It may be difficult for us to view death as anything other than a simple end to one’s life. This biological death may be seen as an interruption of life, but if we accept this we cannot experience existence as a whole. Martin Heidegger believed that one way of overcoming this difficulty was to “shift attention from death as the once-for-all observable fact at the end of life to the existent’s inward awareness that his being is a being-towards-death. (Macquarrie 1973, p195)”. So death is something that is already possible, in fact, the most possible thing in one’s existence. Heidegger relates death to care, and this incorporates the everyday being of the Dasein (my beingness). “It arises from the tension between the forward thrust of possibility into the future and the facticity of the situation into which the existent is already thrown, together with ‘falling’ into the world and the ‘they’. (Macquarrie 1972, p196)”.
One aspect of this is that death can be viewed upon as a supreme possibility of human existence. All the possibilities that we see before us are laid out before death one after the other. We can only experience one thing at a time and each of these things comes before the ultimate possibility of death – still a possibility even though it can be an end to others. For Heidegger, he asks that we should anticipate death and that it should be an included factor into the way we experience certain events. For this reason the Existentialist will prefer to speak of finitude rather than the basic concept of death as it allows them to become aware that existence has boundaries and thus can contemplate it as a finite whole. “There is a great difference in existential attitude between the man who lives in the face of an end and the man who systematically excludes the thought of death, or seeks to do so. (Macquarrie 1972, p197).” This relation of death to facticity is that the possibility of death is aimed at the future; facticity involves things that have already happened – this possibility of death, to the Existentialist, is a current consideration. Nobody believes that death is something that can be stopped or is something that they would want to stop – living forever may be a monstrosity.
Another aspect of care is the ‘falling’. This entails becoming absorbed into the world and being overwhelmed by external forces, thus becoming a part of the ‘they’. The people who are falling have shunned the notion of death and will try to avoid it where possible. People create institutions to deal with the subject of death; funerals are big business and delay the onset of decomposition with methods such as embalming. These people try to ignore and forget about death. Heidegger claims that “death, honestly accepted and anticipated, can become an integrating factor in an authentic existence. (Macquarrie 1972, p198)”. For some Existentialists, death is the final absurdity, just as absurd as life itself. Camus states “Human insurrection is a prolonged protest against death (Macquarrie 1972, p198)” So death can be viewed as the ultimate symbol of the finitude of man’s existence.
There are some problems that arise for the Existentialist when an existence has a lack of wholeness. As humans relate differently to time than animals or things, there are a number of tensions that arise and it is almost improbably for there not to be. A human projects himself into the future - “For the thing or animal, the present only is real; the past is no longer and the future is not yet, and this means in effect that they are unreal. (Macquarrie 1972, p200)”. For humans we should try to gather the past, present and future together in a quest for wholeness. With these Existential ideas in place, we can examine the difficulties involved when discussing finitude. If somebody were to dwell on the future exclusively, then they may be in danger of being overcome by fantasy and have a fear of the past. A preoccupation with the past is just as damaging, as we may paralyse our genuine willingness. We could deny ourselves exposure to new things and changes because of our routines we have adopted. Another common imbalance would be that of the present. In this sense man can become akin to an animal or a thing because of circumstances determined for him – possibly institutionalised code for example – and have thus, fallen into the ‘they’. It’s questions and considerations like these, which arise from speaking of finitude rather than death.
The problem of guilt arises for the Existentialist where the disorder of human existence is noted. Existing is projecting oneself into the future, but there is a flaw between this and where we currently are in the present. For the Existentialist this may be seen as a flaw that allows for morality. It is similar to the idea of ‘falling’ set out by Heidegger. Nietzsche described this flaw of man as the thing that makes it possible for one to become super-man, but at the same time the deterioration of man. As humans we must take responsibility for our being; we must attempt to strive for authentic experience and true self-hood. Existentialists will not agree that there is a blueprint for such an ambition. “Man must decide who he will be, and more than this, each individual must decide the question for himself. (Macquarrie 1972, p206)” In contrary to this an inauthentic existence would be one where external forces limited your creativity and ability to find one’s true self. Sartre said “You are free, therefore choose – that is to say, invent. No rule of general morality can show you what you ought to do; no signs are vouchsafed in this world (Macquarrie 1972, p207)”. Some may critique this idea however as surely we would be abandoning true humanity if everybody just did their own thing. It is possible that we may already be comfortable in our current situation but we must not let our existence stagnate because of it.
So, an Existentialist would prefer to speak of finitude rather than death, as it focuses on human existence as a whole, and as such, allows them to obtain authentic experience. It allows us to preserve the autonomy of existence. In striving to realise values that are truly our own we can avoid the downfalls of an inauthentic experience such as ‘falling’ or our lives becoming stagnated. To ignore death or to think of it as a bad thing that should be fought against is detrimental to humanity in the eyes of an existentialist, and destroys our chances at being able to ask some of the most fundamental philosophical questions of our existence.
Works Cited
Schrag, Calvin O. Existence and Freedom; towards an Ontology of Human Finitude. [Evanston, Ill.]: Northwestern UP, 1961. Print.
Abi-Karam, Ad. Death in Existentialism as a Philosophy of Human Finitude. Dayton, OH: University of Dayton, 1965. Print.
Kerszberg, Pierre. Critique and Totality. Albany: State University of New York, 1997. Print.
Macquarrie, John. Existentialism: John Macquarrie. London: Hutchinson, 1972. Print.
