordingly, the Left reestablished Catalan autonomy, measures were taken to broaden agrarian reform and to appoint more left Republicans to government service and the Falange was banned. The anarchist CNT encouraged the peasants to revolt and take over the land, whilst the socialist UGT called a general strike among the working class. However, the Falange was beginning to grow radically. In addition, a major aim of the Popular Front was to completely eliminate conservative influence from Spanish government. The only remaining non-leftist authority in Spain was that of the president, Alcalá Zamora, and he was removed from office on the charge of having exceeded his authority by dissolving parliament twice and was replaced by Azaña in May 1936 giving the Left full authority over Spain. However, by this time the Left’s supreme power was being used to bypass the Republic and its constitutional system. The revolutionary parties had control of the streets and insisted on a constantly accelerating program of radical change. The Right had no voice in the Cortes and were not permitted to play a role in Spanish affairs. It is apparent that the Left had completely abandoned their commitment to parliamentary democracy and civil war was imminent. As a result of this, on July 12th José Calvo Sotelo, head of a small protofascist movement, was murdered by leftist police officers and communist militia sparking the Civil War to begin. Therefore, by this point Spanish politics had completely polarized to the extreme Left and Right.
Therefore, in conclusion, it can clearly be stated that the Left played a major role in causing the Spanish Civil War. It has to be stated that before the Second Republic was established there were serious divisions within Spain that encouraged divisions to intensify. Firstly, when the Left came to power 1931 they introduced a series of reforms and it can clearly be stated they lacked political sense. They removed the ecclesiastical budget, dissolved the Society of Jesus and confiscated its property and Catholicism was no longer the national religion. In addition, Catholicism was no longer to be taught in primary education and clericals were no longer allowed to teach. In addition, the government passed the Catalan Autonomy Statute greatly angering the Right and the army who had fought to quell Catalan nationalism. The government also passed the Law of Agrarian Reform, despite only having limited success, angered conservatives and landowners who felt that their way of life was under attack. After the “black biennium” where the Left was not in power they regained control in 1936. From this point on the polarization of Spanish politics was complete with individuals siding with the extreme Left or the extreme Right. The government reinstated many of the reforms that were reversed by the Right and banned the Falange- the Spanish fascist part- angering the Right. However, the Right also has to be attributed with significance in causing the Spanish Civil War. Firstly, when the Right came to power in 1933 the reforms introduced by the Left were reversed and this was exacerbated by the, often, vindictive reaction of employers and landowners who reasserted their dominance. In addition, in the risings in Catalonia and Asturias were suppressed with huge amounts of violence and, as a result, left wing newspapers were prohibited and the Catalan Autonomy Statute was suspended. In addition, the Asturias Uprising, a foreshadow for the Civil War, pushed the Left towards a more revolutionary stance, and convinced the Right that the fascism promoted by de Rivera was the only means of controlling the workers. For these reasons, it is clear that the Left and the Right provoked the Civil War on July 12th 1936.
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