Discuss the various ways in which the development of nuclear weapons had an influence on the course of the cold war.

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

JON PRICE

GV103

DISCUSS THE VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD AN INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF THE COLD WAR

The Cold War was a turbulent and tense time between the two post war superpowers; the USA and the USSR. Throughout this era of fear and paranoia there were several events which served to dramatically raise pulses with both the East and West, but none as much as those where weapons of mass destruction were involved. Some of the most intense moments of the Cold War were due to the association with nuclear weapons. The threats of these new nuclear weapons of mass destruction are which caused the Cold War to nearly rise to boiling point and spill over into a hot war. The purpose of this essay is to explore what effects nuclear weapons had on the Cold War and the way it was subsequently conducted after their rise to the forefront of International Relations. In order to do this I will be exploring such areas as the development of nuclear weapons in the Arms Race, flashpoints involving nuclear weapons such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Nuclear weapons first exploded onto the scene of both military and world politics in 1945 when the United Sates dropped the first atomic bomb on Japanese soil obliterating the city Hiroshima, followed by another being dropped on Nagasaki to end to the stalemate that WWII had become. The Japanese government subsequently had no choice but to surrender to the might of the west. The world had now witnessed the devastating affect of nuclear weapons and their awesome and destructive power. According to Lundestad (1999) the use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese in 1945 was not solely to quickly end the war, but also to ‘underscore the power of the United States and thus, get the Soviet leaders to show greater consideration for US interests in International politics.’ (:149)

The nuclear arms race can be argued to have began in 1941 when Roosevelt believed the US should increase research on the development of nuclear weapons for two reasons: ‘…the fear that Germany would be the first country to acquire such weapons’ (Lundestad, 1999: 149) and the fact that such weapons could be produced. Now that nuclear weapons had been witnessed, the question of how to control them subsequently arose, responsibility of which fell to the UN. The US set in motion a proposal known as the Baruch Plan in 1946 to control the use of nuclear weapons, the plan: ‘…would have placed nuclear weapons under international supervision.’ (Mandelbaum, 1981: 107). This was deemed as unacceptable by the USSR as they had not yet had the chance to test a nuclear explosion and were subsequently at a disadvantage to the US (Mandelbaum, 1981: 107), and the idea of international supervision by a third party would go against the Soviet belief of isolation: ‘an international control system would violate the Soviet policy of seclusion from the rest of the world.’ (Lundestad, 1999: 150). Subsequently it seemed that the Soviet counterproposals of total disarmament were equally unacceptable to the US as the Soviet Union would have a very strong military advantage over the US, as according to Mandelbaum the Soviet proposals, if granted: ‘would have given the Soviet Union, with its large non-nuclear army, the kind of military advantage on the European continent that the Germans had sought before WWI.’ Once the Soviet Union had witnessed the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons along with Soviet espionage on weapons of mass destruction, it began to step up its own development of nuclear weapons which had first began in 1942 (Lundestad, 1999: 152).

In August 1949, the United States had to re-evaluate the Soviet threat as the USSR had detonated its first atomic bomb which led to mounting tensions as: ‘After having underestimated Soviet nuclear strength, Washington now overestimated it.’ (Lundestad, 1999: 152). It was clear now that both powers realised that: ‘were one side to attack with nuclear weapons, the other could instantly retaliate in kind whether or not there were any differences in the numbers of bombs they possessed.’ (UN Secretary General, 1968: 31) and with this in mind, relations between the two became tense.

There were several ...

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There were several tense moments in the Cold War between East and West after this time, one of which was over the issue of the recently divided Berlin, which had to be conducted with great care due to the looming shadow of nuclear retaliation. Once Berlin had been divided up amongst the British, French, US and the USSR, the West sought to economically integrate West Germany into Western Europe by introducing a new currency for West Germany. This outraged the Soviet authorities, prompting the military governor, Sokolvsky, to say the following regarding the currency reform: ‘against the wishes and interests of the German people and in the interests of the American, British, and French monopolists…The separate currency reform completes the splitting of Germany’ (Isaacs and Downing, 1998: 67). This led to the barricading of Berlin from the allies, causing the allies to resort to airlifts to supply the Berliners in their occupational zones with food. Continuing for 3 months, the British and American governments could no longer afford to continue with these means for supplying Berlin, and Washington had to examine the seemingly inevitable issue of military action with the Soviets over Berlin (Isaacs and Downing, 1998: 74). As a result in September 1948, a fleet of sixty B-29 US bombers were flown into the UK to show the USSR that the United States had what it took to end the standoff if it came to that., even though the planes were not actually carrying the nuclear warheads, as not enough were in production (Isaacs and Downing, 1998: 77). It appears that whilst being a small and insubstantial event, as the blockade was lifted more due to the counter blockade against East Germany, it shows that nuclear weapons were being used as a negotiating tool. Whilst no threats to drop a bomb were made, the presence of them was enough to alter negotiations, which highlights the idea of nuclear deterrence and changes in defence policies.

The developments of nuclear weapons called for changes in defence policies, which can be seen when Eisenhower was announced as Truman’s successor in 1953. One of the major changes was the introduction of the ‘New Look’ which was to make sure that the: ‘Soviet Union was never to rest assured that nuclear weapons would not be employed’ (Lundestad, 1999: 155) it also meant that any minor attack by the Soviet Union was answerable with nuclear retaliation, a drastic change to that of Truman’s previous policy of containment meant that attacks and aggressive behaviour should be dealt with in the area affected, as opposed to an unrelated area over an unrelated matter (Lundestad, 1999: 156). This change can be attributed to the need to deter the use of the growing numbers of nuclear weapons. The New Look appeared to be a much more aggressive foreign policy, increasing the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in locations which would allow quick retaliation in the event of a Soviet attack, despite the ethical objections the use of nuclear weapons Eisenhower was in favour of their use, saying: ‘Where these things (tactical nuclear weapons) are used strictly on military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else’ (Lundestad, 1999: 156). The US subsequently used the threat of nuclear weapons at various stages of the Cold War, in 1953 the US threatened that weapons of mass destruction would be used if peace was not soon reached in Korea and again in Vietnam to prevent Chinese intervention (Lundestad, 1999: 158)

The USSR also followed the trend of change, even though Soviet developments were believed to have roughly mirrored those made by the US (Lundestad, 1999: 159) for example the reduction of conventional forces the step up in the production of nuclear weapons. Very much like the New Look in the US, the USSR strove for the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons along with their accompanying delivery devices, results of which can be seen with the detonation of the Soviets first Hydrogen bomb in 1953. The first major shock came when in October 1957 the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first satellite, which rocked the US belief that it had technological superiority over the world (Lundestad, 1999: 161). In order to dramatically raise tensions: ‘Khrushchev loudly proclaimed Soviet superiority in the intercontinental sphere…Many Washington policy-makers chose to take the Soviet leader literally when he stated for instance that the Soviet Union had enough nuclear weapons to wipe any aggressor off the face of the earth.’ It is apparent that at this time the development of nuclear weapons had pushed both the US and USSR into a very tense and dangerous period of International Relations as can be seen with one of the major flashpoints of the era, the Cuban missile crisis.

The Cuban missile was believed to be one of the tensest moments of the Cold War with Lebow and Stein arguing that the strategy of nuclear deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers. ‘Fidel Castro’s embrace of communism and subsequent alignment with the Soviet Union made Cuba a major battlefield of the Cold War’ with both the US and the Soviet Union unprepared to give up on it. At this time the USSR was lagging in relation to the US in the nuclear arms race with both armaments and effective delivery systems. At the time the USSR had less than 500 war heads and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles compared to the US having fewer than 5,000 war heads and around 1,500 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. This prompted Khrushchev to position intermediate-range missiles in Cuba as this: ‘would double the Soviets strategic arsenal and provide a real deterrent to a potential U.S attack against the Soviet Union’ (Wiersma + Larson, 1997.) On announcing the discovery in October, Kennedy demanded that the Russians remove the missiles in order to ‘restore the balance of power, preserve NATO and convince Khrushchev and the world of American resolve’ (Lebow and Stein, 1994: 94) and he called upon Khrushchev ‘to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace...’ (Garthoff, 1987: 35) As tensions began to rise between East and West, with each state anticipating the others move, the US finally heard from Khrushchev, when he proposed removing the Soviet missiles and personnel if the U.S agreed not to invade Cuba, the next day however after the shooting down of U-2 over Cuba, Khrushchev demanded the removal of U.S missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Kennedy administration ignored this and replied with agreement to the first. On the 28th Khrushchev signalled his intentions to stand down by announcing that he would dismantle the installation and return the missiles to the Soviet Union. Lebow and Stein believe that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence did more harm than good for the Cold War.

Some theorists argue that the theory of nuclear deterrence was one of the main reasons that the Cold War did not turn escalate into a full out war. According to Nicholson if there are two nations, A and B to use his example, both with nuclear weapons and tensions and mistrust between the two, there is temptation for one of the states to initiate an attack on the other provided that the second nation would not be able to respond, for example the obliteration of their nuclear arsenal. This would be more of a preventative measure by said state, A, to attack B, even if just to stop them from launching an attack against them (Nicholson, 2002: 131). It was believed that if this was the case then the chance of a nuclear war would be very probable and subsequently led to the formulation of the second strike doctrine. This stated that: ‘If both sides could effectively defend their nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack, no matter how large, then they would be in a position to counter attack even if the aggressor had destroyed the country as a whole…This would mean a counter-attack would be possible.’ (Nicholson, 2002: 131) This dilemma is known as MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), first coined in the 1960s. It is also important to address the issue of whether nuclear deterrence actually prevented a superpower war as there are those who would argue that this was not the case and the lack of war can be attributed to the idea that the US did not ‘have any malicious designs on the Soviet Union’ (Nicholson, 2002: 134). It is important to also recognise that there is also strong opposition to the theory of nuclear deterrence as it has ‘technical, organizational and political constraints that make it very difficult, and sometimes impossible, for leader to manipulate the risk or war with precision.’ (Lebow and Stein, 1994: 324)

It is clear that the development of nuclear weapons influenced the course of the Cold War and the way it was dealt with. One could argue that nuclear weapons had a negative influence on the Cold War and postponed its ending as it drew nations into a perpetual state of paranoia, believing that with each weapon gained they were bettering their neighbours and opponents. Alternatively another viewpoint is that nuclear weapons are actually what prevented the Cold War becoming a ‘Hot War’ with armed conflict. Personally I believe that both are valid and correct viewpoints however I believe that nuclear deterrence was a key factor in both countries restraint when it came to military and diplomatic stand offs an example of this would be the belief that the US spread its foreign policies and influence across the world but ‘was unwilling to intervene in Eastern Europe because of nuclear deterrence.’ (Nicholson, 2002: 135).

Jon Price

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