This however didn’t prevent the signing of the Jay treaty in 1794. If the United States wasn’t a satellite of Britain before the signing of this treaty it certainly was after. Although the treaty was successful in that it removed the last British troops from American soil and allowed limited trade with the British West Indies. It also forced Americans to accept Britain’s bullying maritime policies, even going so far as to stipulate that any retaliation against British naval interference would be prohibited. This was called by one opponent of the treaty “a complete surrender of American rights”3. This was without a doubt a national humiliation and to a great extent an admission of the United States position as a satellite of Great Britain. Although there is a great degree of consensus among historians in regard to Britain’s maritime policies as the chief American complaint against Britain, there is debate around whether the primary issue is the
2 ,Reginald Horsman The War of 1812 (Eyre and Spottiswoode 1969) p18
3, James McMonagle Anglo-American relations 1776-1812 (Washington 1992) p56
economic effect of British policy on Americans or the United States’ wish to assert her
independence. The traditional view to which A L Burt among others subscribes was that
Britain’s policies were important because they stifled exports and robbed ships of crewman. This was later challenged by historians such as Bernad Mayo and Bradford Perkins who stressed the effect of the insult impertinent in Britain’s policies to American’s national honour as an independent state. Both of these views support United States being in the position of a satellite Great Britain especially the latter.
One reason the United States could not be considered wholly a satellite of Britain is that France also had claims on her. Historian Alexaander DeConde called the situation before 1812 “a tug of war between Britain and France”4. The Franco-American alliance of 1779, which had been so essential to America achieving independence lived on in two treaties. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which granted each nation special, trading privileges with the other and the Treaty of alliance in which France guaranteed America independence and America guaranteed the French West Indies. France while wishing to maintain good relations with America also wanted to keep her weak and thereby subordinate to France. The French also made a concentrated effort to break America’s economic dependence on Britain by attracting American trade through offering special concessions. This effort failed and Britain maintained her dominant position in American trade and finance. France and the United States certainly had a much closer political and military relationship than Britain and the United States before 1812. Ties were so strong that when war broke out in Europe many Americans supported the idea of joining their ally and now fellow republic in fighting their common enemy and corrupt monarchy Britain. It wasn’t until the 1790’s when the French revolution became bloodier and the United States signed the Jay treaty that relations began to go sour. The United States did not go to war along with France but
4, Alexander DeConde Entangling alliances (Duke University press 1958) p150
remained neutral, even to the extent of abandoning their guarantee of the French West Indies.
France was clearly losing its position of influence while Britain’s influence was increasing. The Federalists who not only admired and imitated Britain but saw France as ruled by bloodthirsty Jacobins, were dominant in Washington.
It wasn’t until Jefferson became President that things started to improve. Jefferson was unhappy with the United States dependence on Britain and hoped to use France as a counterbalance. He tried to do what the French had failed to do in the 18th century by getting France to develop an industrial and credit system that would end Britain’s virtual monopoly on American trade and finance. This, it was felt would end the threat of decongest and finally secure America independence. Whether Jefferson was merely using France as a weapon to free he United States from the position of Britain’s satellite or by his actions moving her towards becoming a satellite of France is a contested issue. Jefferson’s enemies referred to him as “Napoleon’s slave”5 and he himself said he would go to London to celebrate France’s victory when Britain had been successfully invaded. This contradicts evidence that suggest Jefferson was less of a faithful Francophile then some have claimed. Jefferson once said that it was “mortifying to wish success to Bonaparte” 6. The idea that Jefferson saw improved Franco-American relations as an alliance of convenience is backed by his own statement that he wised to side not with “a certain present evil”(Britain) but a “future hypothetical one”5(France). It could be said that Jefferson hoped for a French victory not for its own sake but to prevent what he saw as Britain’s next coarse of action after defeating republican France, namely defeating republican America. Although important in the period following the war of independence France was not ultimately, an effective means of
5, Lawerence Kaplan Entangling alliances with none (Kent state university press 1987) p 27
6, Lawerence Kaplan Entangling alliances with none (Kent state university press 1987) p100
altering America’s position in relation to Great Britain. Jefferson’s attempt to achieve a balance between the two enemies failed. France’s activities in subordinating the United States to her interests were also no where near as successful as Britain’s and got progressively weaker as Britain’s got stronger.
America’s position as a satellite of Britain was however in many ways vulnerable. The population of the United States now more than ever had a strong sense of national identity and a deep rooted patriotism. They would latter be capable of putting up with a great deal and making great efforts to serve the national interest, prevent further injuries inflicted by the mother country and protect the hard won rights of the revolution. The Jay treaty faced enormous opposition at home and it was clear there was only so much Americans would be willing to put up with in the name of peace. Eventually Britain’s actions forced the United States to react. Before the revolution, boycotting British goods had been a successful way of coercing Britain into changing her policies. The United States hoped for similar results by passing a non-importation law in 1806. This prohibited the importation of certain items from Britain that the United States government felt Americans could do without. In 1807 the British frigate Leopard fired on the American vessel the Chesapeake suspected of carrying British deserters. The ship was boarded and four of its crew were taken away. This led to calls for war among the American public. This however did not occur, instead a total embargo was affected, the United States effectively blockading herself. These restrictions had no effect on British policy.
In 1809 the embargo was ended and a non-intercourse act put in its place. This allowed America to trade with all nations but Britain and France. This still allowed indirect trade with both those nations to be carried out. This once again had no effect on British policy and was lifted in 1810. Despite the apparent futility of the commercial restrictions the United States imposed on Britain. They do show that the Americans did not accept their status as a satellite of Britain and were willing to go to great lengths to assert their independence. It is also worthwhile looking at the evidence used by historians when looking at Jefferson’s attempts at commercial warfare. The lack of systemic studies on its effects and the reliance placed on the opinions of New England Federalists mean that what little adequate evidence that exists, is highly questionable in terms of objectivity. One revisionist historian who takes this view is Victor Sapio. He suggests that commercial restrictions were “not as witless as most critics believed”. If the embargo was effective this certainly argues against America being a satellite. However whatever the effectiveness of the restrictions it is clear from the attitude of the American public towards Britain that they did not see their nation as a satellite. Even though they were unable to break the shackles Britain had put on them.
In conclusion the economic dependence of the United States on Britain coupled with the overbearing naval policies Britain carried out by Britain and legitimised by the Jay treaty suggest strongly that the United States remained a satellite of Great Britain. In the years immediately preceding the War of 1812 the choice facing Americans was clear, in the words of Jefferson “War or submission”7. To continue to avoid war with Britain after the failure of Jefferson’s policy of commercial restrictions would have meant abandoning one of the principle achievements of the revolutionary war. The United States would have to acquiesce to British policy in regard to international affairs and accept finally and unquestioningly their position as a satellite of Britain. Although America had its war of independence it would have to fight another to be fully accepted as an independent state with all the rights that status entails. Before the war the United States was inferior, subordinate and unable and to protect its interests in the eyes of the British. The United States position as a satellite was however always precarious and never accepted by the Americans. This is clear from the United States use of commercial restrictions, as well as
7, Huge Brogan The Penguin history of the United States of America (Penguin 1985) 257p
military and war political alliances with France and the constant threat of war. The War of 1812 wasn’t a clean break but something that had been building up over time and finally found a release. Although the itself was effectively a stalemate and the treaty of Ghent that signalled its end little more than an agreement to stop fighting the war was very important symbolically. It showed Britain that it was in her best interests to be on friendly terms with the United States and heralded a new era of Anglo-American relations. Although the United States was still in many ways dependent on Britain, the mother country no longer tried to assert her will on America but welcomed her into the society of nations.
Bibliography
Reginald Horsman The War of 1812 (Eyre and Spottiswoode 1969)
Alexander DeConde Entangling alliances (Duke University press 1958)
James McMonagle Anglo-American relations 1776-1812 (Washington 1992)
Lawerence Kaplan Entangling aliances with none (Kent state university press 1987)
Huge Brogan The Penguine history of the United States of America (Penguin 1985)
John Murray Allison Adams and Jefferson (University of Oklahoma press 1966)
James J Lorence Enduring Voices (Houghtom Miffen company 2000)
Clifford L Egan The Origins of the war of 1812 three decades of historical writing (The Journal of Military History 1979)
Robert Zevin An Interpretation of American Imperialism (Journal of Economic History 1972)
Don Lawson The war of 1812 : America's second war for independence (Abelard-Schuman 1966)
