It is in the 18th century when positive freedom was to be spread as a retrospective vision of one’s idea of being free. It is said to be ‘the liberty of the ancients’ (Heywood 1999: 264). Positive liberty is simply negative freedom bound by responsibility. George Bernard Show defined his opinion back in 1903 claiming that ‘that is why most men dread it’. I agree especially because nowadays people tend to choose safety over freedom. Safety is one of the characteristics of positive freedom. There are a set of rules imposed by a certain governance of people, a social contract among all, that we agree to live under restrains in order to earn the freedom from basic interference. According to Rousseau, a man is free when he acts upon the ‘general will’ (1988), which is said to be the true one, the only freedom, because it is the agreed by all. Acting otherwise is said to be selfish in way that one acts in his own interest which might not be the best. In other words, the stress is not on the ‘inner’ freedom but the moral one where society is the center figure. In that case being free by all means would mean ‘doing what you out to do’ (Heywood 1999) and thus supposed to be much happier. Rousseau gives a very clear example of the notion of positive freedom but his words find themselves in contradiction, too. He gives example of family boundaries. A child is obliged to be under parental control until it develops his individual reason. But he also states that ‘Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains’ when it is supposed to be the other way around. According to the above, men are always supposed to live ‘in chains’. When born children come to be under the family coercion and then ‘the social contract’, obeying the law of all. Rousseau (1988) argues that ‘each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’. Here comes the question of what one understands under freedom. One can only be free to the extent to which he allows himself to be. In other words, individuality should make one a part of the whole. But is there individuality in Rousseau? There is to the greatest extend of delusion, because what he basically says is that one’s individuality should be considered upon all the others, ‘substituting justice for instinct’ with morality a person ‘previously lacked’ (Rousseau 1988: 95) and being free to choose means being obliged to choose. Thus, right he is Burke (1784) that ‘people never give up their liberties except under some delusion’. The widest delusion of all is the common sense, the idea of the positive freedom of having to choose between losing one’s individuality in order to be free in the society governed by itself, and being banished from common welfare for choosing not to be under those constrains that are said to be right. I do most certainly agree that ‘it is better to die on your feet than to live on your knees’ (Ibarruri 1936). The worst of all is ‘living on your knees’ without even knowing about another option and what is more – without being concerned if there is another option because one feels safe, protected and last but not least, governed. One may be governed by decisions he is said to have taken part in but he is still moved by causes that affect him, not by reasons of his own (Berlin 1969).
Both positive and negative liberties have their clashing points. However, they are quite radical, standing on two far ends – ‘whether a man is indeed free or determined’ (Goodwin 2007: 334). There is an in between position where one can be free from ‘the tyranny of public opinion’ (Goodwin 2007: 345) and still develop his ethics. Bentham’s theory has a weak point. His notion of pleasure ceases to cover the moral sight of human beings. On the contrary, John Stuart Mill (1974) has managed to combine pleasure with ethics. He finds not the necessity of a contract or a government – a grasping ‘hand’ of rules. Enough it is to have a social conscience, the individual to act in a way that interest him and meanwhile to have in mind what interests society (Mill 1974: 141). According to the text of ‘On Liberty’ (Mill 1974: 142), people should not act that selfish as to mind only their interest, but they should look for each other, help and encourage but shall not inveigle another or influence what one chooses to do with his life. Moreover, ‘there is category difference between many rights’ (Goodwin 2007: 245). Mill associates that with education, which ‘helps a child’s development’ and this is a right to a child to get educated but it has been turned into obligatory duty and thus has gained negative meaning among certain age groups. Socialists believed that is people are ‘given opportunities suited to their talents and needs’ (Goodwin 2007: 346) where they could find themselves free enough to choose for themselves in their lives, they will be indeed satisfied.
One is said to be free when he can ‘act unobstructed by others’ (Berlin 1969: 122). This means that one is not free, in other words positively free, when one has been prevented from achieving something that he could otherwise do, an intervention in people’s basic natural rights. Berlin (1969) stands by the idea that what distinguishes negative from positive freedom is that the negative notion is freedom from while the positive one is freedom to. Freedom from interference compared to ‘freedom to develop as an autonomous individual through political self-determination and education’ (Goodwin 2007: 346). He also points out that the negative one is more concerned by the extent to which there is no interference by other people and the positive one deals with the source of control or who determines what can be and cannot be done (Berlin 1969: 121 – 122). Both ways it seems not oddly impossible to fulfill all people’s needs. ‘Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means’ (Berlin 1969: 118) and thus mankind is more interested in having the opportunities to choose, to dream, to have things to aim at and have them accomplished rather than how or under what rules or governance does it happen. Moreover, positive and negative liberty are not so different as to concept, but they are ‘two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life’ (Berlin 1969: 166).
Centuries of numerous attempts of defining liberty have passed. Whatsoever, idealists ought to believe in the possibility of having the absolute freedom – the negative freedom. How is it attainable? One should liberate himself and live for himself only. Thus, is it attainable? In my opinion, there is no such thing as absolute freedom in the very meaning of it. It is the mere fact that there are so many circumstances that impose some kind of restrictions that makes it impossible to have the full capacity of decisiveness. First of all comes the right of every human being to be secure and the right to life. With every right of one comes restriction to another – ‘What is freedom of expression? Without the freedom to offend, it ceases to exist’ (Rushdie 1990). Moreover, both negative and positive freedoms are based on the trust on a human being. In a world where corruption, greed and jealousy do exist how can one be trusted. What is more, how can all be trusted under no control? Freedom is not for anyone but what is the right way to decide who chooses and how? That is something Bentham missed to explain in his theory – how does one make the choice who is in the ‘greatest number’ and how much. When free in Bentham’s world, one has the right to choose pain or pleasure. Joel Miller (2004) finds the weak point in the latter saying that if people are free ‘in any meaningful sense of the word, that means they are at liberty to foul up their lives as much as make something grand of them. That’s the gamble we all take. That’s the risk of liberty.’
Imagine a helium balloon hold by a string in a hand, string on a stand. Rousseau would probably want all balloons to be bound on the stand and Bentham would free the greatest number of them. I would say that society is like the air in the balloon – it is rounded by borders. They should either exist or not be put at all. What happens to that balloon when Bentham gives pleasure to the greatest number is that the balloon becomes heavier and falls downwards. Thus people who have not chosen pain would be automatically chosen by pain. So it may be better if the balloon is bound by a string on the stand just like so many other balloons. It is just like the planet we all live in. We live within it without being aware of what is beyond other bodies. What is changed now is that people do care to see what is impossible to be seen.
List of References
Bentham, J. (1960) A Fragment On Government And An Introduction To The Principles Of Morals And Legislation. eds. by Wilson, C.H. and McCallum, R.B. Great Britain: Basil Blackwell and Mott
Berlin, I. (1969) Four Essays On Liberty. Great Britain: Oxford University Press
Burke, E. (1784) County Meeting [speech] Buckinghamshire, 1784
Goodwin, B. (2007) 5th edn. Using Political Ideas. England: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Ibarruri, D. (1936) Convention of Solidarity [speech attributed to Emiliano Zapata] Paris, 3 September 1936
Mill, J.S. (1974) On Liberty. England: Penguin Books
Miller, J. (2004) Bad Trip. United States of America: Thomas Nelson
Plamenatz, J. (1963) Man And Society. Vol. 2, Great Britain: Lowe & Brydon (Printers) Ltd.
Rousseau, J. (1988) ed. by Ritter and Bondanella, Rousseau’s Political Writings. trans. by Bondanella, J.C. United States of America: Norton & Company, Inc.
Rushdie, S. (1990) Weekend Guardian 10 February
Shaw, G.B. (1903) Man And Superman. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press
