`Van Evera is quite black and white when categorizing the belligerents - the Central Powers suffered from windows of vulnerability and thus fought preventive wars whilst the Entente powers perceived mainly windows of opportunity and so were aggressive.
`I find this argument ultimately fails - Van Evera bases his view of the Entente powers solely on the fact France and Russia mobilized first which actually contradicts his earlier argument and his own definition! His definition itself, as I stated earlier is limited as his thematic view blinds him to the domestic/internal situation of the belligerent countries. The concept as whole though is useful but it needs to be backed up.
`Mayer's thematic approach is both stimulating and controversial. Mayer argues that far from declining or facing extinction the anciens régimes of Europe (the preindustrial and prebourgeois elites) had simply adapted to the growth of capitalism and industrialization and had consolidated its political, economic and social power. Thus for Mayer, "...The Great War of 1914...was an outgrowth of the latterday remobilization of Europe' anciens régimes." I don't believe that Mayer is saying that the belligerent elites deliberately started the war but they were content to let the July crisis escalate into a full-scale war, simply to preserve their own power, and as a thematic approach Mayer is at pains to include "liberal" Britain and France. As with Van Evera, Mayer cites the belief that offensive war would ultimately triumph, as a powerful influence on the thinking of the elites. Unlike Van Evera, Mayer shows the relationship (perhaps too briefly) between the international and internal scene thus war is provoked to prevent the end of the anciens régimes (so again we have preventive war).
`This is obviously very controversial and whether you accept the argument or not pivots on whether you accept Mayer's definition of 1914 Europe as economically "preindustrial and prebourgeois" and politically "feudal and nobilitarian". (Unfortunately I don't have the space to give Mayer's arguments here.) For me Mayer's argument works better when referring to the autocratic countries, (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia) where political and economic power can be sen to be concentrated in the hands of the few, than when it refers to Britain and France . To be frank, Mayer's argument smacks of conspiracy theory, where all the elites somehow conspired together to save their own skins. Mayer also tends to paint a picture of the elites in cool calculation when it seems to me from my reading of the events that most of the time nobody really had much idea of what they were doing or indeed of who was actually making the crucial decisions. I like this argument though, as it is a refreshing alternative to the general view that events just slipped out of control (a view similar to the fatalistic attitude adopted by Bethmann-Hollweg).
`Mayer (in a separate article) offers us another thematic viewpoint, namely that the 1914 war was not a preventive international war but a preventive domestic affair (a theme incorporated by other historians).
`In his article although Mayer does give specific examples of domestic problems, he makes a general observation that all the major powers faced a growing left/right wing polarization which affected the stability of the centre and its political institutions. The powers believed that war if successful could restore order and stability (Mayer contrasts the military success and failure of Germany and Russia and the effects it had upon their social structure). Joll gives a good counter-argument to this theory, which I agree with. With the exception of Austria-Hungary, where most commentators agree that foreign and domestic policy were one and the same, there is little evidence that domestic policies were the major factor Mayer portrays them to be. This is not to say that domestic concerns and tensions played no part at all but rather that it was just one piece of a complex puzzle.
`A survey of the individual countries involved may expound the general themes already discussed and enable us to say for each country whether or not it was fighting a preventive war or not.
`One or two general points can be made to begin with, which follow on from the previous discussion. The cult of the offensive flourished because it seemed in 1914 that war of one kind or another was inevitable. I use the word "war" in a broad sense because the First World War was actually a combination of two 1914 Wars that were already being fought - the Austro-Serbian War and the continental European war between France, Germany and Russia. The question of escalation is very interesting in discussing preventive war. Did Austrian preventive war mean Serbia exclusively (as it appears that Austria perceived Serbian nationalism as the major threat to its existence) or did it include fighting Russia? Did German preventive war mean fighting Russia exclusively (I hesitate to use the word, but German paranoia about the threat of Russia and the extinction of Germany by the Slavs dominated German foreign policy) or did it plan for British intervention? Did the belligerents' idea of preventive war turn out the same in reality?
`Another point to make is connected to the question itself, in that it assumes that all the major belligerents were free to enter the war or remain neutral - were they? When looking at reasons for France and especially Britain declaring war, it is difficult to suggest that they were in a position to choose. Of course there were material reasons - France's desire to neutralize Germany and regain Alsace-Lorraine, Britain's desire to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Given Van Evera's definition of preventive war I appear to have just contradicted myself, but the point I am making is about choice, not the war that Britain eventually fought. I appear to contradict myself again as I am suggesting that Germany and Austria-Hungary had a choice not to fight their versions of preventive war. I do believe that they had a choice not to fight but obviously I'm arguing in hindsight. (Ironically, Britain actually fought two preventive wars - one to maintain the European balance of power and the other to prevent Russian interference in Persia and the Middle East.)
`It might be said that preventive war is an action to which the enemy provides a reaction, i.e. Austria-Hungary and Germany acted by launching preventive wars to which the Entente reacted. The problem with this is that I appear to be following Van Evera in stating that only the Central Powers fought preventive wars . Am I arguing this?
`Firstly I am arguing that the Central Powers did fight preventive wars. Austria-Hungary was fighting against the tide of Balkan history, nationalism and expansionism, which is why it initiated the Balkan war that followed. Quite what Germany was fighting against is less easily defined - in the 1912 War Council and subsequently, the phrase preventive war was used a lot but not always in the same context. Russia always came up but so did France and occasionally Britain. This paranoia I should stress was not unique to Germany (although it was most wide-spread there) and so it can be argued that the Entente countries, suffering from this belief that every other country was hostile to them, believed they too were fighting preventive wars.
`"War resulted from both side's preference to fight rather than back down."
`I think this statement best sums up the attitudes of the belligerent powers. The problems faced by the belligerent powers, nationalism, imperial conflicts, increasing international and domestic tensions, mutual suspicion and arms races - all of these could have solved, all the crises prevented, by non-military means. The idea that these problems could be solved or curtailed by a brief glorious would suggest that Mayer has a point, since non-military solutions would have involved the elites of society relinquishing most of their power.solution. As it turned out the objective of preventive war failed - the empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia collapsed, Germany failed to expand and even the victorious Entente countries failed to maintain peace or equilibrium in Europe. Had the powers involved known this, I feel they would have made more effort to prevent war altogether.
`
`Bibliography
C.Emsley, War, Peace and Social Change in Twentieth Century Europe.
`(O.U.P., Milton Keynes, 1989.)
J.Joll, The Origins of the first World War.
`(Longman Group Limited, England, 1984.)
L.Krieger (Ed), The Responsibility of Power.
`(Macmillan and Co.Ltd., London, 1968.)
S.Miller, Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War.
`(Princeton University Press, U.K., 1985.)
D.Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics.
`(Oxford University Press, England, 1988.)