How did Swedish and French diplomatic relations affect the Thirty-Years War?

The French under Ludwig XIII and cardinal Richelieu had always been struggling against the Habsburg dynasty and its attempts to spread its influence over Europe. Until 1629 though, they had been engaged in internal unrest, fighting the protestant Huguenots, but this was now over (France ended up being catholic) and they could continue their fight with the Habsburg Empire again. The reason for this hostility was, just like in Sweden, the fear of being surrounded by and eventually consumed into the Habsburg Empire. The Swedish plan on sending an army to Germany was therefore of outmost interest to the French. In 1629 Richelieu sent his top diplomat, Charnacé, to Sweden to propose an alliance and to encourage the Swedish to get involved in the German war in exchange for subsidies. Diplomacy was at first slow but an agreement became increasingly reachable.

3. Discussion and analysis

It is interesting that Richelieu, and the Swedish too, in their cooperation and actions, disregarded that France was catholic and Sweden was protestant. The war itself had started and was still, even though not as much, driven by religious disagreements. But in the case of Sweden and France their fear of being consumed into the Habsburg Empire had grown stronger than ever and it was now considered more important than any religious matter. Religion got a more domestic role; not regarded important enough to fit into foreign politics. To end the Habsburg Empire’s war-supremacy, the Swedish and the French started to collaborate, even if it was painstakingly slow in the first years of 1629-1630. This matter is absolutely important though, because it might have started a major change in the Thirty-Years War: The initial religious quarrels became less important and overrun by other motivational factors such as protection of the homeland and political survival. This aspect factor was to develop the longer the war went and generally the people involved would care less about the religious differences the harder the war struck them. It is very hard to speculate to what extent the Swedish and French relations had been responsible for starting this change, but they produced the first and biggest non-religious coalition throughout the whole war. Several similar coalitions would be created later in Germany, of which the Prague peace in 1634 is an example, which would satisfy political interests and not religious ones. There was also a drastic increase in the appearance of catholic soldiers on the protestant side and vice versa.

In 1628, the religious factor was still reasonably influential and it did not make the Swedish and French negotiations any easier: Talks often stranded over religious differences and at some occasions it went as far as blood-spattered skirmishes between the delegations. This was not the only problem: The diplomacy at the time was a very slow and unreliable procedure and promises were often broken. Moreover, the Swedish and French diplomats were particularly stubborn and did not accept bad deals. These matters became less of a problem towards the end of the war but they should still be taken into account when investigating any diplomatic meeting between Sweden and France.

The first such diplomatic meeting which gave a considerable result was in Bärwalde in 1631. The Swedish had successfully invaded Germany a year earlier but were now in economic crisis. Richelieu was on his side more willing to support the Swedish king knowing of his military success, and on the other Gustav Adolph desperately needed the French money: The conditions were excellent for a diplomatic agreement. After a substantial quarrel on whether the Swedish or the French king were to be mentioned first in the contract, an agreement was reached: The Swedish would keep an army (35 000 soldiers) in Germany in exchange for French subsidies of 400000 thales every year from 1631 to 1635. 400000 thales was not an awful lot of money, but it came in just the right moment for the Swedish: Now, the soldiers who were on the verge of rioting after having their salaries postponed, could finally be paid. Bärwalde had a striking effect on the 30-Year War because without the 400000 thales the Swedish army might have dissipated due to bad economy leading to Sweden being pushed out of the war. And if this would have happened in 1631, when France had not joined the conflict yet, the war could have abruptly ended with a Hapsburgan victory in Germany because there was simply no one strong enough to oppose them other than Sweden or France. It is then likely that the emperor would have pushed on his plans to conquer the Baltic Sea having secured success in Germany.

Instead, through Bärwalde, the Swedish army could carry on pillaging Germany and also defeated a German-catholic army in the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631. For a couple of years after this battle the Swedish would remain the strongest military force in Germany, conquering large areas and important towns all the way down to Bavaria.

Swedish and French diplomats discussed what to do with the occupied land. Richelieu wanted to trim the states close to France into a buffer zone to the German Empire. All he really cared about at this point was to secure France from the empire, not to destroy it. The Swedish found out about these plans of Richelieu from a couple of inexperienced French diplomats and were not happy: It had been thought that France was going to support Sweden with an offensive army. With these anticipations gone, the relations cooled off for the next few years and the visiting French diplomats were ill-treated. The Swedish king said: “The French are not to be trusted“ and put the diplomacy aside.  

These deteriorating diplomatic relations led to decreased Swedish-French military and civil cooperation, which definitely affected the war in general. Most importantly, since France did not want to give military support, the Swedish started to look for allies within Germany that could give military support. The death of the Swedish king, Gustav Adolph, accelerated this process. Under the leadership of Axel Oxenstierna, the chancellor of Sweden and Gustav Adolph’s successor, the so-called Heilbronn Alliance was set up in 1633. This alliance included most protestant states in Germany and its main aim was to resist the emperor’s influence. The alliance was very weak though and most members abandoned it after the Swedish defeat in the battle of Nördlingen in 1634. One could argue that the Swedish initiative to set up the Heilbronn Alliance instead of developing its relations with France, was a mistake, resulting in the emperor gaining the upper hand in the war by the end of 1634. By then he had reconquered most of the northern German, protestant states and forced them to join his side in the so-called Prague Alliance. One aim of this alliance was to force out Sweden from the conflict and for the next few years this was nearly achieved. This was probably the closest the emperor ever got to win the war, but Sweden survived on small margins that were possibly the size of the French subsidies. There were, however, many factors adding up to the Swedish survival and France is only one of these.

In any case the Swedish needed all help they could get at this point and Oxenstierna went to Compiègne to meet Richelieu and re-establish good relations. There were small objective results from these talks, but Oxenstierna and Richelieu came along well and this should not be underestimated: Their friendship put Swedish and French foreign policy on the same course and ensured the continuation of an alliance between the two countries. Richelieu’s comment on Oxenstierna hints on mutual trust and friendship: “There is nothing I would not do for (…) Axel Oxenstierna” 

In 1635 there was an important diplomatic meeting in Stuhmdorf, which concerned the Swedish ability to continue the war in Germany. The six year long cease-fire between Sweden and Poland, which had been signed in 1629, was now over and the Polacks, well informed of the Swedish trouble in Germany, were more than willing to take up arms again and retake Prussia, which had been lost to Sweden in the previous war. This was not only a concern for the Swedish, but for the French aswell: Richelieu knew that he could not count on support from a country engaged in two wars at the same time. He therefore sent the experienced diplomat Claude d’Avaux with instructions to urge the Swedish to create a prolonged ceasefire with Poland and to continue the war in Germany at all cost. D’Avaux, who had been situated in Stockholm for half a year, knew how to deal with and trick the Swedish diplomats and Oxenstierna already suspected that “...D’Avaux will try and corrupt someone who has a say in the government, with French pensions, for that they are masters of, and they are not ashamed of it...” And in the following Polish-Swedish negotiations, d’Avaux managed to convince the Swedish to leave all of Prussia to Poland without a fight in exchange for a 26 years long ceasefire. On the one hand the deal had been hard-hitting for the Swedish but on the other they now could continue the war in Germany. A war with Poland at the same time would most certainly force the Swedish to withdraw from Germany or to stay there with a very passive role. Since d’Avaux had been a key figure in completing these talks, one can argue that the Swedish and French diplomatic relations had been an important factor in making Sweden staying in the war in 1635.

In 1636 France finally declared war on the German-Empire. Sweden had a significant role in making France go to war. One of the most important factors for this development was the known fact that the Swedish military campaign had already exhausted a large part of the emperors military and financial resources. The diplomatic relations were also important, and after talks in Wismar earlier that year, ensuring Swedish and French friendship, Richelieu had vaguely promised the Swedish to go to war in Germany. There were many reasons for the French declaration of war, but one can certainly argue that the stubborn Swedish diplomats were important in whimpering up a French sympathetic final decision.

Initially the French war effort went badly: The French military was almost completely defeated and Richelieu considered peace as an alternative. But the Swedish victory at Wittstock in 1636 forced Ferdinand’s field marshals to withdraw a significant amount of troops to the other front, and this saved the French military. This marked the beginning of a military cooperation between Sweden and France that would last until the end of the war. This was absolutely imperative in deciding the outcome of the war because now, militarily at least, the upper hand was with the Swedish and the French. The diplomatic relations were, as stated above, in many ways responsible for creating this military coalition, so they are perhaps even more important in turning the tide of war.

The Wismar negotiations in 1636 were strengthened and concluded in Hamburg by the French diplomat d’Avaux and the Swedish diplomat Adler Salvius. This proved significant, because a couple of months afterwards, a big German-Roman delegation appeared in Hamburg and proposed a separate peace between Sweden and the German Empire. Many in the Swedish government supported peace and were tempted to accept the proposal, something that could very well have happened, had it not been for the Swedish-French diplomacy in Wismar and Hamburg which forced the Swedish government to deny the offers made.

The emperor had a backup plan though, in which he sought to use Denmark as an intercessor in peace-talks between himself and Sweden, thinking the Swedish would listen more with Denmark involved. To some extent he was right; the Swedish showed more interest than previously and plans were drawn up for a peace conference in Lübeck. The French, who had not been invited to this conference, were worried and d’Avaux was ordered to sabotage these peace plans. Lübeck failed for many reasons, but one is certainly d’Avaux actions: He “hindered the peace negotiations” by getting himself into a brawl with one of its organisers, Adler Salvius. With Salvius tied up in the brawl the emperor tried to negotiate with the Swedish military instead. The problem was that the Swedish field marshal, Banér, was a warrior, not very interested in peace compared to the peace-loving Salvius. The negotiations went back and forth and by 1641 there had not been any real decision on the matter. The Swedish-French relations were considerably strengthened though, with the notable agreement back in Hamburg: The Swedish promised to continue the war in Germany until the emperor had been defeated, for yearly subsidies of 480000 thales. So the Hamburg agreements had resulted in that “Swedish cooperation with the French had been strengthened”, while peace talks with the emperor had been postponed. So again, the Swedish-French diplomatic relations prolonged the war, preventing peace from happening in 1637.

In 1642 Sweden went to war with Denmark mostly because of the two countries conflicting foreign policies. This did not have a great impact on the Swedish war in Germany because the emperor had been severely weakened militarily by several smaller defeats both against the French and the Swedish. Richelieu was against a Swedish war with Denmark, and sent the diplomat Thuillerie to propose peace talks between the two. Both sides accepted and peace was signed in 1645. It is hard to conjecture on the importance of France serving as an intercessor in these peace talks but it is arguable that this peace would have been postponed without the French involvement. With this peace, Sweden could again concentrate on Germany where troops were needed.

The Hamburg agreements had worked as a preliminary agreement for the greater peace talks that would take place in 1644 to 1648 in Westphalia. The talks were made complicated by the fact that the war was still raging in Germany at the time and it continued throughout the whole peace conference. The Swedish and French were mainly responsible for this warfare, and carried through several attacks into Bavaria and Bohemia and partly occupied the emperor’s capital Prague. This was very advantageous for Sweden and France, who got themselves better peace conditions. The peace was finally completed in 1648 and it was certainly advantageous for Sweden and France: Both of them got money to pay their soldiers salaries and some areas bordering the German empire. The northern-German states were also promised religious freedom and non-Habsburgan, self-rule. Many historians would agree on that the war had been successful for France and Sweden mainly because the Habsburgan threat and expansion had been stopped via the Peace in Westphalia. Also, Sweden and France had managed to keep most of the actual fighting outside their borders so that their towns and land had remained secure: There was not a great deal of physical damage in Sweden and France after the war.

4. Conclusion

The research question can by no means be fully answered due to the limitations this investigation includes: The Swedish-French diplomatic relations probably affected many more areas in the 30-Years War than those discussed in this essay. But hardly any of these can be proven. The matters discussed in this essay are those that can be supported with evidence. In the introduction these matters were shown as hypotheses, and here these hypotheses are answered. The Swedish-French cooperation in the Thirty-Years War affected:

The religious importance in the war. The Swedish and the French, who were two of the more important powers involved, were clearly not fighting the war on religious basis. If these two countries had not cooperated, the war would therefore have been more religious in character. I therefore find support for the hypothesis that religion had a secondary importance in the war for these two countries.

The geographical location of where the war was fought. The locations certainly changed by Swedish-French cooperation, but it is hard to know exactly how. One could argue that the war would have spread northwards if the emperor’s plans on conquering the Baltic Sea would have been carried through. However, these plans were wrecked by the Swedish and French coordinated counter-attacks into Germany. Also, Sweden might have spread the war into Poland if the French diplomat d’Avaux had not ensured ceasefire between the two countries.

The length of the war. Swedish-French cooperation was a key factor in the two countries military survival in 1634-1636, and this prevented the emperor from ending the war with an advantageous peace for himself. Instead, the war went on. When the emperor proposed a separate peace with the Swedish in 1637 they denied, partly because they felt strong enough with their French aid to get themselves better peace conditions than those proposed by the emperor. In fact, the Swedish and French governments had the power to end the war practically whenever they wanted after 1637, but since their coordinated armies were sacking Germany at the time, bringing home prosperity, they were reluctant to do so. The emperor was not strong enough to resist both Sweden and France. The duration of the war was thus clearly extended due to the Swedish-French cooperation.

The outcome of the war. In 1634, after Nördlingen and the Prague Alliance, Sweden was about to be pushed out of Germany and the Swedish defeat would probably bring the war to an end. However, the Swedish recovered, and with French armed support the tide of war was turned. The final outcome can basically be considered to have turned completely from the expected outcome in 1634. The Swedish recovery was largely dependent on the French, and it is very doubtable that Sweden would ‘win’ the war without French support: “If Sweden wanted to fulfil its (…) war-aims, this could only happen through cooperation with France” The war aims were fulfilled, but it is impossible to know how much of this was due to the cooperation with France; there are no sources (at least that I used) which go into detail on this matter.

All-in-all, it is clear that the Swedish and French diplomatic relations had a very significant influence on major aspects of the war, not least turning it into the “30” Years War it has been called ever since.

 

Bibliography:

Litterature:

• Ahnlund, Nils: Tradition och historia, Nordstedts, 1956
• Englund, Peter Ofredsår, Atlantis, 1993
• Tapié, Victor Louis: La France de Louis XIII et de Richelieu, Champs Flammarion, 1980
• Tham, Wilhelm: Den Svenska Utrikespolitikens Historia, Boktryckeriet P.A, 1960
• Tunberg, Sven: Histoire de l’administration des Affaires Étrangères de Suède, Almquist &Wiksell, 1940
• Wetterberg, Gunnar: Kanslern Axel Oxenstierna, Atlantis, 2002
• Wetterberg, Gunnar: Levande 1600-tal, Atlantis, 2003.

 

Internet:

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Abstract

In the Thirty-Years War (1618-1648), Sweden and France fought on the same side against the Habsburg Empire. The cooperation was both military and financial: Sweden maintained an army in Germany fighting the Habsburg Empire in exchange for French financial subsidies. The cooperation satisfied both Swedish and French foreign interests because it supported and strengthened the fight against the Habsburg Empire, which both Sweden and France resented. This investigation puts focus on how their cooperation affected the war in general:

How did Swedish and French diplomatic relations affect the Thirty-Years War?

Most of the research to this investigation supported that the answer to this question must be somewhat vague and without a distinct answer. There are rather several diverse matters in the Thirty Years War that were affected by the Swedish and French diplomatic relations. These matters are: The importance of religion in the war; the geographical location of where the war was fought; the length of the war; and the outcome of the war. These areas approach the research question in different ways which are analysed in this essay.

In general terms, the Swedish-French cooperation was an advantage for Sweden and France, and a disadvantage for the Habsburg Empire. This affected the geographical location of where the war was fought, the length of the war and the outcome of the war. The importance of religion in the war was in all probability decreased by the Swedish-French cooperation, but it is hard to support such a statement with foolproof evidence.

Illustrations

Axel Oxenstierna                                                           Armand Jean du Plessis Richelieu

                                                                             

Claude D’Avaux                                                              Adler Salvius

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