Examine the Evolution of Soviet doctrinal thinking during the Cold War.
Examine the Evolution of Soviet doctrinal thinking during the Cold War.
Soviet Military Doctrine is entirely based upon the Marxist-Leninist teachings, which include both the ideological and methodological basis for soviet military doctrine and soviet military science.
In 1969 the General of the Army Semyon P. Ivanov commandant of the Academy of the General Staff gave periodization for military doctrine:
* 1st period: 1917 - 1928 civil war to Industrialization
* 2nd period: 1929 - 1941 industrialization to great patriotic war
* 3rd period: 1941 - 1945 great patriotic war
* 4th period: 1946 - 1953 end of war to death of Stalin
* 5th period: 1960 - the dissolution of the USSR new military doctrine
Military Doctrine, First Stage (1917-1928)
A. A. Svethcin, best known for his book 'Strategiya' believed that the concept of doctrine should be limited to the tactical outlook.
M. V. Frunze stating that the doctrine had two parts laid out the principals of the initial doctrine: political & technical.
* 'The state must define the nature of overall, in particular, military policy beforehand, designate the possible objects of its military intentions in accordance with its policy, and develop and institute a definitive plan of action for the state as a whole, one that would take account of future confrontations and ensure their success by making prudent use of the nation's energy before they take place.'
Frunze gave a definition of the unified military doctrine:
* 'A teaching adopted by the army of a particular state establishing the nature of armed forces development, the methods of troop combat training, and the methods of troop management, based of the state's prevailing view on the nature of the military missions lying before it and the means for executing them, which are dependant on the class nature of the state and are defined by the level to which the country's productive forces have developed.'
According to Frunze, the military doctrine outlined above could only be implemented in the state where 'the power belongs to labour' and where 'the working class has the leading role.'
He also emphasized the inevitability of war as the soviet state was the only stronghold of socialism, and therefore, soviet military doctrine must be shaped accordingly. The strategy of the red army was a remaining ambiguity: defensive or offensive.
In 1923 I. I. Vatsetis commander in chief of the red army forces and professor of the red army academy expanded the issue of the military doctrine further by stating that the war cannot be won by engagements and battles but by winning a campaign. This could be achieved by strength increased through drastic annihilation of the enemy, by concluding an appropriate alliance etc. Increasing one's combat might only by exhausting one's own country would lose the campaign.
Military doctrine was therefore state's readiness for war: an attribute of state power
* This goal could be achieved through establishing a unified military school. Certain factors had to be established, such as what factors would influence the establishment of a common interpretation of the military affairs. Such change could be achieved through the influence of military education.
A unified military school 'is a categorical, self-defined universal entity within the army of a given state.'
The opposing view of Trotsky - 'permanent revolution' was eliminated by Stalin and gave way to Frunze and Vatsetis. Trotsky's 'Military Doctrine or Pseudo-Military Doctrinarism' claimed that the red army was the military expression of the proletarian dictatorship. He further added that the red army was the military embodiment of the doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship.
* First: the proletarian dictatorship is rendered secure by the red army; second: the dictatorship of the proletariat would be impossible without the red army
* He claimed that soviet military theorists failed to base the concepts of military doctrine upon reality, giving improper formulations of general goals of tactics and strategy.
Trotsky claimed that the development of the new doctrine should be based upon concentrating on important, practical tasks that made the real culture of the red army - placing emphasis on military fundamentals.
Unlike Frunze, Trotsky believed that strategy must be offensive because it flows from the class nature of the proletariat. The theory of proletarian art was too early to develop, as soviet military theorists were yet immature to generalize over the principles of military affairs.
Military Doctrine, Second Stage (1929-1941)
In order to achieve an agreement over the military doctrine and strategy soviet theorists considered the WWI - positional warfare, concluding that the major objective in future conflict would be to avoid positional warfare and restore maneuver to the battlefield. This objective became the cornerstone of the military-technical side of soviet military doctrine.
Soviet theorists began to develop a new theory of the deep operation, which became imbedded in military doctrine.
* A further doctrinal decision was made - that the USSR should attempt to achieve superiority in 3 decisive weapons needed - tanks, aircraft and artillery.
The idea of deep battle expressed the offensive nature of soviet military doctrine. According to these regulations any attack on the USSR would be beaten off with all the might of the read army, with the transfer of military actions onto the territory of the attacking enemy. Only a decisive offensive in ...
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Soviet theorists began to develop a new theory of the deep operation, which became imbedded in military doctrine.
* A further doctrinal decision was made - that the USSR should attempt to achieve superiority in 3 decisive weapons needed - tanks, aircraft and artillery.
The idea of deep battle expressed the offensive nature of soviet military doctrine. According to these regulations any attack on the USSR would be beaten off with all the might of the read army, with the transfer of military actions onto the territory of the attacking enemy. Only a decisive offensive in the main direction followed by pursuit will lead to complete destruction of the enemy's men and equipment.
* According to the new military doctrine military leaders had to be trained to implement the concept prescribed by the doctrine. The operational staff must become not only the brain of the red army - it must become the military brain for all of the soviet state.
In 1936 an academy of general staff was established to give higher military education to soviet commanders. The unified school of thought that Vatsetis had advocated became a reality
Stalin's direct leadership in matters of military strategy, combined with the loss of the top soviet officers in the purges, had an adverse effect on the capabilities of the red army and in particular on the military education of operational staff.
Military Doctrine, Third Stage (1941-1945)
Once the war started, military doctrine was suppressed by military strategy to direct the war in progress. As indicated by soviet military theorists, military doctrine is reflected in regulations. Stalin personally disliked the word doctrine but his regulations served the same purpose as doctrine. These regulations are as follows:
* A crushing blow of the entire might of the red army shall meet any enemy attack against the USSR
* If the enemy forces the USSR into the war, the red army will be the most aggressive of all the armies ever existed
* Soviet union shall conduct an offensive war, carrying it into the enemy's territory
Stalin's permanently operating factors:
* Stability of the rear
* Morale of the troops
* Quantity and quality of divisions
* Armaments of the army
Organizational ability of command personnel of the army Instead of creativity in military science, which is the foundation of military doctrine, military theorists were permitted only to comment on Stalin's pronouncements on military questions that bore a personal, incidental character
Stalin's thesis of permanently operating factors became dogma; the limited experience of wars conducted under special circumstances (Spain, Finland) was transferred to the structuring and use of the soviet armed forces
For the entire WWII and up until the death of Stalin, these factors were accepted as the final and unquestioned authority. Any discussion of war by soviet military strategists had to be within the framework of these five factors. Instead of creativity in military science, which is the foundation of military doctrine, military theorists were permitted only to comment on Stalin's pronouncements on military questions that bore a personal, incidental character
Stalin's thesis of permanently operating factors became dogma; the limited experience of wars conducted under special circumstances (Spain, Finland) was transferred to the structuring and use of the soviet armed forces
For the entire WWII and up until the death of Stalin, these factors were accepted as the final and unquestioned authority. Any discussion of war by soviet military strategists had to be within the framework of these five factors.
* Even the victory in the WWII was attributed to the complete superiority of the soviet state and its military doctrine over other countries and their military doctrines
Military Doctrine, Fourth Stage (1946-1953)
The postwar period was highlighted by the trend of de-Stalinization that was caused by his cult of personality.
* In 1969, Ivanov in an article on military doctrine and strategy did not mention either Stalin's purges or his personality cult
* He only stated that until nuclear weapons were available, soviet military doctrine and strategy developed on the basis of the experience of the war
Post-Stalin Era (1953-1960)
Questions that soviet theorists asked about military doctrine:
* What is the degree of the probability of war
* What kind of enemy the state will have to deal with
Determining the probability of war, however, depends on the kind of war at stake. A philosophy that advocates world revolution almost automatically makes the probability of war quite high.
* Marxism-Leninism had posited that as long as imperialism exists, war would be inevitable
That position had dominated the political side of soviet military doctrine since 1917. However, nuclear weapons made such position very dangerous. There was a split between the communists who believed that imperialism should be eliminated immediately, since the inevitability of war was so certain. Others believed that the term inevitable should be qualified, since in 1955 N. Krushchev launched a political offensive at the 20th Party Congress, stating that:
* '...war is not fatalistically inevitable. Now there are powerful social and political forces which have formidable means at their disposal to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and if they do try to start one, to give a crushing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventuristic plans. To do this, it is necessary that all forces opposing war be vigilant and mobilized so that they can act with a united front and not weaken their struggle to preserve and consolidate peace.
Thus, Lenin's thesis that as long as imperialism exists, the economic base for predatory wars is preserved, remains in force. As long as capitalism exists, reactionary forces representing the interests of capitalist monopoly will seek military adventures and aggression. Therefore, constant vigilance on the part of the USSR is crucial within the framework of the military doctrine.
* Lenin's principles of peaceful co-existence were defined as a special form of class warfare between socialism and capitalism in the international arena
In discussing the military needs of the USSR in an era of peaceful co-existence. The term military doctrine was not used. It was Marshal G.K. Zhukov who pressed for implementing the term, with all subsequent theoretical implications:
* 'In restructuring soviet armed forces, we proceed from the fact that the methods and forms of future war will be different from all past wars in many ways. Future war will be characterized by the mass use of air forces, rocket weapons, and means of mass destruction such as atomic weapons. However, we proceed from the fact that the latest weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, do not reduce the decisive role of the ground armies, navies and aviation. Without strong ground forces, without strategic, long-range and frontal aviation and modern naval fleet, without well-organized co-operation between them, modern war cannot be waged'
The Revolution in Military Affairs - according to soviet writings after the event, a revolution in military affairs took place in the soviet armed forces between 1953 and 1960 affecting all facets of the military. It continued until the end of the cold war until Gorbachev's introduction of perestroika.
* Karl Marx's collaborator Friedrich Engels to describe the introduction of gunpowder used the term revolution in military affairs.
The revolution in military affairs was mainly promoted by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky. He was also the prime mover of bringing the USSR into the nuclear age and thus responsible for setting the stage for the next formulation of military doctrine.
As a result of all the deliberations, a new military doctrine was formed. This new objective - development of new military concepts was the result of a directive from the Minister of Defense as well as of a military-science conference held in May 1957.
Discussions on the role of nuclear weapons were conducted widely, both in military schools and in the field. A great number of papers were produced by prominent generals, admirals and officers on conducting nuclear war, especially on the beginning of such a war. Some of the main problems examined were how to stall a surprise attack by an aggressor, how to train troops, and how to conduct modern battles and operations.
Military Doctrine, Fifth Period (1960-1970)
Soviet military theorists and strategists do not set forth their own ideas on military doctrine; rather they elaborate on doctrinal decisions already made at higher levels
* In USSR philosophy and ideology are guide to action and decision making in military affairs
In analyzing soviet doctrinal writings there is a danger of being led astray by the use of dialectic. The dialectic is discussion and reasoning by dialogue used by Socrates as a method of intellectual investigation. To Marx and Engels it was development through stages of thesis, antithesis and synthesis in accordance with the laws of dialectical materialism. In military terms this finds expression as follows:
* The appearance of the new means of struggle always brings into being corresponding counter means, which in the end also lead to changes of military operations. The struggle of tanks and antitank means, aircraft and antiaircraft defense...this is the axis around which revolves the development of military affairs, including the development of methods and forms of armed conflict.
Since 1960 soviet military doctrine features several constant themes that are as follows:
* Doctrine has two sides: political and military-technical. From the political side, soviet military doctrine is against aggressive, unjust, predatory wars. It supports liberating, just, revolutionary wars. At the same time military doctrine considers that war is no longer a fatal necessity. From the military- technical side doctrine is determined by radical changes in armaments and equipment and combat training and moral-combat qualities of troops.
* Doctrine is for the world war. If not prevented it will be unleashed by imperialists. If occurred, the new world war would be a decisive armed clash of two opposed social systems. War is probable to begin by surprise with massive use of nuclear weapons. A surprise nuclear attack is most likely. Therefore the primary task is to be constantly ready to reliably repulse a surprise attack of the enemy.
* The war may be short and swift moving or it may be protracted. Nuclear rocket weapons will play the decisive role, but final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of joint actions of all services of the armed forces and service arms. Future war will demand massive multimillion man armies. Troops must be ready to fight both with use of nuclear weapons and without them.
4th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 1960. Khrushchev delivered a major policy speech outlining the fundamental positions of the military doctrine based on the decisiveness of nuclear weapons (thorough analysis of modern warfare)
* War would begin deep in interior
* Surprise attack is possible but could not itself win the war
* The overall quantity of the red army to be reduced - dependence upon firepower, not on the number of men under arms
* Combined efforts would be needed to win the war. Reliance on combined arms (Malinovsky)
* Number of the enemy's divisions destroyed was not the determining factor anymore. Destruction of the enemy's nuclear capacity and delivery means became the primary task of soviet military doctrine.
Khrushchev defined the types of wars that could be fought in modern conditions
* World war
* Local war
* War of national liberation
The first two were considered unjust war in soviet terms as they pursued imperialist predatory nature. The third type was categorized as just by the soviets as it complied perfectly with the ideological framework of the soviet state.
* With reference to local war: 'there is much talk in the imperialist camp today about local wars, and the imperialists are even making small-caliber atomic weapons for use in such wars.'
* The imperialists even 'concocted a special theory about such war
* However 'a small-scale imperialist war, no matter which of the imperialists starts it, may develop into a world thermonuclear war'
* The USSR therefore, 'must fight against world wars and local wars'
The 22nd Congress of CPSU. Khrushchev declared that increasing international tensions had forced the USSR to suspend the reduction in the armed forces planned for 1961
* USSR to raise its defense budget
* Postpone the annual release into the reserves of soldiers and sailors completed their compulsory military service
* Renew nuclear testing in the atmosphere
The New Party program of 1961 was intended as a guide to action. The program is to the communist party what military doctrine is to the soviet armed forces
* The CPSU considers that the chief aim of its foreign policy is to deliver mankind from a world war of extermination
* 'It is possible to avert a world war...to banish world war even before the complete victory of socialism on earth, with capitalism surviving in some parts of the world'
This particular goal was to be achieved through general and complete disarmament under strict international control as a radical way of guaranteeing peace: 'the peoples can and must force the imperialsists into disarmament'
Major exception of policy: Khrushchev increased the fears of the west regarding the abortion of the plans to reduce the military by stating that the USSR would continue to oppose all wars of conquest, including wars between capitalist countries and local wars aimed at 'strangling people's emancipation movements...the soviet people consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just anti-imperialist wars of liberation'
Soviets list 4 types of just wars:
* War in defense of socialist fatherland and of the countries of the socialist community
* Revolutionary wars of working class
* Wars of national liberation
* Wars directed at the defense of state sovereignty of capitalist states from imperialist aggression.
Unjust wars are identified as follows:
* Wars of imperialist states against socialist countries
* Wars of exploiting classes against the working class
* Colonial and neo-colonial wars
* Aggressive imperialist wars inside the capitalist system
According to soviet military doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons in response to their use by the aggressor does not deprive war of its just nature from the side of the state opposing the aggressor.
The new military doctrine: minister of defense Malinovsky used the term soviet military doctrine for the first time with all its significance. The basis of the new doctrine is as follows:
* 'One of the most important positions of this doctrine is that a world war, if the imperialist aggressors nevertheless unleash it, will inevitably take the form of nuclear rocket war, such a war in which the main means of striking will be the nuclear weapon and the basic means of delivery to the target will be the rocket. In connection with this, war will also begin differently than before and will be conducted in a different way.
* The use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, with unlimited possibilities for their delivery to any target in calculated minutes with the aid of rockets, permits the achievement of decisive military results in the shortest period of time at any distance and over enormous territory. Along with groups of enemy armed forces, industrial and vital centres, communication junctions, everything that feeds war will be the targets of crushing nuclear strikes.'
He added that the final victory over the aggressor would require all services of the armed forces. The attention must be given to the development of all kinds of weapons. A future war would be waged in spite of enormous losses, by massive, multi-million armed forces.
Soviet doctrinal tenet was formed then for many years to come:
* The imperialists are preparing a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and other socialist countries. Soviet military doctrine considers the most important, the main and primary task of the armed forces to be in constant readiness for the reliable repulse of a surprise enemy attack and frustrate his criminal plans.
* All sectors of the society were also to be prepared to fight in the conditions of a prolonged nuclear war, since the imperialist are most likely to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR
Western View: this potential breakthrough of the soviet military doctrine was highly commented in the west and believed to be the result of the US actions during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.
However, the doctrinal decision to concentrate on the nuclear missile forces came years before the crisis. After years of research and development, production lines for missiles were stated in the 1950s.
The full impact of the new military doctrine upon warfare was in fact explained in the book 'Military Strategy' by V.D. Sokolovsky. The book was actually about:
* Nuclear war in general
* The type of military actions that would take place
* The forces required
* The command and control needed
* The necessity of preparing the armed forces, industry and the entire population for this eventuality
Sokolovsky explains that the book does not directly deal with military doctrine, but rather with its implementation: 'military strategy occupies a subordinate position in regard to military doctrine. The latter determined the overall policy in principle, while military strategy, starting from this overall policy, develops and investigates concrete problems upon the nature of future war, the preparation of the country for war, the organization of the armed forces and the methods of conducting the war.'
However, what is important is that there is not always a clear distinction between writings on military strategy and military doctrine. In certain cases military doctrine is called military science. What stand out in the evolution of the soviet doctrinal thinking is the repetition of the same concepts and ideas.
Overall, however, Sokolovsky outlines the features generally found in the military doctrine:
* Exclusion of inevitability of war, but not the exclusion of its possibility
* The struggle for peace of the entire socialist camp
* The unresolved economic and political contradictions of imperialism
* The class struggle throughout the world
* The aggressive course of the politics of world reaction - US monopolists
* The intensified preparation for war by imperialist countries
Therefore, the evolution of soviet doctrinal thinking was a process of immense complications where ideology and socialist principles, as well as cult personalities played a great role. The development of the industrial base, or its vital necessity produced the concerns with the nuclear, intercontinental war and vice versa. It is therefore, vital to consider the origins of soviet strategic and military thought in relation to state's connections with the opposing world and the ability of internal integration and industrial stimulation. Finally, the doctrine, or its principles were always subjective to the overall political and economic mood of the soviet state and the directions in which the society was shifting. Thus, one should be cautious in styling the evolution of the soviet military doctrine, as the concept itself is strongly blurred by the ideological dialectics of the socialist state.
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