How far did both Hitler and Stalin have consistent foreign policies?Discuss with reference to the period 1933-1941.
Question:-
How far did both Hitler and Stalin have consistent foreign policies?
Discuss with reference to the period 1933-1941.
In the study of 20th-century history there can be no foreign policy's more influential to the geo-political map than those of Hitler and Stalin. As the autocratic leaders of Germany and Russia, both of which were potential superpowers, the power wielded by them, in their own country and on the world stage, shaped the development of Europe in the last century
The period specified in the question has obviously not been selected at random, as January 30th 1933 saw Hitler become Chancellor of Germany, heralding the dawn of the Third Reich and by the end of 1941Germany was at war with Russia and had just declared war on the United States of America. Stalin had seen his former ally invade Russia and had consequently transferred his country's allegiance to reconvene the allies of the First World War. In discussion of the question posed, this essay will first explore the positions of Hitler and Stalin in 1933 and the circumstances that had formed these positions. It will then move onto the aims and ideologies of the two leaders within the timeframe of 1933 to 1939. The years of 1939 to 1941 will be discussed as a period, as the two leaders foreign policies became entwined before violently diverging.
According to the Pocket Oxford Dictionary the adjective 'consistent' is defined as, "compatible or in harmony" or alternatively, "constant to the same principles". Using these definitions in the study of the two leaders foreign policies a theme emerges, this theme is based in the contrast between the rigid ideologies of Hitler
and Stalin, set against their personal pragmatism and opportunism in the short-term pursuit of their ideological goals. Due to the evolutionary nature of foreign policy, it is important to look at earlier factors, before studying the period stipulated by the question. The first of these is the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on the third of March 1918, which extracted Bolshevik Russia from the First World War. It was entered into by the Russians in order to consolidate the revolutionary government and in signing it Russia capitulated to Germany. It represented a trade-off between time against land and proved expensive for Russia, as she surrendered all the territories gained since the 16th century, including Finland, the Ukraine and the Polish and Baltic territories, in total one million square kilometres and one-third of her population. These terms would be remembered by the Russian government and in particular Stalin in later years. The Treaty of Versailles was condemned for its severity, however the terms imposed on Russia by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty were far harsher.
The Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28th of June 1919, brought the First World War to an end. The German delegation to the peace conference set out, "in the firm belief that the settlement would be a negotiated one." (The Road to War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 27). This was not to be; under threat of Allied invasion the German representatives were forced to cede to the allies and submit to terms of a diktat. The German view of the armistice as a truce was dismissed by article 231, The War Guilt Clause, which laid the blame for World War One on Germany. In order to settle this account with the allies an eighth of German European territory
was divided up and given to France, Belgium, Denmark, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The loss of the port of Danzig, as it became a 'free city' under the newly formed League of Nations, and the corridor which linked it to Poland particularly rankled with Germany, nationalists referring to it as the "open wound in the east". (The Road to War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 2). Union with Austria was forbidden, the Rhineland was demilitarised and the Saar basin was placed under international control, resulting in the loss of its iron and steel industry. In conjunction with The War Guilt Clause reparations were demanded from Germany totalling 132 billion gold marks, with a payment plan stretching to 1988. There were also strict limitations imposed on Germany's armed forces, including the numbers retained, a ban on conscription, limitations of ships tonnage and the banning of all aircraft, airships and submarines. Her borders were also redrawn resulting in 13% of the German population being marooned beyond the original German borders, making them ethnic minorities of their new countries. The treaty was neither conciliatory nor crushing in its treatment of Germany, producing a "vengeful Germany" (The Origins of the Second World War. A W. Perdue, page 13), bitter at her treatment by the allies,
It was this profound sense of injustice that infused all Germany's foreign policy during the years that followed. (The Road To War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 28).
Two other treaties, which had a bearing on later foreign policy, were the Rappallo Treaty of April 1922 and the Locarno Treaty of December 1925. Rapallo is
significant as it signalled the re-emergence of the signatories, Russia and Germany, from the wilderness of defeat and revolution back to the political stage. The importance of the Locarno Treaty is drawn from its ability to please all parties involved, including a German delegation. Among its stipulations was that Germany should be accepted into the League of Nations, this helped to encourage the feeling that the Germans were now "treated as equals, not the defeated enemy" (The Origins of the Second World War. AJP Taylor, page 83).
Hitler became Chancellor Germany on January 30th 1933, in a period of economic decline he offered 'bread and work' whilst stirring up old feelings of bitterness against the victors of World War One coupled with reminders of Germany's period of humiliation. At the time of his ascension to power Hitler's aims and ideology can be divided into five areas, the first and most immediate of which was for Germany to become a great power again. This was a broad aim encompassing economic restructure and growth, rearmament and the acceptance by the German people of the Nazi ideology of ...
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Hitler became Chancellor Germany on January 30th 1933, in a period of economic decline he offered 'bread and work' whilst stirring up old feelings of bitterness against the victors of World War One coupled with reminders of Germany's period of humiliation. At the time of his ascension to power Hitler's aims and ideology can be divided into five areas, the first and most immediate of which was for Germany to become a great power again. This was a broad aim encompassing economic restructure and growth, rearmament and the acceptance by the German people of the Nazi ideology of 'Social Darwinism' and the concept of the Aryan 'Master' race. The second aim was the reversion of the Versailles Treaty, important as it symbolised all that was negative in recent German history and, by its conditions, it restricted the country's growth and separated her people. Hitler's concept of 'lebensraum', or living space, had been sketched out in Mein Kampf eight years before and was an integral element of his plans for Germany to become a world power, "without space Germany would decline however strong her racial stock" (The Road to War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 44). His fourth aim was
closely associated with the lebensraum's expansion eastwards, as it was the destruction of communism. The ideologies of fascism and communism were diametrically opposed and Hitler also believed that Bolshevik Russia was part of the 'Jewish world conspiracy'. Settlement of the 'Jewish problem' is the last of the five aims and it can be seen that it runs in harmony with Hitler's views concerning racial purity, lebensraum and the destruction of communism.
Although Hitler's aims remained consistent from the 1920's throughout, during his early years in power priority was given to the rebuilding of Germany economically, as he needed to consolidate his party's political power and without a strong base Germany would be unable to pursue any of his further aims in foreign policy. "During the years of economic recovery and political stabilisation German foreign policy remained restrained and circumspect." (The Road To War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 39). Openly speeches were made on the revisionist policies towards Versailles, always tempered with talk of peace and allies, whilst in private, although vague, Hitler spoke of conquest in the east, Germanisation, rearmament and the annulment of Versailles. In line with his future plans for Germany Hitler's first steps into foreign policy withdrew Germany from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations, on the grounds of parity in arms. His consistent anti-Soviet rhetoric severely damaged relations with Russia formed by the Rappallo treaty, which was eventually destroyed by Germany's non-aggression pact with Poland, signed in January 1934. This was the first of a number of pacts signed to prevent Soviet attempts at collective security and was an example of long-term
ideological goals, i.e. lebensraum, being pursued at the expense of frontier revision. It seemed to be an about face in policy and was unpopular as Poland held large areas of land, formally part of Germany, but to Hitler it was an important buffer between Germany and Soviet Russia. By 1936 both Hitler's and the Nazi's power had been consolidated, Germany's economy was in a much stronger position and a strident rearmament program had just begun. Coupled with Germany's secure foundation was Britain and France's desire to uphold peace in Europe above all else, demonstrated by their uncoordinated and weak response to Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935. Sensing an opportunity, presented by the preoccupation of international politics with the Abyssinian crisis, Hitler decided to restore full German sovereignty to the Rhineland. Even though this action violated both the treaty's of Versailles and Locarno the gamble paid off, as it provoked only verbal protests from the British and French governments. Fuelled by his success, the initiative in German foreign policy from 1936 passed to Hitler embarked on an active and aggressive pursuit of his goals, prompted by the opportunities presented by a failing League of Nations and Britain and France's weakness due to economic crisis, and political instability. There was also an underlying feeling in Europe that some revision of Versailles was necessary and the fear of a second war in thirty years amongst the British and French politicians weakened their position. For Hitler a war was inevitable if Germany was to realise her potential and his plans, it was only the timing that was flexible, as in his view war was "a necessity, a natural outcome of the competition between races."
(The Road to War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 45). With the knowledge of Germany's limits and the rest of Europe's fears Hitler was astute enough to recognise, "the role of circumstances and opportunity in international affairs." (The Road to War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 45). This consistency in ideological aims pursued by flexible opportunism in foreign policy would become a hallmark for Hitler's actions throughout the period 1933 to 1941. On the fifth of November 1937 an infamous meeting took place, during which Hitler outlined his immediate plans to his commanders-in-chief. These included the annexation of Austria, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the gain of European lebensraum and a major conflict with the great powers, to occur no later than 1943/45. The authenticity of the document which recorded this meeting, known as the Hossbach memorandum, has been disputed, but even if it is not entirely accurate it is still a testament to the consistency of Hitler's ideological goals. The achievement of these goals through the opportunist application of foreign policy was also consistent as Austria was marked out to become a province of the Third Reich, an objective "he had stated on page one of Mein Kampf fourteen years before". (Hitler and Stalin Parallel Lives. Bullock, page 617). The Anschlus was achieved in March 1938 by a mixture of political chicanery and Nazi bullyboy tactics employed against Austria's politicians. Austro-German unity was specifically forbidden under the terms of the treaty of Versailles, but again the action only provoked verbal chastisement. The previous year Eden had told Ribbentrop "people in England recognised that a close connection between Germany and Austria would have to come at some time."
(Europe 1880 to 1945. Roberts, page 427). Buoyed by the ease of his success, achieved under the pretext of uniting the German people, liberation of the three and a quarter million Germans of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia became the next item on Hitler's foreign policy agenda. Originally Czechoslovakia was the goal but Hitler settled for the Sudetenland at the Munich conference, mainly because he could not be sure of the Soviet response if he used force and the possibility of war on two fronts, a repeat of a major World War One mistake, was to be avoided at all costs. Even though Britain and France stood their ground against Germany's use of force and saw it as a victory, "peace in our time," Hitler had again collected the spoils of war without a fight. The appeasement policy of Britain and France at Munich showed a further extent to their weakness to him, which he intended to exploit further in 1939.
A search for security against Nazi aggression and expansion was the great continuity in Soviet policy from 1933-41, not a quest for alliance with the future enemy. (The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War. G. Roberts, page 4).
Nevertheless Soviet Russia's alliance with Nazi Germany was the result of Stalin's pursuit of his aims and foreign policy of the 1930s. In 1933 Stalin's aims bore more than a passing resemblance to Hitler's, the most constant and overriding of which was to maintain the security of the Soviet nation. This concern bordered on paranoia at times, but it was understandable to a degree, as Soviet Russia was the only communist country, with a completely different ideology in a capitalist world.
There were advantages to this ideological isolation as Stalin had been able to carry out the rebuilding of the country without worrying too much about foreign policy or events outside his borders. There is no doubt that another of Stalin's aims was for Russia to become a great world power, if only to reflect his own personal success and the success of communism as a practical ideology. Coupled with this aim was the reversion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, which had deprived Russia of land, and resources. Once established as world power opportunities may arise to reclaim the lost territories. The rise of fascism in the twenties and thirties and its condemnation of communism made it a threat to Russian security, therefore its containment and defeat was an aim, as the security of the nation was paramount. Finally, the aim to spread world communism was a stated objective of communist ideology; the initial hope that the 1917 revolution would spark others had not occurred, but this ideological objective remained a constant factor in Soviet foreign policy.
Stalin's foreign policy throughout the 1930s can be seen as a complex balancing act, whereby he endeavoured to maintain Russia's semi-isolated stance but was prepared to be more involved in world and European politics in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe and thereby safeguard Soviet interests. The ideological differences between Soviet Russia and the other countries of Europe always meant that Stalin was suspicious of their motives, his view regarding any dealings with capitalist countries was that they were to be entered into with a healthy mistrust. By the end of 1933 Hitler and the Nazi party's publicly stated anti-communist stance had prompted Soviet Russia to embark on the foreign policy
of collective security, i.e. "to the construction of a system of alliances with other states designed to curb Nazi aggression and expansionism." (The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War. Bullock, page 47). The first evidence of this policy was the Soviet entry into the League of Nations in September 1934. Russia's policy of collective security from 1933-39 was based in a belief that the imperialist nations had divided into two camps, the 'aggressive' containing Germany, Japan and Italy and the 'democratic' with Britain, France and the United States of America as members. As it was the 'aggressive' camp that threatened Soviet security, Russia's interests became aligned with those of the 'democratic' camp. For Stalin there was a concern over alliance with the 'democratic' countries, as in their future efforts to avoid a war they may steer the 'aggressive' alliance eastwards towards Russia. A situation that would leave her alone to fight their war, should they renegade on their collective security responsibilities. In an effort to counter this problem Stalin's foreign policy was to 'hedge his bets' by maintaining efforts to improve German/Soviet relations while signing non-aggression pacts, containing little or no Russian commitment to assistance in the event of war. The period of appeasement by France and Britain and their hidden agenda of directing the 'aggressive' powers eastwards did nothing to quell Stalin's fears over the failure of collective security. Although powerless to prevent either the remilitarisation of the Rhineland or the Anschlus of Austria, both Russia and France had commitments to Czechoslovakia through mutual assistance treaties. The noncommittal French response to Soviet enquiries regarding a combined action in defence of
Czechoslovakia from Germany and the subsequent 'betrayal' of the country at Munich signalled to Stalin that his fears over collective security were likely to be realised. From the Soviet point of view, the Munich crisis presented the last chance to stop Hitler without all-out war, although collective security, as a policy was not formally abandoned after Munich, Soviet foreign policy was now directed to finding a war fighting alliance. "Collective security was superseded by strategy of collective defence." (The Unholy Alliance. G. Roberts, page 93). In order to maintain his long-term goals Stalin's ideology would be required to be flexible.
The period of 1939-41 is dominated, in terms of Hitler and Stalin's foreign policy, by the formation and dissolution of the German/Russian Non-Aggression Pact, signed on the 23rd of August 1939. Initially, the notion of a pact between these two opposed ideologies, publicly committed to the eradication of one another, seemed improbable at the least. Therefore the pacts existence stands as testimony to the pragmatism of both Hitler and Stalin, both of whom had never dismissed the possibility and thereby compromised their respective ideologies with practical foreign policies.
The Soviet choice in August '39 was a rational, even predictable one.
It was avowedly opportunistic but Stalin had never pretended that soviet foreign policy was anything else. (The Road to War. Overy and Wheatcroft, page 246).
Stalin's decision to enter into a pact with his ideological enemy was based on the following reasoning. The failure of collective security, still pursued by the Soviet
Union until the middle of August '39, in the face of British time wasting and the Polish refusal to grant passage to Red Army troops, enabling them to advance on Germany. Even if a settlement could be reached with Britain and France what could they offer Stalin? At best, the hostility of Germany and at worst involvement in a European war, their preparations for which appeared inadequate and based on defensive rather than aggressive tactics, neither of these facts gave Stalin any confidence in their proposals. Another factor was the fear that Britain and France would abandon the Soviet Union in a combined stand against the imminent German action against Poland. The appeasement policy may be used to encourage Germany's interests eastwards, so in signing the pact both of these threats were removed, even if, with regard to Germany's interest in the east, the respite was temporary. During the hasty negotiations Stalin also managed to obtain German guarantees on a 'Soviet sphere of influence' in the Baltic States, Finland and eastern territories of Poland, detailed in a secret additional protocol to the pact, revising the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.
For Hitler, the most immediate reason for the forming of the pact lay in the premise that without Soviet support Britain and France would not take military action against him when his plan for Poland was executed. It would also remove the possibility of a 'two front war', for which he did not have sufficient resources, however lebensraum and the destruction of communism could be pursued again, once the threat from Britain and France had been neutralised. Any chance of an encirclement of Germany by Allied countries would be thwarted and the
psychologically damaging revival of First World War entente between Britain, France and Russia could not returned to haunt him. Safe in the knowledge that he had tamed Stalin and the non-aggression pact was signed and sealed Hitler's forces invaded Poland on the first of September 1939. Originally planned for 26th of August the invasion was put back until the pact with Stalin was complete, such was its significance. This time verbal protests were followed by an ultimatum, and on the third of September Britain and France declared war on Germany, an act that surprised Hitler who had expected appeasement, as before.
The pacts lifespan was less than two years, destroyed by Hitler's invasion of Russia on the 22nd June 1941. Named Operation Barbarossa, it signalled the return of Hitler to his ideology demonstrated by foreign policy. In the last six months of the pact Stalin had tried to extend the Soviet sphere of influence to the Balkans, making demands on Germany, mistakenly in the belief that Hitler needed him more than he needed Hitler. The demands were read as threatening and only added to the list of reasons for the implementation of Operation Barbarrossa. These included, Hitler's theory that Soviet or American intervention was seen as a prop for Britain which she may have been holding out for, therefore the destruction of Russia removed one of these props and would allow Japan freedom to concentrate on America. Other factors were lebensraum, racial and political hatred, and Hitler was also worried that once Britain was defeated he would be incapable of rousing the German people to fight Russia. Hitler had rationalised the 'two front war', something that his foreign policy had previously been consistent in its avoidance of.
Although wary of using the term alliance, Churchill immediately agreed to fight alongside Stalin, paving the way to the rekindling of the World War One entente between Britain, France and Russia.
Hitler's last significant act of foreign policy before the end of 1941 was the declaration of war on the United States of America on the 11th of December. It came four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and initially the decision may be seen as an act of hubris. To Hitler, the declaration was seen as an opportunity to formalise the state of relations already in existence with America, due to her support of Britain, whilst retaining the advantage of control of the situation. As von Ribbentrop told Weizsacker at the time, "A great power doesn't let itself have war declared on it, it declares war itself." (Hitler Nemesis. Ian Kershaw, page 446). A revised tripartite pact tied Germany to war with the USA, as a partner of Japan, so after Japan's declaration of war it was therefore inevitable. Hitler's miscalculation lay in the presumption that Japan would reciprocate and declare war on Britain and that the USA would concentrate her efforts, and underestimated resources, in the Pacific rather than Europe. The decision to declare war on the USA was both pragmatic and opportunistic although it had no foundation in Hitler's original ideology making it a departure from the consistent decision-making process he had previously employed.
Hitler was in effect re-doubling the odds on a gamble which had already failed in 1941. After committing Germany to war with Russia before defeating
Britain, he had now also committed her to war with the USA before defeating either Britain or Russia. (Hitler and Stalin Parallel Lives. Bullock, page 858).
When studying the various books concerning Hitler and Stalin's foreign policy certain words such as, opportunist, pragmatic, consistent and ideology are conspicuous by their repeated usage. For the foreign policies of either leader to be consistent they had to be based in a definitive ideology, which although very different, both had and maintained their pursuit of. However, implementation of these long-term ideological aims was carried out, in the short-term, by the use of opportunist and pragmatic foreign policy. The German/Soviet non-aggression pact stands out as the pinnacle of opportunist foreign policy, pragmatically agreed, to facilitate the short-term objectives for both leaders. It also required Hitler and Stalin to compromise their stated ideologies, if only for less than two years, a bold step, for which the ends were seen to justify the means. If a consistent foreign policy is the product of a fixed ideology then the non-aggression pacts compromise of Hitler and Stalin's ideology must result in an inconsistent foreign policy. As both leaders proved in 1941 that they remained consistent in their long-term ideology it can be said that both Hitler and Stalin were consistent in their long-term ideological goals, whilst the instrument of their pursuit of these goals, foreign policy, was flexible and used in a consistently pragmatic and opportunistic manner.
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