Descartes' classification of thoughts.
Descartes
From the Second Meditation, Descartes knows that the mind, as well as the body, is known, neither by means of the senses nor the imagination but rather by the understanding, an inspection of the mind and its contents. In the Third Meditation, Descartes reviews the contents of his mind, namely, ideas, which are modes of thought, which exist, only in a thinking mind. Descartes reminds himself that he is certain that he is a thing that thinks, but asks whence comes this certainty. It lies, he argues, in the clear and distinct perception of what he affirms. Therefore, as a general principle (Descartes' rule of evidence), whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived must be true, as long as God exists and is not a deceiver. However, although it seems that the cogito (thinking) and 2+3=5 are true insofar as they are both clearly and distinctly perceived, if there is an evil genius deceiving Descartes, he cannot be assured of the truth of his rule of evidence. Therefore, in this essay I am going to show how Descartes proves 1) that there is a God and 2) whether or not God can be a deceiver, in order to demonstrate that nothing, which is both clearly and distinctly perceived, could ever be false and that the best evidence Descartes can have for the truth of anything is that he clearly and distinctly perceives it.
Descartes starts off by classifying all of his thoughts into three types: ideas, like images if things; volition, emotions, and affections (e.g., fear, desire); and judgments (to affirm or deny). First, there are ideas, which properly speaking, are like images of objects (e.g., man, chimera, sky, angel, God). Descartes says that ideas, as simple images in the mind, cannot be false. Besides conceiving of an object or having an idea, the mind can also add something to the object. On the one hand, it can add volitions or emotions (desire, fear) or it can add a judgment (affirm or deny). Volitions and emotions cannot be false even though their objects may be bad or even non-existent. So, Descartes concludes that formal falsity must lie in judgments, most commonly in judgments, which assert that the idea which Descartes believes is his idea of something (X) perfectly resembles, corresponds to, or represents, some X in the external world when, in fact, the idea does not conform to X at all. But to check this correspondence or perfect resemblance, Descartes must first discover the cause of his ideas.
Descartes distinguishes among his ideas, three classes of ideas, categorizing them according to their apparent cause, or origin: 1) Innate ideas, which Descartes says, are born in him and exist in the mind for as long as the mind has existed. These ideas (thing, truth, thought, God) are developed without recourse to experience. They are simply certain capacities that the mind has to think particular ideas. 2) Adventitious ideas, which are alien to Descartes and from without. These ideas arise in the mind seemingly from some external agency (hearing a noise, seeing the sun, feeling heat). Adventitious ideas are simply our sensations. 3) Fictitious ideas are made and invented by Descartes himself. They are the product of the mind's own invention (sirens, hippogriffs, mermaids). Descartes next considers the cause of adventitious ideas in particular, that is, the ideas that purport to resemble external objects.
Descartes wants to see if there is any evidence to believe in the correspondence of his idea of X and X in the external world, which is thought to send its likeness to him and impose it upon his mind. Why does Descartes believe in this resemblance? 1) Nature teaches him so. Descartes has a natural inclination to believe in this resemblance. However, Descartes argues against this "blind and rash impulse" because natural light (reason, the source of all truth) gives him a valid and considered judgment against this view. 2) Descartes believes in this resemblance because, through ...
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Descartes wants to see if there is any evidence to believe in the correspondence of his idea of X and X in the external world, which is thought to send its likeness to him and impose it upon his mind. Why does Descartes believe in this resemblance? 1) Nature teaches him so. Descartes has a natural inclination to believe in this resemblance. However, Descartes argues against this "blind and rash impulse" because natural light (reason, the source of all truth) gives him a valid and considered judgment against this view. 2) Descartes believes in this resemblance because, through his experience and pondering, he has found that sensations are independent of him insofar as he does not will them. He believes that sensations are produced in him by something different from him. Descartes is therefore not their cause. But Descartes argues against this view, to see whether his reasons are "powerful enough" (26). 1) Inclinations and dreams also come against his will even though they are produced by him. 2) There might be some unknown faculty in Descartes, which produces these sensations. 3) Even if Descartes grants that external objects cause these adventitious ideas, there is no reason to believe that the idea he has perfectly resembles or corresponds to the external object. For example, Descartes has two quite different ideas of the sun. The idea from the senses (adventitious) would make Descartes believe that the sun is very small. His innate idea of the sun, however, which, Descartes derived from mathematical considerations, would make him believe that the sun is much larger than the earth. Both of these ideas cannot correspond to the same sun. Reason or "natural light" tells Descartes that the idea, which resembles it the least, is in fact the most accurate.
Next, Descartes brings in the argument in which he says that ideas, as modes of thought, are the link that connects mind and world because they have both formal and objective reality, and are equal. As modes, all ideas have an equal formal reality. Formal reality refers to the actual degree of reality that a something has in this world. Thus, as modes, the idea of a mouse and the idea of a mountain have equal formal reality. Descartes then distinguishes between formal reality and objective reality. Ideas are thought to represent different kinds of things, that is to say, have different representative values. Ideas may, for example, represent 1) infinite substance (God), 2) finite substance (mind, body), 3) attributes, or 4) modes. These ideas, though having equal formal reality, have different objective realities. Objective reality refers to the ranking of ideas according to the amount of reality the ideas represent. Thus, an idea can have formal reality, being a mode of thought itself, and it can also have objective reality, representing something outside itself. Descartes then distinguishes between the formal reality and the objective reality of ideas through his understanding of causality. According to Descartes, a cause can only give to the effect as much reality as the cause itself; "there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as there is in the effect" (28). Hence, nothing can come from nothing. For instance, a stone can be made by chipping off a larger piece of rock, since the larger rock has more (or just as much) reality, but a stone cannot be made out of a colour, since a stone has more reality than a colour. Descartes also suggests that an idea can only be caused by something that ahs as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. A stone or a large rock, then, could cause the idea of a stone, but it could not be caused by colour. Therefore, Descartes grants that ideas can be caused by other ideas, but that there must ultimately be something more than an idea that is the cause of these ideas. The first cause of an idea must be something with at least as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. If he can conceive of some idea with so much objective reality than it must come from some cause with more formal reality than he himself possesses, Descartes reasons that he will then know that something outside his mind exists to create this idea.
Descartes has ideas in his mind of God, of himself and of corporeal things. Descartes himself could have caused the ideas of corporeal things since they represent finite substance, or modes of the substance of body, because he too, as a thinking thing, is a finite substance. Descartes clearly and distinctly perceives that body (corporeal substance) contains only size extension, shape, location, and movement. On the other hand, Descartes does not clearly and distinctly perceive whether bodies have colour, light, taste, heat or cold. They might be ideas of real things or of non-things. When it is not apparent from an idea whether it represents reality or the privation of reality (hot/cold; light/dark), the idea is said to have material falsity. Ideas of things that do not exist (that is, have no reality) Descartes could have easily caused by himself, because they are false; they proceed from nothing insofar as they proceed from a lack or an imperfection in Descartes. As for what is clear and distinct in the ideas of corporeal things, it appears to him that he could have borrowed some of them from the idea of himself: "namely, substance, duration, number, and whatever else there may be of this type" (30). He concludes that 1) a stone is a substance, that is to say, a thing that could possibly exist in itself; 2) he thinks he, too, is a substance.
Descartes has an idea of God: the "eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things" (28). As an infinite substance, the idea of God has the most objective reality of any idea, and thus has far more objective reality than he has formal reality. If Descartes' idea of God is an effect, it has the most objective or representational reality of any idea. What then must be the cause of Descartes' idea of God? If he has an idea in his mind with a degree of reality that he himself does not possess, it follows that some other entity must exist which has at least this degree of reality and that it must be the cause of Descartes' idea. Since the idea of God cannot have originated in himself, he concludes that God must be the cause of this idea and must therefore necessarily exist.
While he can doubt the existence of other things, he cannot doubt the existence of God, since he has such a clear and distinct perception of God's existence. The idea has infinite objective reality, and is therefore more likely to be true than any other idea. Descartes then entertains the possibility that he may be supremely perfect, that all his deficiencies are potentialities within him, and that he is slowly improving toward perfection. If perfection is a potentiality within him, then it is plausible that the idea of God could be conceived in him without any outside cause. Descartes rejects this view three ways: 1) God's perfections are all thought to be actual, while Descartes' perfections, if he has any, are at best only potential. 2) The fact that Descartes' knowledge increases daily only proves Descartes' imperfection. 3) Lastly, only a being who actually has all perfections could produce the idea in Descartes' mind of a being who actually possesses them.
Descartes investigates his own origin or cause, wondering whether he could exist if God did not exist. Descartes examines five possible causes for his existence. 1) He comes from nothing? Omitted by Descartes because causality dictates that nothing comes from nothing. 2) Descartes caused himself? If so, did Descartes have a beginning? If he did, and he caused himself, he would have created himself out of nothing, that is, created himself before he even existed. If Descartes did create himself, he would have had the power to create a finite substance, and he would have no reason to have doubts and desires. It would therefore have been easy for Descartes to give himself perfections such as power as well since they are only modes. To exist, that is, to come into existence, requires a cause, but so too does maintaining existence from moment to moment. (Water continues to boil only as long as the cause continues). To create existence is equivalent to conserving existence. Descartes is unaware of conserving himself so he cannot be the author of his own being. 3) Descartes comes from a being who is greater than Descartes but less perfect than God? This cannot be true because a being who was less perfect than God could not give Descartes his idea of God (perfection) either. 4) Descartes comes from his parents? But Descartes' parents, as finite substances, could not have given Descartes his idea of God as infinite substance. If his parents or some other imperfect being created him, this creator must have endowed him with the idea of God. If this creator is a finite being, we must still ask, with respect to it, how it came to possess the idea of an infinite God. We can trace this chain back through countless creators, but we must ultimately conclude that the idea of God can originate only in God, and not in some finite being. Therefore 5) God must be the cause of Descartes.
Having concluded that God must necessarily exist, Descartes asks how he received the idea of God. The idea cannot be adventitious, coming from without, nor can Descartes have invented it. Thus, the idea must be innate, and God must have created Descartes with this idea already in him. Therefore, the whole force of the argument lies on the fact that he recognized that it would be impossible for him to exist, being of such nature as he is, namely, having in him the idea of God, unless God did in fact exist. He clearly and distinctly perceives that God is no deceiver, since all deception relies on some defect or other, and a perfect God has no defects.
Descartes has eliminated both himself and the outside world as possible causes of his idea of God, Therefore this proof of God relies on casual reasoning, suggesting that there must be a cause of the idea of God that is as great as God Himself. Though my idea of God might have come from my grandparents, and their idea came from the minister, the suggestion is that at the end of that casual chain, there is a first cause, which is God.
