Examine the Great Elector's Contribution to the Rise of Prussia.

      That was Frederick William’s rash intention. Instead of treading carefully along the uncertain path of recovery by ending the war first and then cracking down on the estates, the young Elector reversed that order and sought to subdue the Cleve-Mark estates immediately. By 1644 Norprath’s mustering of troops in the Rhineland was already causing great political upheaval. The Elector’s Rhenish possessions were not at all used to his – what they regarded as – ‘despotic’ measures and they certainly were not going to pay for troops that would fight the Duke’s conflicts in distant Brandenburg. Unfortunately for Frederick William the Cleve estates were powerfully backed by the Empire and the Dutch General Estates, whose garrisons in Cleve were ordered to prevent Hohenzollern attempts to establish authority “through the sword” “within the range of the[ir] cannon.” Frederick William’s early attempts to assert himself in Cleves-Mark and Jülich-Berg failed: His Cleves subjects were openly discussing a Republican future based on the English and Dutch example, and the Duke’s aggressive invasion of Berg in autumn 1646 gained Ravensberg only, besides a chorus of condemnation from the major powers who were set on finally bringing to an end thirty years of war.

      Even so it is remarkable that twenty years later in his political testament Frederick William regretted not having reverted to force earlier: “I always regret that at the beginning of my reign I let myself, to my very great disadvantage and against my will, be misled and follow contrary advice.” Undoubtedly, it was French benevolence towards Brandenburg-Prussia – part of Mazarin’s grand anti-Habsburg designs – rather than Frederick William’s ‘unexpected skill’ that carried home outstanding results for her Duke at the peace of Westphalia. Nevertheless, it perhaps was Frederick William’s aggressive stance and pigheadedness which exasperated the Imperial envoys into agreeing to offer splendid compensations for Brandenburg, and which convinced the French that it might well be worth having young protestant Frederick William on their side against Catholic Habsburg. In the end Brandenburg was, despite her wretched performance during the Thirty Years War, greatly overprized with the cession of East Pomerania, Minden, Halberstadt and the prospect of Magdeburg. Although Frederick William had failed to get hold of Pomerania as a whole, his compensation’s revenues alone by far exceeded those of West Pomerania.

      It seems that Brandenburg was nothing more but a fat prawn in France’s European power game. However the negotiations at Münster reveal that Frederick William was a shrewd diplomat, a talent that would come to the fore during the War of the North. Throughout his reign the founder of the Prussian state took care not to imitate his father’s mistake of overtly committing his resources to any of the major powers. This he did whilst heeding the advice of his councillors, especially during the initial years of his fragile government. Frederick William’s tutor Leuchtmar was convinced that “Only foreign help can bring recovery… . Besides the States General, I can only see France as the best candidate for Your Highness.” Nonetheless, although relations with France remained cordial, Frederick William refused to commit himself to an alliance. At the same time, lavish presents persuaded Swedish generals and diplomats to accept softer terms including the vital cession of east Pomerania. Thus from the beginning of his reign and even more so during the Wars of the North and the Dutch War, shrewd foreign policy on behalf of the Great Elector contributed to the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia.

      The treaty of Westphalia opened up a new front against the estates when Frederick William established himself as the leader of the Corpus Evangelicorum. With the support of the Hessians and the Swedes the 1555 Augsburg provisions were for the first time extended to include the Empire’s Calvinists. This settlement substantially advanced Hohenzollern rule in their protestant dominions. John Sigismund and George William had suffered badly at the hand of reluctant estates who were unwilling to tolerate the new confession, especially in Prussia. Also under Frederick William and previous to the Westphalian settlement Calvinism was strictly confined to the electoral court only. At his accession Frederick William was forced to abandon one of two Calvinist pastors at his Königsberg court, and in 1642 Wladyslaw IV of Poland had to intervene personally with the Königsberg estate to ensure that a Calvinist cleric could take his father’s burial service. All this was a ‘deep humiliation’ and can only be interpreted as a direct challenge to Frederick William’s authority. This is probably why – after having been hit by the gauntlet in the 1640s – Frederick William as a mature ruler prevented Königsberg and the Brandenburg towns from recovering their economic muscle following the wars of the 1640s and 1650s. He would rather see their economies dwindle than let their wealth challenge his political authority. Throughout his reign Brandenburg-Prussia was seen as one of Europe’s most tolerant countries. Her tolerant and immigrant-friendly policies attracted Protestant elites from all-over Europe, especially France, whose Huguenots contributed significantly to the rise of Prussia. They were so important in economic terms that Frederick William risked a contraction in relations with Louis XIV by defending the Edict of Potsdam in 1985.

      The wrestle for power with the estates occupied much of the Great Elector’s time and patience: More than once rebellious ‘evil’ estate deputies were denounced as ‘godless, frivolous and insolent’. Historians are but divided over the nature of estate power which so evidently thwarted Frederick William’s rule. Carsten emphasises the power of the nobility. In his view “At the beginning of the seventeenth century the ruler himself was nothing more than a primus inter pares… . There was nothing to indicate that Brandenburg or Prussia would ever play a major part in German or in European affairs.” The situation in 1640 was but not as desperate as Carsten makes out. Brandenburg-Prussia was a major German power: In terms of land mass only second to Habsburg Austria. The succession of weak and heavily indebted rulers had allowed the estates and the nobility to temporarily curtail Hohenzollern power in the 16th and during the first half of the 17th century. Essentially however, although paralyzed during much of the Thirty Years War, the fundamental powers of the Elector remained intact: Only the Elector could call for the general diet, and the constellations of committees and regional assemblies were influenced by the Elector. The Elector was the legitimate ruler of his possessions and he  remained the single largest landowner in his domains. The estates never achieved the means to legislate themselves. Thus crucially the Brandenburg electors kept the upper hand in constitutional terms, but were tied down financially. At most the nobility achieved the status of ‘partial dualism’. What was needed to break the deadlock between the ruler and the estates was the accession of a strong-minded Duke and a state of emergency that would impose sufficient pressure to force the estates to submit to a strong leader. The accession of the Great Elector in 1640 and the years of war in the 1640s and 1650s ultimately led to the absorption of the Brandenburg-Prussian estates by Frederick William’s state machinery during the last twenty years of his reign.

      The turning point in Frederick William’s relations with the Brandenburg (indeed all his) estates came during the War of the North. Frustrated by the selfishness of the estates who refused to contribute to the war effort the Elector announced to his privy council in 1657 that he had the right to enforce taxations without the consent of the estates if the latter failed to defend the country seriously. From 1655 until May 1657 – in addition to the 1653 instalments that had been granted to Frederick William in return for the latter having confirmed estate privileges – 517,766 thalers were levied. That amounted to a harsh sum of 717,766 thalers being collected in just two years, not accounting for taxes levied in kind. Brandenburg was completely devastated after 1660, its population had deserted what really were ghost-towns. The tax burden lightened but the contributions were maintained and Frederick William did not dissolve his army. Now the Elector had the means to enforce his authority and impose a unitary taxation program.

      It is interesting to note that the 1640s had witnessed a far more idealised and sensible Frederick William. Impressed by the workings of the General Estates the young duke sought to cooperate with rather than confront the estates which had been suppressed by the Schwartzenberg regime in the 1630s. Frederick William but soon lost faith in the estates especially following the fruitless outcomes of the 1651 stamp duty negotiations and the 1652 general diet which led to the famous ‘Magna Carta of Absolutism’ – “Concessions which not only confirmed the social privileges of the nobility but also the political power of the estates.” However, it is a telling story that the general diet of 1653 – the first for thirty-seven years – also remained the last of its kind. Although the privileges of the estates formally remained in place, the needs of the state came first.

      This became apparent in the aftermath of the War of the North. The estates’ most powerful weapon, the managing of electoral finances, turned into its greatest liability. Exceptional wartime contributions transformed into a quasi-permanent preliminary taxation system, which was complemented in 1667 by the introduction of the excise tax. The tax proved rather unsuccessful. The application of the excise was not obligatory and the immunity of the nobility corrupted the system. However, the introduction of the excise provided the electoral administration with an opportunity to breech the self-rule of the towns and dismantle the autonomy of the estates. The introduction of the first Berlin excise director in 1677 inaugurated a process of electoral intrusion that ultimately subdued the towns “to a new body of officials [Steuerräte & Local Commissioners]  who were their ‘all powerful guardians’, the most typical representatives of the police state interfering with everything.” Certainly after the Dutch War, the Great Elector had emerged into such a strong position that he could expand and enforce the excise unopposed in 1680 and 1682.

      Frederick William’s tax reforms proved to be financially successful as well. His reign witnessed a possible trebling of total electoral revenues. This was largely the work of two competent Hofkammerpräsidenten. The first Raban von Canstein was thoroughly efficient and by the time he retired in 1674 had achieved a fivefold increase in Frederick Williams’s Brandenburg domain returns. The financial innovations of Dodo von Knyphausen were far-reaching, contributed to Prussia’s ‘financial rise’ well after the Great Elector’s death and are even attributed with having established the principles of the administration of King Frederick William I. The development of the excise was accompanied by the introduction of the Generalkriegskommissariat – another invention of Frederick William’s rule that specialised in collecting the contribution tax. Its authority covered all electoral dominions and GKK officials were knows to be especially ruthless and efficient enforcers of electoral wishes. The whims of the estates in 1683 prove that the workings of the GKK were far less lenient than the conciliatory Privy Council. Special tribute must be paid to the Great Elector for having transformed the contribution tax throughout his territories into a source of income sufficiently large to support a standing army. Certainly in his own eyes, a standing army was a ruler’s most valuable asset: “Alliances to be sure are valuable but armies are better.”

      It was the army of course that earned Frederick William the sovereignty of Prussia. In July 1656 the Brandenburg army took important part in the three day Battle of Warsaw on the sides of the Swedes who rewarded their ally in November 1656 by recognising Frederick William as the sovereign lord over Prussia. The Poles were forced to follow suit a year later when they conceded sovereignty at Wehlau. In 1640 Brandenburg was “…holding on to Prussia like [holding on to] an eel’s tail.” In 1660 the peace of Oliva confirmed Hohenzollern sovereignty – an essential prerequisite for the rise of the kingdom of Prussia.

      Force of arms also enabled electoral wishes to be enforced in the Rhineland. During the six years of war in the 1650s some 1.5 million thalers were wrestled from Cleves-Mark. Resistance was tough because the Cleve estates had powerful patrons such as the Dutch Republic and the Empire. Frederick William was lucky: The Dutch and the Habsburgs failed to intervene because both parties wanted Brandenburg-Prussia to resist the invading Swedes. Frederick William took his chances. In Prussia and the Rhineland, he decided on shows of strength by disabling the heads of opposition. In the Rhineland, following the May 1654 Reichsabschied, Willich zu Winnenthal was arrested and carted of to Berlin. Opposition quickly quietened down. In Prussia the estates and the nobility, who were openly flirting with the Polish, were discouraged to rebel by the arrest of the alderman Roth of Königsberg in 1662 and the execution of von Kalckstein in 1671.

      This essay inevitably concentrates on the first half of the Great Elector’s reign because this era undoubtedly witnessed his greatest achievements. Once the inexperienced Frederick William had taken the hurdles of war during the 1640s and 1650s, the consolidation and expansion of his rule from 1660 onwards was inevitable. The War of the North in particular was a “turning point in the relations between the elector and the estates in all his territories.” It provided the Elector with the opportunity to foster his rule not only in Brandenburg proper but also in his difficult Prussian and Rhenish territories. Brandenburg-Prussia ultimately benefited from the wars that the Great Elector fought, because they created unity. Experiences such as the glorious victory at Fehrbellin produced an image of a rising Prussia and a Great Elector: “Celui-ci a fait de grandes choses” – the man who averted the threat of republicanism in Cleves-Mark, who earned Hohenzollern sovereignty over Prussia and who incorporated the estates into a modern absolutist Prussian state.

Bibliography:

Büsch, Otto; Neugebauer, Wolfgang: Moderne Preußische Geschichte, 1648-1947. Band 2. Walter de Gruyter &  

    Co. Berlin, New York, 1981.

Carsten, FL: The Origins of Prussia. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1954.

Dietrich, Richard: Preußen – Epochen und Probleme seiner Geschichte. Walter de Gruyter & Co. Berlin, 1964.

Marriott, JAR; Robertson CG: The Evolution of Prussia. Oxford University Press. London, New York, 1946.

McKay, Derek: The Great Elector. Pearson Education Ltd. London, 2001.

Vierhaus, Rudolf: Staaten und Stände. Vom Westfälischen bis zum Hubertusburger Frieden, 1648 bis 1763. 

    Propyläen Verlag. Berlin, 1990.

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