Cuban Missile Crisis:
At 8:45am, October 16th 1962, A US Lockheed U-2 Aircraft on a surveillance mission, captured images, photographic proof of Soviet Missile sites that were under construction in Cuba.
In published, document 18, United States foreign relations meeting from the evening of the 16th of October 1962, which records a meeting between Kennedy, Dean Rusk (secretary of state) Robert McNamara (The secretary of Defence) and McGeorge Bundy (National security advisor) met to discuss the findings of the U-2 aircraft, earlier that same day. Less than 12 hours had passed since the U-2’s discovery before this major Security Council was in session to discuss the matter.
During this session, Kennedy and McNamara in particular voiced their concerns and together with the rest of the staff present at the meeting, informally began to formulate plans in which McNamara indicated that there would need to be a series of diplomatic conversations with Khrushchev along with indications of impending military action, the Secretary of Defence stated: ‘There must be a very, very precise series of, of contacts with him and indications of what we’ll do at certain times following that.
We should be prepared to answer your questions regarding the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off.’
This indicates the level of tension and anxiety the United States suffered; furthermore, this was only 12 hours after the U-2 photoreconnaissance mission. There was to be another fourteen days to the missile crisis.
During the two week period of military tension that followed, Chairman Khrushchev and Kennedy were in constant communication in the form of correspondence. During this period, On October the 23rd, it becomes transparent that the Soviet Union too, understood the gross risk involved and surrounding the Missile Crisis, which Krushchev illustrates in one of his correspondence to his American counterpart, President Kennedy, initially referencing to the US, Sea & air space blockade placed upon Cuba: ‘The United States has openly taken a path of gross violation of charter of United Nations, path of violation of international norms of freedom of navigation of high seas, path of aggressive action against both Cuba and the Soviet Union.’
He then goes on to illustrate that he (they) recognize the gross risks involved, if they did exchange IRBM salvos: ‘I hope that Government of United States will show prudence and renounce actions pursued by you, which could lead to catastrophic consequences for peace throughout the world.’ (The New York Times -Issue: October 14, 1962.)
Kennedy’s response to the above correspondence again demonstrates the cautious diplomatic course both sides adopted, both in hindsight refer what later would be considered as MAD (Mutually assured Destruction) A term coined by United States, Secretary of Defence, McNamara a short time later in 1961. Robert McNamara elaborated upon the MAD concept in lay mans terms, stating: “If we could create an umbrella we would need it, no matter what costs.” This school of thought would some twenty two years later become part of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative created by President Reagan.
The United State’s Response:
The Cuban Missile Crisis caught the United States off-guard and as such, a quick response was required, the first of which the naval and airspace blockade imposed upon Cuba and its surroundings. Furthermore the constant and high brow political pressure imposed upon both the United States and the Soviet Union to remove the missiles and or (for the United States) not to use them.
In retrospect it is known that Kennedy was completely against any form of military invasion or assault, despite the recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The US militaries leaders, who collectively agreed that an invasion upon Cuba was the best course of action. Speaking against this course of action, Kennedy stated: ‘They, no more than we, can let these things go without doing something. They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians and then do nothing. If they do not take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Cuba.’ (Thirteen days: A memoir of the Cuban missile crisis)
It was also believed at this juncture by some of the Joint Chiefs that the amount of warheads in possession of either nation could sway the balance, a notion, that Robert McNamara openly disagreed with, due to the fact the US already had 5,000 Warheads, whilst the USSR had 300. Blight, J And D, Welch- Intelligence and the Cuban missile crisis (1998) suggest that supporting the warheads in Cuba, there was also 42,000 Soviet soldiers: ‘At least 42,000 soldiers along with machinery supported the warheads in Cuba.’
Despite this, the strategic Air Command (SAC) as well as a mass of military units were placed on high alert to invade Cuba at short to no notice at all. Two operation plans were suggested for this, the first of which; OPLAN316 allowed for a full invasion of Cuba using naval and ground forces, supported by the Air force. Along with the more conservation OPLAN312, which just allowed for Air forces to strategically assault certain targets such as the disputed missile sites.
Despite Kennedy vetoing any potential assault or invasion upon Cuba, Castro remained convinced that an assault of some form was imminent, on October the 27th, in light of the fact that three of the proposed four missile sites in Cuba were now operational, he gave the overheard for the Cuban Anti-aircraft batteries to engage any US aircraft, before this point, they would only engage, if groups of aircraft approached.
Crisis fears:
By the 25th of October, coming towards the final and some ways most dangerous phases of the Cuban missile crisis and in an effort to compose fears, The United States allowed a single Soviet ship, The Bucharest through it’s naval blockade and quarantine, after deeming it was possibly not a threat. This was the beginning of the ultimate cooling down period between the two Super powers. The first of the incremental steps required to find some sort of mutually acceptable manner of settling this situation.
This was possible due to the external pressures placed upon the situation by U.N secretary general, U Thant who asked the Kennedy to make some compromises in an attempt to prevent the situation from escalating.
The stakes would be raised, publically, the next day, when on the 26th of October, Nikita Krushchev publically requested for the dismantlement of the Turkish missile sites. The next day A US U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down, killing the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson; the only combat fatality of the Cuban missile crisis. The soviets claimed the action taken to shoot down the plane was not of their direction.
McNamara illustrated how they believed that only the Soviets had the technology to shoot down the plane and therefore were responsible at a decision making level: ‘We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn't have capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air-missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict.
Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought "Well, it might have been an accident, we won't attack." Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2.’ ( Robert McNamara speaking in 1970)
Again, John f. Kennedy stood against the decision of the Joint Chiefs to put into effect an assault or an invasion upon Cuba. Instead, the very same day, Kennedy authorized the dismantlement of the US Missile sites in Turkey.
Two days later, on the 29th of October, after much deliberation, an secret arrangement had been made for the US to remove all offending missile in both Turkey & Italy in return, the Soviets would dismantle the Cuban sites. At 9am on the 29th, Krushchev authorized for a transcript of his message to the Kennedy administration to be broadcasted from a Moscow radio station. Krushchev stated: ‘the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as 'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.’
The Kennedy response was swift, stating that Krushchevs letter was ‘an important and constructive contribution to peace.’ The same day ,Kennedy went on to elaborate how in an effort to maintain the peace and prevent further issues, the United states would go to efforts including:’ it will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs’ (Faria, Miguel (2002). "Cuba in Revolution)
The following year in a review of the Cuban missile crisis events, Robert McNamara stated:’ Soviets, Cubans, and Americans learned how close the world had come to a nuclear conflagration’ ( Robert McNamara, 1963)
Détente:
The period of Détente is typically classified between the years of 1969 and 1979, so it didn’t actually come into effect until 7 years after the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However the Cuban missile crisis showed both the super powers and the world the potential dangers associated with the use of IRBM’s and ICBMS. From 1963 onwards, it was clear that the relationship between the two nations was improving, to the extent that a telephone hotline was created between the Whitehouse and Kremlin, facilitating more immediate conversation, furthermore in July of the same year, both nations signed the Limited nuclear test ban treaty, which would inhibit the speed of the nuclear arms race and further cool international tentions.
Steve Philips, The Cold war: conflict in Europe and Asia states that the Cuban Missile crisis lead to the realisation of the direction that tension and arms race were heading in: ‘The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, had highlighted the danger of superpower confrontation resulting in nuclear war.’
Could Détente have been possible without the super power’s facing a Cuban missile-esque crisis? ‘The threat of Mutually assured destruction loomed and ultimately lead towards the Permissive actions links (Pals) system being introduced to prevent situations such as the Cuban missile crisis.’ Whereby the commander in Cuba had the authorization to use missiles if he deemed fit, this system, one of many fail safes prevented any one person from making such gross decisions. (Getting MAD: Nuclear mutually assured destruction: Its origin and it’s practices. D,Henry, 2000, p.18)
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I believe the influence the Cuban missile crisis had upon reforming policy and behaviour between the Super powers in the cold war is the first and foremost the reason for how we ever saw a period of détente.
In kennedy’s inaugural address, in 1963 Kennedy spoke out against Nuclear weapons and their uses: ‘President Kennedy told Americans in June 1963, "For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.’
It’s reasonable to suggest that to attain a period of Détente, first there needed to be a period of anxiety. Richard A Faulk argues that in fact, too much nannying of the arms race and weapons control was in fact what ended Détente: ‘SALT II and the nato double-track decision served to help bring an end to the détente period.’
‘The basic principles of Détente, its basic fundamentals, the interest in war-prevention and a balanced, controlled amnesty.’ (Richard A Faulk – The New détente- rethinking east-west relations 1989, p.66)
With out a period of aniexty, tension and potential war, the fundamentals required to force through an agreed period of détente are not there, therefore, without the Cuban missile crisis and one of the super powers hands being forced, it’s arguable that the practice test ban and subsequent policy changes required that ushered in the period Détente wouldn’t have happened and if they did, most probably not in the medium term future.
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Bibliography:
Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Transcripts. No classification marking. The source text is a 35-page transcript of audiotape 28.1. Identifying footnotes in the source text are not included. For Taylor's draft account of this meeting, October 16, including a list of participants, and Carter's memorandum for the record, dictated on October 17, see the Supplement. Carter's memorandum is also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 145-147.
Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Eyes Only. At 7:41 p.m. on October 21 the Department of State had sent Ambassador Kohler the first draft of this message. (Telegram 961 to Moscow; ibid.: Lot 77 D 163) Subsequent changes and additions resulted in only the second and final paragraphs remaining as originally drafted. The message was delivered to the Foreign Ministry at about 6 p.m. Washington time. Another copy of this letter is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, and Khrushchev Correspondence. Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1973, pp. 635-636, and Claflin, The President Wants To Know, pp. 205-206. This letter and the letters and messages exchanged through December 14 (Document 84) were published in English and Russian in United States Information Agency, Problems of Communism, Special Edition, Spring 1992.
Kennedy Library, National Security Files: Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. Secret; Eyes Only; Niact; Elite. Passed to the White House at 11:05 a.m. October 23. A Department of State translation of this message is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, along with the Russian-language text. Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1973, pp. 636-637.
The New York Times -Issue: October 14, 1962.
Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis – Robert Kennedy.. Page 14 (1971).
Blight, J And D, Welch- Intelligence and the Cuban missile crisis (1998)
The John F. Kennedy Memorial and museum - Memorandum of Conversation with Andrei Gromyko
Kamps, Charles Tustin, "The Cuban Missile Crisis", Air & Space Power Journal, AU Press, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Page 88. (2007)
Robert McNamara – National security Archive documents 1962 (edited 1998)
F Miguel,Cuba in Revolution (2002) P.4
Steve Philips, The Cold war: conflict in Europe and Asia (2001) page. 175
Getting MAD: Nuclear mutually assured destruction: It’s origin and it’s practices. D,Henry (2000) p.18