Many of the countries that availed of funds provided by lenders were also used to finance capital flight. For example, the country sells cheap green backs to their citizens. The citizens, instead of reinvesting into the domestic market removed their money from the local system and took it elsewhere. The extent of debt build-up had grown to enormous proportions that made the third world borrowers unable to repay them. The commercial bank lenders, recognizing the risks, continued to increase lending rates. Even though debtor countries kept piling up their debts the commercial banks continued extending their lending facilities thinking that “the country had more at stake at the investments and governments would not allow them to fail” (Dornbusch and Fischer 1986, p.837).
Of the total loans availed, Kreye and Schubert (1988) summed up the division of such loans into three. Only a third of the loans went to internal investments, another third was primarily used for consumption. The final third was “used - and misused – for transfers of profit, capital flight, interest payments and rescheduling of debt” (Kreye, O. and Schubert, A 1988. p.263).
Exacerbating the woes of debtor countries was the increasing interest rates. Between 1980 and 1982, the world economy was experiencing a slowdown. First world lenders hiked their interest rates from 2% to 8%. Debt servicing ate up 3.3% GDP of some Latin American countries in 1983 and this was attributed to the interest rates increase. The vicious cycle of borrowing funds to pay for previous debts eventually took its toll on the global economy. The inability of the third world nations to repay their debts had caused serious imbalances in the global financial structure.
Mismanagement of funds and corruption was the third cause of debts in the third world. Many of the borrowed funds were not used to improve the lives of the poorest segment of the third world. Instead, the funds went to the more affluent in the form of behest loans with the government guaranteeing the loans. Other loans were lost to corruption and dictator regimes. The Jubilee USA described such debts as odious debts. “Odious debts were loans extended to illegitimate dictatorships and using those loans to perpetuate continued oppression and self-interest” (Shah 2005). This was done with the tacit knowledge of the creditors.
An example of an odious debt was the South African experience. The debts incurred by an apartheid regime were inadvertently transferred to the newly liberated South Africa. In a report, it was estimated that “apartheid-caused debt” was at £28 billion. Of the total, £11 billion were loaned to maintain apartheid, and the remaining £17 billion were lent to neighbouring states to quell apartheid destabilisation and aggression. This comprises 74% of the present regional debt. In legal jurisprudence, such loans do not merit repayment (Shah 2005).
A fourth cause of third world debt was the untenable policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that had induced heavily indebted countries to borrow more or suffer the consequence of economic and political sanctions. Instead of debt reduction policies, the World Bank and IMF imposed policies that buried third world nations into the quagmire of debt and debt servicing. Third world countries had to approach IMF or the World Bank and concede to their policies to avoid economic and political repercussions. Some of the conditions that third world debtors needed to fulfil were “devaluing currency, import liberalization, privatisation, cuts in government expenditure, continued debt servicing, economic development focused on exporting goods and moratorium on hiring and pay increases for both public and private sectors” (Kreye and Schubert 1988, p.264).
Finally, the elite and wealthier nations took advantage of the financial conditions of the third world. In many cases, the loans extended to less developed countries came with strings attached. In order to access lending facilities from developed nations, the third world countries availing of the loan should buy or export certain products exclusive to the lending country. Often this kind of arrangement puts the third world country at a disadvantage because they were forced to sell their goods at the lowest price or buy goods at the behest of the creditor country. In the end, the third world developing country was left with nothing while the wealthier nations reaped benefits. The continued subservience of the third world developing nations to wealthier nations was in fact an evidence of neo-imperialism.
One of the measures proposed by the IMF to ease the burden of debt was to introduce stabilisation programs referred to as structural adjustments. The IMF highlighted the structural adjustments requisites to include programs that emphasize “productive capacity as critical to economic performance” and “measures to raise the economy’s output potential and to increase the flexibility of factor and goods markets” (Ferraro and Rosser 1994). The structural adjustment scheme was primarily implemented to address balance of payments issues. These issues were largely generated by internal conditions such as high inflation rates, budget deficits or inefficient allocation of resources. The IMF assumed that in order to recover from the debts, third world countries must tighten its expenditures and divert them to more productive domestic investments. However, tightening the belt meant reduced government subsidies on food and services, higher interest rates, more lay-offs, higher interest rates and taxes. The scheme inadvertently affected the poorest segments of the third world country.
Ferraro and Rosser (1994) noted that instead of easing the burden debt, the policies of the IMF appeared to drive the country into further debts. The IMF’s policies with exclusive emphasis on internal economic improvements failed to consider external factors such as oil price movements or global recession that might affect the fiscal positions of the third world nations. Their policies had pushed the heavily indebted countries into more desperate conditions and the future of economic growth in these countries was hampered.
Another solution proposed was the market-based reduction using the Brady bond strategy. According to Barbone and Forni (2001), the Brady agreements were based on “on the exchange, on a voluntary basis, of commercial debt for a menu of options including bonds or new money—the bond option being the most popular one” (Barbone, L. and Forni, L. 2001. p.115). The scheme was usually implemented when debtor countries were already undergoing economic reforms. As a consequence, secondary markets were developed and relaxed credit constraints. Moreover, the strategy secured the external debts as well as restored access to international financial markets. The main objective of the Brady plan was to restructure commercial bank loan where interest rates were reduced, principals condoned and maturity periods lengthened. The Brady plan proposed four schemes: “discount bonds, par bonds; new money and cash buybacks” (Arslanalp and Henry 2005,p.1023).
The Brady Plan introduced in the late 1980’s as a debt relief option was successful when implemented to middle income developing countries that experienced debt overhang. Debt overhang was perceived to hinder economic growth therefore something must be done about it to reduce the strain on the economy and allowed the country to recover. Arslanalp and Henry (2005) revealed that because of the implementation of the Brady plan, countries availing of the restructuring experienced growth in the stock markets and bank creditors benefited because their stocks at the bourses rose after the restructuring. It should be noted that the Brady plan worked for countries that exhibited debt overhangs. Countries with more serious debt conditions need to consider the weak economic institution and infrastructure as main contributors to the failure of debt relief.
The heavily indebted and poor countries (HIPC) initiative of the IMF presented an alternative strategy for countries corresponding to HIPC criteria. HIPC initiative identified a country as “heavily indebted” if traditional measures for debt relief are inadequate to reduce debts to manageable and sustainable levels. “Debts are considered sustainable if the net present value (NPV) debt-to-export value ratio is at 200 to 250%” (Gunter 2004, p.6). However, three years after implementation, the HIPC framework was inadequate. In 1999, IMF and World Bank agreed to introduce reforms to the HIPC framework. The reforms included the reduction of debt-to-export value ratios for debt sustainability criteria, replacing the fixed three-year period between decision and completion with floating completion point and provision of interim relief from creditors (p.6).
The HIPC framework is problematic because it is inaccurate to use debt-to-export ratios because they are prone to over or underestimation. The United States General Accounting Office observed that unless economic growth is sustained, the initiative is unlikely to support debt sustainability and eventual debt exit (p.11). Other problems perceived in the HIPC framework include the exclusion of the supposed benefactors in the framing of the HIPC initiative. Many critics observed that the some developing countries that are major creditors to HIPCs were excluded from the consultation. Another criticism involves the concept of HIPC initiative. The HIPC initiative was formed based on inappropriate debt relief constructs using sustainability indicators instead of strategies for sustainable development. The HIPC is not linked with poverty reduction initiatives.
The concept of burden sharing included in the HIPC received a cold reception especially from developing country creditors. The burden sharing is estimated cost creditors nearly $12 billion for Paris Club members and $3 billion for non-members (p.12). The HIPC framework uses currency-specific commercial interest reference rates (CIRR) to calculate net present value (NPV). This strategy implied unfair burden sharing and it averaging for 6 months using CIRR causes volatility. (p.13).
The Jubilee 2000, the Church, some prominent political figures and celebrities call for the complete repudiation of the debts of the poorest countries in the world. The group argued that the ultimate solution to the debt problem was for creditors to completely forget the debts of poorest countries and to release those countries from fulfilling debt obligations to debts considered odious.
Easterly (2001) however argued that it would be impossible to determine the intentions of governments. Most of the loans extended were used in activities like military improvement or establishing stronghold in their respective countries. It was difficult to determine if corruption will persist despite the introduction of reforms. The argument of illegitimacy would only contribute to the creation of “perverse incentives by directing scarce aid resources to countries that have best proved their capacity to mismanage such funds” (p.32). The legitimacy issue would also tend to limit access to needed financial facilities. The financial community would definitely refuse to grant loans to countries which they perceive, had the propensity to disown loans made to dictators or corrupt leaders.
To sum up this essay I would say that the problem of the third world debt affects the global community. The inefficient financial structures of the past had resulted in the current debt crises. There are no quick fixes to the problem. It is apparent that the solutions to the debt problem required cooperation between the creditors and the third world countries. Various fiscal, political and economic reforms should be in place to make the debt relief programs more effective. It is widely accepted that it is essential for the Third World debt problem to be solved, for economic development but mainly for social policy reasons. Though it might be stated that creditors do not usually operated under humanistic criteria, it is a common point that a significant debt relief will highly improve both the social and the economical status of a country, leading it to an increase of investment ability and to the necessary quality of life that is needed for a human society to exist and progress properly. In the end, justice must prevail in the resolution of the debt problem. The different arguments had shown that the debt problem is not localised but global in nature.
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