Probably, as Kennedy himself pointed out in the 1960 presidential election, that had the executive chosen to embrace Castro during that first visit, he would not have been a problem during 1961. As former Ambassador to Cuba Bonsai said:
2. Freeman, S.R, (1983) the united states and the Latin American sphere of influence, Kreige Pub co, Paperback. P.54.
3. Langley. L.D, (1985). The united states and the Caribbean in the 20th Century, University of Georgia, hardcover, P.216
“We did not force Castro into the arms of the Communists, but we were...unwisely cooperative in removing the obstacles to his chosen path” (4). The Eisenhower administration made a number of mistakes which benefited Castro. Castro knew of Eisenhower's planned invasion with Cuban exiles, and so was forced to take measures to protect himself. He was also, unconcerned by the claims of American businessmen for compensation for property which he had nationalized. There was no compensation for their loss in Cuban courts. When Eisenhower cut the amount of sugar that America would purchase from Cuba, he little realized that he was persuading Castro to walk up the very path to Communism that the American government had been trying to prevent. Sugar was the main product of the Cuban economy, and the island’s special relationship with America had always held on that product. Now Castro was forced to go elsewhere to find a market in the USSR. The Eisenhower administration made many flaws, still enjoying in the victory of Guatemala in 1954. I would say truly that No one in the executive realized that they were leading Cuba in the opposite direction.
Kennedy was right to be critical of the administration in his famous debates with Nixon during the 1960 presidential campaign. Both candidates competed to create the toughest stance on Cuba. Kennedy attacked the administration for either being too harsh or too weak in dealing with Castro. Nixon, of course knew all about the invasion plans, but could not reveal them. As Langley wrote “In view of the disaster that ensued, such revelations…might well have saved Kennedy and the nation from the ignominy of the Bay of Pigs” (5). They would not have been revelations to Castro anyway.
4. Blasier. C, (1976) the hovering giant: US responses to revolutionary change in Latin America, University of Pittsburgh, Paperback, P.208.
5. Langley. L.D, (1985). The united states and the Caribbean in the 20th Century, University of Georgia, hardcover, P. 218
However, Castro did not expect Kennedy to continue with the invasion as Langley said “on the day Kennedy took office Castro called a halt to the mobilization” (6). If he did so, then he was misguiding himself. Castro surely would have heard of Kennedy’s leading criticism of Eisenhower, that he had allowed the Iron Curtain, because as Welch argued “to advance almost to our front yard” (7).
By late aware, it is possible to say that as Blasier wrote “Kennedy felt forced to make the decision before he was fully acquainted with his major advisers and firmly established in office” (8). The more argument which always declared was that time was on Castro’s side. The more the invasion was delayed, the more time Fidel had to build up an arsenal supplied by the Soviets. Cuban exiles in Miami and the Guatemalan training camps were getting restless, and the rainy season in Cuba, etc. Smith notes that as late as the 1st of April, Kennedy was still making changes to the plan. In that day the decision was the one which changed the location of the invasion, the Bay of Pigs was finally decided upon. The plan had undergone so many changes, especially under the guidance of the CIA, that its original concept was hardly recognizable. It had become a World War II amphibious operation. One and half thousand Cuban exiles were supposed to rout a well equipped army of two hundred thousand. Even allowing for the desired mass desertion from Castro’s ranks, the whole plan was doomed from many opinions.
Richard Bissell, head of CIA, was the ‘mastermind’ of the operation. It is true to say that the CIA made a number of total errors. One of the most important was selecting Frank Bender to supervise the plan in Miami. Bender did not know anything of Cuban history or Latin America. He conducted a vendetta against any Cuban who criticized him, especially Manuel Ray. Ray was one of the most
6. Langley. L.D, (1985). The united states and the Caribbean in the 20th Century, University of Georgia, hardcover, P. 221
7. Welch,R.E, (1985) Response to Revolution: United States and the Cuban Revolution, University of North Carolina: Paperback. P.65
8. Blasier. C, (1976) the hovering giant: US responses to revolutionary change in Latin America, University of Pittsburgh, Paperback, P.201.
prominent of the anti Castro Cuban exiles, one who genuinely believed in a free, democratic Cuba. Yet, because he was one of the few sensible people to criticize the plan, the CIA did its best to dismantle the MRP, his revolutionary organization. Besides, the CIA was not designed to conduct large scale invasions, and it was foolish of them to believe that they could.
There were too many errors in the actual operation. The fact is Kennedy and his advisers should have realized that the plan was risible. The only person to really speak was Senator J.William Fulbright. Objections were raised by people such as Abram Chayes and Arthur Schlesinger, but they did not really push their point across. One of the most crucial decisions was supposedly Kennedy’s cancellation of the second air strike against Castro’s air force. The first attack had not worked because the rebels had been using dilapidated B-26. The logic if the planes were disguised, then nobody would know of U.S. involvement. This is the reason why Kennedy did not support the invasion with more American firepower, when the exiles mistakenly believed he would. Yet it was painfully obvious that America was involved. One consequence was that the credibility of Adlai Stevenson in New York was destroyed when he related the cover story to the United Nations. America’s involvement was discovered; perhaps Kennedy should have gone all the way. He was certainly advised to by some of the military. As Welch wrote, “Kennedy did not make his decision in a vacuum but rather in an organizational context which made inevitable his approval” (9).
The Bay of Pigs only served to prove Castro’s strength. Langley notes that “the real battle was for the loyalty of the Cuban people. This battle Castro won” (10). It helped Castro’s assertion that he needed Soviet aid, something which led to the Missile Crisis. Kennedy was entirely responsible for the operation, but it is
9. Welch,R.E, (1985) Response to Revolution: United States and the Cuban Revolution, University of North Carolina: Paperback. P.72.
10. Langley. L.D, (1985). The united states and the Caribbean in the 20th Century, University of Georgia, hardcover, P.225.
doubt that any other president would have acted differently. Castro was determined that Cuba be no longer dependent on America. Perhaps such humiliation was necessary. It was a far more cautious and aware Kennedy who took the initiative against the Cuban Missiles. Not only was the failure perfect, but it was critical, if it affected the behaviour of a president responsible for defusing an atomic incident.
The failure of the invasion seriously embarrassed the Kennedy administration, which was blamed by some for not giving it enough air support and by others for allowing it to take place at all. The success of Castro's forces secured the Cuban regime and pushed it closer to the Soviet Union, leading to the Cuban Missiles Crisis in the following year. An internal CIA secret audit of the operation blamed the failure on a series of mistakes made by the agency in the planning and execution of the invasion. Prepared by CIA Inspector Lyman Kirkpatrick, the audit was kept secret for 36 years before being released to the public in 1998.
Secondly, I'll discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, which was a huge confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold war that occurred in 1962 over the issue of Soviet supplied missile installations in Cuba. The crisis began when the United States discovered that Cuba had secretly installed Soviet missiles able to carry nuclear weapons. These missiles were able of hitting targets across most of the United States. The discovery led to a tense stand off over several days as the United States imposed a naval blockade of Cuba and asked the USSR to remove the missiles. The United States chose many different categories of action besides the blockade. Invasion was one of them which allow them not only to “remove the missiles, but also to rid itself of Castro”. (11)
11. Allison, G.T. (1971) Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis, Boston: Little Brown, P.59.
I’ll analyze the actions that were put to solve the crisis and how Kennedy’s chose the right decision to the situation. Kennedy quickly assembled a small circle of advisers, including both national security officials and others whose judgment Kennedy valued. The Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara outlined three possible courses of action for the president of US Kennedy to resolve the crisis which were: firstly, “the political course of action” to resolve the crisis diplomatically, an option that McNamara and others considered unlikely to succeed, secondly, “a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance” coupled with “a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba”, thirdly and finally, “military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles.”(12) On 16th of October, the first day of the crisis, Kennedy and many of his advisers agreed that a surprise air attack against Cuba followed by a blockade would be the only effective response to the threat posed by the Soviet missiles.
President Kennedy chose to take the blockade option. Choosing to call it a “quarantine”(13), all ships attempting to enter Cuba were stopped and searched by the American military. If the ships carried any weaponry, they were not allowed to pass. Negotiations were opened with the Soviets with the threat that if they did not proceed smoothly, air strikes would begin to take out the missiles. Initially, the Soviet asked that the United States remove nuclear missile installations that had been placed in Turkey in the 1950s. After several stress days of negotiation the Soviets officially agreed to separate the missiles under the watch of U.N weapons inspectors, while asking only that the United States agreed to never again invade Cuba. In addition the U.S. had also agreed to pull their Jupiter missiles out of Turkey, but one of the provisions of this decision was that it was never to be broadcast. So, the missiles were disconnected in April 1963.
12. Foreign Relations of the United States, (1996), Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department of State). vol1,XI.
13. Ernest. R, May& Philip .D. Zelikow, (1997), the Kennedy tapes: inside the white house during the Cuban missile crisis. Cambridge, Mass, London: Belknap Press. P.170
Graham T. Allison stated in his book (essence of decision), that Secretary McNamara mentioned some advantage points to the blockade route which are: “firstly, it would cause the least trouble with allies. Secondly, it avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba. Thirdly, which is contrary to their tradition, it is the only military course of action compatible with their position as a leader of the free world, it avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a response from the USSR which could result in escalating actions leading to general war”.(14) These advantages helped Kennedy to choose the blockade solution as the best one to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The President outlined that during a blockade, more missiles would become operational, and the complete of sites and launching pads, the threat would increase. He asked General Taylor how many missiles they could destroy by air action on Monday. General Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor an air strike on Tuesday when United States forces could be in a state of readiness. He said he did not share Secretary McNamara's fear that if they used nuclear weapons in Cuba, nuclear weapons would be used against them, and would be the failure. But Finally, President Kennedy made the right decision. When faced with real evidence of weapons of mass destruction, the American President didn't choose a military solution that would have caused the deaths of thousands of people and put the U.S. in a difficult occupation of another country, but instead ended the situation peacefully.
14. Allison, G.T. (1971) Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis, Boston: Little Brown, P.61.
To sum up this essay I would say truly that the understanding of the Cuban missile crisis as a total failure for the Soviet Union and a total success for the United States is, I think, incorrect. However, the crisis was not a clear victory for Soviet. The fact that the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba makes this clear. The successes the Soviet Union did have came about in ways that were not expected. The outcome of the crisis was a success for Kennedy and the Soviet Union. However, for Khrushchev himself it was almost certainly a failure. At the end we conclude that the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion was caused by misinformation and mismanagement, however, the Cuban Missile crisis resolved by Kennedy successfully which means that Kennedy had learned many things from the failure of Bay of Pigs. The Cuban missile crisis was a very dangerous episode, bringing the world’s major military powers to the brink of nuclear war. Kennedy has been criticized for such policies as the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, which helped cement the Soviet Cuban relationship and led Khrushchev to think Kennedy, might be bullied. Yet most historians agree that it was Kennedy’s good judgment. The lessons from the Bay of Pigs failure may have contributed to the successful handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis that followed.
Bibiolography:
* Allison, G.T, Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis, Boston: Little Brown, 1971.
* Ernest. R, May& Philip .D. Zelikow, the Kennedy tapes: inside the white house during the Cuban missile crisis. Cambridge, Mass, London: Belknap Press, 1997.
* Welch,R.E, Response to Revolution: United States and the Cuban Revolution, University of North Carolina: Paperback, 1985.
* Langley. L.D, The United states and the Caribbean in the 20th Century, University of Georgia, hardcover, 1985.
* Freeman, S.R, the United States and the Latin American sphere of influence, Krieger Pub co, Paperback, 1983.
* Langley, L.D. The united states and the Caribbean in the 20th Century, University of Georgia, hardcover, 1985.
* Blasier. C, the hovering giant: US responses to revolutionary change in Latin America, University of Pittsburgh, Paperback, 1976.
* Garthoff, R.L, Reflections on the Cuban missile crisis, Washington, D.C: Brooking institution, 1989.
* Fursenko, A. “ one hell of a gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis, 1958-1964, London: John Murray, 1997.
* Chayes. A, the Cuban missile crisis, Paperback, Oxford press, 1974.
* Foreign Relations of the United States, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Washington, D.C. : U.S. Department of State, 1996.