Only two years later there would emerge another European institution but this time it would be supranational, that is to say it would be above the level of national governance. Again the US would be involved in its formation. The US wanted to see Germany back on its feet and believed that for Europe to be strong they had to unite. They wanted to increase German output of coal and steel to help its recovery but these were the resources used to manufacture military equipment. The US’s proposal flew in the face of the Dunkirk Treaty signed by Britain and France in 1947 which pledged to keep Germany under control to avoid the possibility of another war. Nevertheless France rose to the occasion and the French economist and integrationist Jean Monnet worked on what would be known as the Schuman Plan named after the French foreign minister. It proposed the merging of French and German coal and steel and would allow Germany to grow without threatening the stability of Europe. The German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, agreed to this idea knowing it would unite Germany with Europe again. The Schuman Plan was finalised in April 1951 and was thereafter known as the ECSC, it was not just for France and Germany but all of Europe. (Cini, 2003). Nevertheless only four other countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy) joined them. It had a high authority whose members were appointed by member governments but thereafter not responsible to them. This treaty was very important establishing three other institutes, the assembly to be renamed the Parliament, Council of Ministers and the High Court of Justice. (Treverton, 1993).
The US had forged economic links with Europe and wanted to form an alliance along military lines as well to guard against the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. It was in 1949 that NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) emerged, uniting ten Western European states to North America and Canada. (Neill Nugent, 1999). In 1950 war broke out in Korea and was overtly supported by Stalin (Duignan and Gann, 1994). The US deployed its troops to Korea leaving NATO with less military power. The US wanted Germany to be rearmed and join NATO to bridge this gap. Again this meant a loosening of control over Germany. The ECSC had not yet been finalised and its completion was made urgent by this development. There was the potential for a rearmed Germany with increased capability for the production of military equipment. France formulated the rearmament of Germany under the control of NATO rather than national control in the form of the Pleven Plan, proposed on October 26 1950, later to be called the EDC (European Defence Community. (Arthur Cyr, 1987). Unfortunately this alliance failed, the French themselves voted against the EDC in 1954 and it would appear that European states were not ready to give up sovereignty over security issues. (Treverton, 1993). As the Korean war ran on and with even less commitment from the US towards NATO, Germany rearmed and joined NATO in any event. France had finalised the ECSC in 1951 but having control over coal and steel made the re-armament of Germany less threatening.
Undoubtedly the Marshall Plan helped European integration but it could also be said that it was not an entirely selfless act and benefited the US’s own economy as well. Directly after the war the US took up an isolationist position and could do so as it had emerged as a superpower after the World War Two. (Arthur Cyr, 1987). As Duigan & Gann (1994, pg 38) put it: “the victors of war usually take rather than give”. Despite isolationism the US was worried that problems in Europe’s economy could lead to a depression, as had been seen following the World War One, and this may have an impact on the US’s economy. (Kipling Magazine, 1948, [online]). The US also wanted Europe to have a capitalist economic system the same as its own because it would provide it with new markets. There is also some dispute as to how much the Marshall Plan actually did aid Europe. According to Treverton (1993) the Plan did not help that much totalling only 5% of Europe’s GNP (gross national product). Furthermore US free marketeers believe that by the time the Marshall Plan was implemented Europe was already recovering and although it was bankrupt its industrial structure was in tact. What it needed were the four “Fs”, fuel; food; fertilizer; and feed and the Marshall Plan helped in this regard by providing ready cash. The four Fs were imported directly from the US and an incredible 70% of Marshall aid went straight back to the US economy causing an economic boom. (Treverton, 1993).
As Arthur Cyr (1987) has observed, the US’s economic interests influenced its foreign policies and therefore it is not surprising that there were political benefits from the Marshall Plan as well as economic ones. The US was concerned that Europe, in a time of financial difficulty, would turn to communism. This was reiterated in President Truman’s speech on 12 March 1947: “The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife...” (The Marshall Plan, Spartacus, 2002 [online]). The US was not the only superpower to emerge after the Second World War there was also the Soviet Union and many Eastern European states were communist. The US wanted to eliminate the perceived threat of the Soviet Union by securing Western Europe into liberal democracy. (Neill Nugent, 1999). The US intervened in the distribution of the aid even though it had given control over to Europe. The US withheld funds from Italy who had a strong communist party. Europe was leaning to the left politically and to socialism whereas the US was anti-socialist and individualistic. Although the Church denounced communism, the Ossenature Romano (Vatican newspaper) in 1949 wrote that capitalism was actually more incompatible with Christianity than communism. The US could see there was the potential for communist rule in Italy and sent in the CIA who used its first covert operations to intervene in elections thus ensuring communist parties were kept out of government. It was only once the Christian Democrats were elected that the US released Marshall aid to Italy. (Marshall Plan, 1998).
The Marshall Plan also furthered and exacerbated the tension between East and West. The Soviet Union saw the Marshall Plan as an aggressive act and “a plan for interference in other countries”. It also accused the US of dividing Europe. (see CNN – Cold War, 1998, [online]). Indeed their spies uncovered papers which revealed that the US’s offer of aid was only half-hearted and was not expecting the Soviet to join in. (Marshall Plan, 1998). Churchill referred to this divide in his address at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri in 1946 as an “iron curtain” (see Duigan and Gann, 1994, pg 36) and became a phrase used by many in years to come.
In summary, it is evident that the US benefited from the integration of Europe both economically and politically. It succeeded in its economic goal to lock Western Europe into capitalism and also politically by keeping Western Europe away from communism. The end of the Cold War and break up of the Soviet Union would suggest that capital liberal democracy has won over communism as stated by Francis Fukuyama in his The End of History and the Last Man (1992) (see Steans and Pettiford, 2001, pg 47) and the US has emerged as a hegemon. Of course Europe had tried to integrate in the inter war years but to no avail. The success of the post 1945 institutions is due to the fact that co-operation was borne out of a need for economic co-operation, albeit that the underlying reason for this co-operation was to keep control over Germany. The US has played a very important role in furthering European integration and begs the question of whether, without US involvement, integration would have come as far as it has and in its current form.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOMBERG, E., STUBB, A., 2003. The European Union: How Does it Work? 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
CINI, MICHELLE., 2003. European Union Politics. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
CYR, ARTHUR., 1987. U.S. Foreign Policy and European Security. 1st ed. Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
DUIGNAN, P., GANN, L.H., 1994. The United States and the New Europe 1945-1993. 1st ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
NUGENT, NEILL., 1999. The Government and Policies of the European Union. 4th ed. Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
TREVERTON, GREGORY., 1993. America, Germany and the Future of Europe. 4th ed. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
STEANS, J., AND PETTIFORD, L., 2001. International Relations: Perspectives and Themes. 1st ed. Harlow: Longmans.
INTERNET RESOURCES
KIPLINGER MAGAZINE. 1948. Benefits for the U.S Economy [online]. Available at: . [accessed 16 Mar. 2004].
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