Explain and critically examine Britain(TM)s policy of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War

Although in reality either outcome was likely to be undesirable for British interests and pride as ‘an extreme right victory is likely to be embarrassing in respect of foreign policy and interests, while an extreme left victory might be equally embarrassing, though in a different way, to any country which desires the maintenance of ordinary democratic government in those countries in which it still survives.’ But for the Conservatives within the national government it was clear that Franco’s rebels could potentially crush the potentially awkwardly radical Popular Front.  Prior to the coup that led to the outbreak of war the conservatives had decided where their sympathies ought to lie.

With the two dominant ideological forces in Europe emerging in states broken by the war being those of communism and fascism the lack of political strength of the Popular front government led to fears that Spain could enter a so-called ‘Kerensky-phase’. The weakness of the Republic could precede communist power-sharing throwing Spain into a pre-revolutionary political climate.  When the coup began on July 17 it had been reported by the British embassy that no stable government existed and that ‘there were militant forces in operation on the one hand, opposed by a virtual Soviet on the other.’  So from an early stage the Republic was perceived to have become practically communistic and the cabinet adopted a policy of tacit neutrality hoping to avoid providing aid to the Republican force believing that despite their status as a legitimate government were concealing revolutionary tendencies. Whether or not such tendencies would ever have been realized is debatable but what seems clear at this stage is that motivation for British neutrality was largely based on ideological rather than legal or humanitarian concerns. This perception of Spain was fuelled by the fact that the British Foreign Office had made little effort to communicate with France; there had been little discourse with the Popular Front Government. This lack of communication seemed to bury the fact that at the outbreak of war no member of the Popular front government was a communist but the British still regarded them as being tainted by this ideology.

On July 26 Baldwin issued a clear political directive to Eden that ‘on no account, French or other, must he bring us in to fight on the side of the Russians’ also stating that he hoped it would be possible to prevent the Republican government buying from Britain, though he publicly supported their right to do so. He did so on the basis that it was ‘quite clear that the alternative to France [was] communism tempered by anarchy.’ As part of a government and political system where the strength of Labour and the Trade Unions was beginning to show Baldwin thought it necessary to impose rigid restrictions on policy, particular foreign policy that would be politically divisive. The preservation of a socio-political consensus on home soil was important and given the clamoring from the left regarding appeasement and tacit recognition of the fascist rebels Baldwin and Eden had to be seen to hold the line with regard to Britain’s policy of non-intervention.

With Spain perceived to be in the formative stages of revolution, appeasement of Italy was considered more important than ever. This issue was to arise later in the conflict when Italy was seen to break the agreed arms embargo. Good relations with Italy were key in order that it might avoid Rome forming an alliance with Japana and Nazi Germany. This would have been disastrous as it laid down the possibility of a war of three fronts, for which Britain was ill prepared. Also, Britain, still keen to promote economic recovery from the war and political stability in mainland Britain but also the empire, could not meet to demands of an arms race that might arise these factors can go some way to explaining the maintenance of the policy of non-intervention in the face of Italian support for Franco.

It is often said that Britain’s non-intervention was projected onto the rest of Europe for fear that France would ally with the republicans thus strengthening the forces of communism and precipitating a war between the two competing ideological forces in Europe. According to this interpretation at an international conference on 2 July France were coerced into halting their plans to aid the Madrid government. However, though they suspended the export of arms to Spain they failed to take this policy to its logical conclusion of halting the export of civil aircraft, easily convertible for military use. So in this case it is debatable whether the French were making a concession to the British or merely a token gesture. On 1 August the French government officially endorsed the policy of non-intervention, which was perceived by some as a further British victory. However, France suspended this policy on the realisation that the Italians were supplying arms to the rebels, thus on 2 August the French Foreign Military issued this statement ‘the fact that munitions of war are now being sent from abroad to the insurgents compels the French government to reserve their liberty of Judgement in application of their decisions [not to supply arms].’

Though on August 7, it appears that Britain intervened and seems they won another victory for non-intervention. It appears that as a result of British intervention the French cabinet approved an immediate and unilateral ban on the export to Spain of civil as well as military aircraft. It was said that the French, having agreed to aid the Spanish Republic had pressure exerted upon them by Britain. It was said that M. Corbin, French ambassador in London, called Blum and emphasised that the British were extremely agitated over Air Minister Cot’s decision. It is recorded that the British ambassador Sir. George Clerk had presented the French with an ultimatum and stated that should France choose to continue to provide military aid to Spain and war with Germany ensued ‘Britain would hold herself absolved from her obligation to aid France under the Treaty of Locarno.’ Certainly the Spanish Prime Minister believed Britain had involvement in France’s non-intervention in the belief that Britain equated ‘the Republican emblem with the Hammer and Sickle.’ This belief that Britain was so fervent in their policy of non-intervention for ideological reasons is one still quite commonly held.

British and French figures at the time both assert that France were under no pressure from Britain. This is unsurprising given that the admission would show both parties in a bad light. What is somewhat more convincing is that they have maintained the position since. Eden persisted that he had never exerted any pressure on the French stating ‘[when asked if it were true] I denied this statement, adding that I should have been glad to be able to say that non-intervention was my proposal, as I considered it the best which could have been devised in the circumstances.’ Quite how much credence can be given to political memoirs is debatable.

Although French figures deny the more extreme version of events that claim France were intimidated into non-intervention there are those that admitted to indirect pressure from Britain. Leading figures including Cot noted that the British cabinet had made it abundantly clear that they disapproved of French attempts to prop up the Spanish Republic. There were suggestions that if France could not adopt a policy of neutrality then the British may have been compelled to aid Franco, a policy that would compromise collective security. ‘That was what Blum had been given o understand when he had gone to London on 22 July and it had been repeated still more frankly in naval and military circles…rightly or wrongly, it looked as if non-intervention policy would be the only way of preventing England from aiding Franco’ But such statements make no specific mention of threats concerning Locarno, which is really the most serious charge against the British in their pursuit of non-intervention.

Several years on even Blum said that ‘it would be exaggerated to speak of overt opposition. But counsels of prudence were dispensed and sharp fears expressed’ It is reasonable to wonder whether terms such as ‘counsels of prudence’ are in-fact diplomatic euphemisms to suggest that some pressure was exerted. Others suggest that the exaggeration of British pressure on France was the work of British left-wingers, riled at British appeasement of Fascism. More convincingly the rumours could well have their origins in the more radical members of the French cabinet and wider French Popular Front, with much the same motivation. Either way it seems that there certainly was some kind of international dimension to Britain’s policy of non-intervention but there seems to be no records that suggest the Locarno Treaty was actually being laid on the line. Though, as is evident in all modern politics it may be that this was tacitly threatened.

Britain’s motives for maintaining a multi-lateral policy of non-intervention were certainly deceptive. Though they publicly pronounced that it was simply not Britain’s place to participate in a war on foreign soil it seems that multi-lateral non-intervention was an attempt to carry out Churchill’s policy which stated that ‘it [is] most important to make Blum stay with us strictly neutral, even if Germany and Italy continue to back the rebels and Russia sends money to the government’ The desire for French support was key at every stage from tacit neutrality to the signing of the Non-intervention pact. Unfortunately this policy was pursued on the assumption that the war would be brief and the French more docile than they were. The assumption that war would be short-lived would also mean there would be little time for public opinion to form and opposition to gather, unfortunately for Baldwin and Eden this assumption was incorrect.

At the point of transition from coup to civil war in November 1936 Britain found itself in a position where it’s interests coincided with Franco’s. As long as Britain maintained its relations with France, to the extent that they would under no circumstances intervene, regardless of the actions of Italy and Germany this was satisfactory.  It was a concern that a fascist Spain might ally with the other fascist powers in return for the military aid. However, Britain had been assured that this would not be the case and as much as Italy and France might be compensated for their aid, Britain might be compensated for her neutrality. It was also true that the Army led the insurgency and would be receptive to bribery should diplomatic interests clash in the future.  It is perhaps unsurprising that Britain’s policy was regarded as rather mercenary and as such bred contempt on the left and led to workers solidarity movement with the republicans. The International Brigades seemed to have contempt for the moral cowardice of their governments and in the long-term appeared to be proved right in their hard-line position against fascism and contempt for appeasement.

Though Britain never explicitly broke their neutrality it became clear they considered a Franco victory to be preferable. Measures were taken that support this claim, though they were subtle enough to maintain the image of an impartial state. Examples include the refusal to transfer the British ambassador to Madrid at the request of the Republic, rather he was transferred to a border town in order to keep reasonable communication with Franco without the pressure to legally recognise the insurgents. This was supplemented by several cases of obstructing the free-flow of funds to the Republicans. This contributed to the change in the political climate that took place in October. As the Labour Party condemned the abysmal failure of the Non-intervention Pact to prevent aid to Franco they began to call for the right of the Republic to buy British arms to be re-instated.

At this point the assumption that the war would be brief had been proven false and German and Italian involvement had reached a level that had become impossible to ignore.  Given the action of other fascist powers and the surprising resilience of the Republicans in Madrid it had become politically inexpedient to recognise the Franco government.  By January of 1937 the folly of appeasing two expansionist and anti-British states was finally being recognised by Eden who began to realise that if it were not possible to prevent German intervention in Spain then it would be equally impossible to stop it in other areas, which might precipitate more problems. However, it appeared that the cabinet still perceived good relations with Italy as preferable to intervention until on January 9 whole Italian divisions were sent to Spain. At this point an attempt was made at fully implementing the Non-intervention pact, with the inclusion of Italy and Germany. This was not in-fact a change in policy so much as consolidation of multilateral non-intervention. It did not challenge the degree of Italio-German intervention, merely preventing its escalation, perhaps rather too late.

The upshot of this decision was that Britain wished to ally with the victorious party in the hope of securing support in the face of any future hostilities. Policy in Spain was always considered secondary to German and Italian appeasement, which was to prove a mistake in the long run. Fears regarding the communist tendencies of the Spanish Republic were both overstated and possibly less serious than the threat of fascism. These fears were obviously severe enough to hold the British to a policy of Non-intervention regardless of fascist violation of the pact. British policy during the Spanish civil war set a very dangerous precedent regarding the policy of appeasement throughout Europe. The policy was deemed to keep good diplomatic relations with key states such as Italy and keep stable socio-economic consensus within Europe. In reality the policy at best delayed tension in Europe and at worst began a dangerous pattern of tolerance of fascism that ultimately led to further hostilities. It has never seemed unreasonable that Europe should have allowed the Republic to buy arms and this would have been the case if the two belligerents had been regarded with genuine parity, as a Spanish delegate at a Labour National Executive Conference said ‘We [the Republicans] are fighting with sticks and knives against tanks and aircraft and guns, and it revolts the conscience of the world that that should be true. We must have arms. Help us to buy them somewhere in the world... Is it too much to ask that in this fight against the Fascisms of the world.? In retrospect most agree that this was not too much to ask.

Bibliography

1. P. Preston (Ed.), The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain 1936-1939, Edinburgh University Press, 1996.
2. Moradiellos, British Political Stratergy in the face of the Military Rising in Spain, Contemporary European History, Volume 4.
3. J. Colton, Leon Blum, Humanist in Politics, New York 1966
4. Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators
5. M. Cot, Triumph of Treason
6. L.R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez, Cambridge, 1975

7. J. Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, Macmillan 1979.
8. K. Watkins, Britain Divided. The Effects of the Spanish Civil War on British Political Opinion, London: Thomas Nelson, 1963. 

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