Did the Charter of the United Nations Reflect and Correct the failings of the League of Nations?

However, the problem of material weakness persisted, and the United Nations was unable to deal with threats to peace and security when seriously challenged by either the Soviet Union or the United States.  Indeed, given initial Cold War tensions, the Security Council had little power until the 1980’s when the Soviet Union changed its policy from confrontation to cooperation with the West – only then could it take effective enforcement action under Chapter VII.  Yet until that time the world had little faith in the form of Collective Security outlined by the Charter, and this is evident through the establishment of the mutual defence alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact.  So it would seem that the Charter could not correct this problem.  

The consistent prioritisation of national interest over the principle of collective security, intensified through ambiguity and legality problems in the Covenant, rendered joint military action through the principle of Collective Security a mere concept, with no practical application.  With reference to the Greco-Bulgarian conflict, it becomes apparent that it was in the best interests of Britain, France and Italy to act: both Britain and France wanted to reinforce the spirit of Locarno, while Italy wanted to secure good relations with Bulgaria.  Lord Lothian stated at the time that Britain’s attitude to crises ‘must depend on its view of the merits of each case when it arises and of its effect on its own vital interests’.  At the time of the Manchurian Crisis it was not in the National interests of the League’s members to act, since combating the economic devastation of the depression took primacy.  Ambiguity in the Covenant provided an escape clause for member states who did not wish to implement military sanctions: Article 10 stated that the Council could ‘advise’ military action when a member state’s sovereignty was challenged, and it was argued whether ‘to advise’ was binding.  Furthermore, Article 16 relates only to social and economic sanctions suggesting that military action was discretion based. Finally, through the necessity of unanimity in the League’s Council, found in Article 15 paragraph 7, action could not be taken legally if one Council member voted against it.  Indeed, on 24th October 1931 the Council voted fifteen to one for Japan to withdrawal the Kwantung Army from Manchuria, yet the vote had no juristic effect, despite the fact that Japan was the only state to vote against the proposition.  Yet, it seems highly probable that such unanimity was deliberately, not carelessly, inserted into the Covenant.  When one remembers that the Covenant was a product of negotiation, it becomes clear that neither Britain nor France were willing to put themselves at risk for the sake of the Collective Security principle, unless such action coincided with their National Interests.  Perhaps then, the League was not so much a failure as is traditionally seen, and it did live up to its Covenant to a notable extent, even if it did not maintain international peace and security.  

The UN Charter did reflect upon the fundamental self-interest of the League’s members, and did to a significant extent attempt to correct such problems.  However, it will be demonstrated that the self-interest of member states, just as in the League of Nations, plague the United Nations from its conception.  On the surface at least, the Charter goes some way in removing the ambiguity regarding the implementation of economic and military sanctions, which had been discretion based under the Covenant.  The Security Council’s main weapon in enforcing the peace is found under Article 42 which states:‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.   Article 43 then details the mechanism whereby armed forces are to be made available.  Indeed, the meaning of the Charter is clear – the Security Council, in conjunction with the proposed Joint Staff Council, would plan the extent and character of military operations when faced with an aggressor.  Indeed, Articles 46 and 47(3) clearly state that ‘plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council’.  But States have objected to this, evident through the immediate collapse of the Joint Staff Council, and argue that the Security Council merely authorises a State to use armed force as it sees fit to achieve objectives set by UN security policy.  It seems States were looking for ambiguity to justify their own interests, rather than being puzzled by the requirements of the Charter.  Effectively, therefore, the Charter – just as the Covenant – can only recommend the use of armed force, but this is scarcely the fault of the text itself.  It reflects the consistent state prioritisation of their national interests over Collective security; states do not wish to be obliged to commit forces if it does not suit their interests at the time.  Indeed, just as in the League, ‘the idea of collective security was far weaker than each individual State’s desires to protect its national interests’.

Moreover, the problem of unanimity was not solved by the Charter in the Security Council; indeed, at Dumbarton Oaks with later clarification at the Yalta Conference, the right of Veto was established for the permanent members.  White indicates astutely that such a right was merely‘recognition by those powers of each others’ and their own national interests being paramount over any collective interests’. Obviously, the addition of the veto renders decisions by the Security Council ineffective if but one permanent member objects.  However, the Charter did try and overcome this problem, so perhaps deserves more credit in correcting the problems of the League.  It provided that ‘if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security…the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures’.  In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain and France vetoed Security Council action with respect to their invasion of Egypt, and as a result the General Assembly dispatched an Emergency Force and called for a ceasefire, which appeared successful.  However, upon closer investigation it is clear that Britain and France only backed down after the US flexed her economic muscles, which relates back to the problem of material weakness of the United Nations.  Furthermore, although the Assembly recommended action against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary the same year, their calls were ignored, due to the superior strength of the aggressor.  

In conclusion, the UN Charter did reflect the failings of the League of Nations.  However, it did not correct them, and perhaps could not have hoped to.  It has been demonstrated firstly that the material weakness of the League of Nations was a significant problem in maintaining international peace and security, because it prevented action against a strong aggressor, such as Italy.  Although the UN Charter does address the issue of major power absences from the organisation, it does not, and could not, solve the problem of confronting an aggressive, powerful state.  Secondly, and more significantly, it has been shown that the self-interest of the League’s members had a disastrous impact upon the effectiveness of collective security.  Yet national interests still take primacy to collective security, despite the Charter’s best efforts to remove ambiguity, and take responsibility for the administration of economic and military sanctions.  Perhaps the unauthorised invasion of Iraq by the US best demonstrates the continuing dominance of the National Interest.  

Bibliography

Walters, A History of the League of Nations, Volume 1, Oxford Uni Press, London, 1952

Edited by Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations, Volume II, Oxford Uni Press, Oxford, 2002

Evan Luard, The United Nations: How it works, What it does, Macmillan Press, London, 1979

Roberts and Kingsbury, United Nations, Divided World, Oxford Uni Press, New York, 1988

Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, Oxford Uni Press, London, 1959

White, Keeping the peace, The united Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security, Manchester Uni Press, Manchester and New York, 1993

Barros, The League of Nations and the Great Powers, the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970

Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations, Hutchison & Co. Ltd.